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Multiple Acquisitions, Market Valuations and Managerial 
Overconfidence: The Wealth Effects of the UK Merger Activity 
By Dimitris Petmezas 
Abstract 
In this thesis we investigate shareholders' wealth effects of UK acquiring firms engaged in 
Mergers and Acquisitions and potential factors that affect their performance. More 
specifically, we analyse bidder gains and losses for acquisitions of firms with different 
ownership status (i. e. public, private and subsidiaries) and when alternative methods of 
payment are used in the transaction. We also place emphasis on the performance of firms 
that conduct a substantial number of acquisitions during a short span of time (i. e. frequent 
bidders). These firms constitute a large proportion of the entire UK takeover activity and 
therefore an examination of their share price performance reveals significant and 
interesting conclusions. We further seek to examine a potential source for the results 
obtained for bidding firms and we find that market conditions (i. e. stock price valuations) 
affect stock performance and drive acquisitions. Moreover, when comparing whether the 
stock market or the merger market is responsible for the return patterns obtained, we 
conclude that high or low market valuations lead bidders' returns. Finally, we offer a 
behavioural explanation (i. e. overconfidence) for the differing performance exhibited 
between casual acquiring firms and bidders carrying out many acquisitions (i. e. frequent 
acquirers). 
'In 
particular, we empirically examine whether psychological biases of the 
acquiring managers play an important role in merger activity. We use the high 
acquisitiveness of bidders as a direct proxy of overconfidence and compare their stock 
performance to casual bidders. On the whole, we suggest that overconfidence is strongly 
related to merger activity and conclude that aggressive acquisitions lead to lower abnormal 
returns. 
The material contained in this Thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree in 
this or any other University. 
The copyright of this Thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without his prior consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
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Chapter I 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
The central purpose of this thesis is to examine acquiring firms' stock performance and 
potential factors that affect shareholders' wealth. Existing literature has identified several 
determinants that drive bidders' performance and some of the most pronounced ones are 
related with the method of payment used in the transaction, the target ownership status or 
market valuations during an acquisition announcement. 
A small body of literature has recently emerged that examines the performance of 
acquiring firms engaging in many acquisitions. The use of a multiple acquirers' sample to 
examine major return determinants is novel as it allows looking into the wealth effects of 
merger characteristics within a largely homogeneous group of acquirers. Within this 
context, the performance of acquirers buying unlisted firms that behave differently to 
public acquisitions has been barely examined, especially in the UK- Further, there is a 
growing body in the literature suggesting that market valuations determine bidder's 
performance, while no evidence is provided for UK acquisitions on this matter. Very 
recently, some studies have tried to link managerial "overconfidence" with corporate 
acquisitions. However, there is not much information on what is the effect on 
shareholders' wealth of aequisitions initiated by overeonfident bidders, and, most 
importantly, on the way managerial overconfidence could be measured. We attempt to fill 
these gaps in Chapters 2,3 and 4. 
in Chapter 2 we examine shareholders' wealth effects of bidders initiating many 
acquisitions during a three-year period. In general, the largest body of the literature 
regarding short-run abnormal returns suggests that target firm shareholders experience 
gains (i. e. positive abnormal returns) around the acquisition announcement. However, we 
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argue that no clear conclusion can be made about the potential gains or losses of bidding 
firms. Due to the existence of a large amount of information surrounding merger 
announcements, we seek to isolate bidder characteristics by applying a sophisticated 
research design suggested by Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002). More specifically, we 
use a sample of bidders who make three or more bids within a three-year period acquiring 
public, private and/or subsidiary firms, and we observe how returns vary by target 
ownership status and method of payment. Fuller et al. (2002) argue that multiple bidders 
enjoy significant profits (i. e. positive abnormal returns) when acquiring private firms or 
subsidiaries. While Fuller et al. (2002) provide evidence of bidders' performance with 
respect to certain characteristics (i. e. method of payment, target public status), it cannot be 
ruled out that this result is sensitive and limited to the short-run performance. It is likely 
that stock prices temporarily deviate from their fundamental values due to investors' 
systematic over- or under-reaction to acquisition announcements. In such case, serious 
doubts arise towards the short-run window's ability to distinguish real economic gains 
from market inefficiency. We thus believe that Fuller et al. 's (2002) conclusion needs to 
be addressed with certain caution. As a consequence, we proceed to a complementary 
long-run analysis in order to reach a relatively thorough inspection of shareholders' wealth 
effects. 
We examine the largest feasible period (1985-2004) that Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) has data available for the UK merger market of multiple bidders. Such a 
comprehensive sample has not been studied before and it provides an updated insight of 
the merger activity covering also the takeover booming wave of the 1990s. The UK 
market appears to have a significant proportion of multiple acquisitions during this period. 
In our sample the firms that acquired three targets within a three-year period constitute 
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more than 40% of all the large, non-financial, non-utility takeovers in the UK as reported 
by SDC, providing a reliable testing ground for bidders' returns analysis. Another 
noticeable point is that we include in our sample private targets or subsidiaries, which are 
major components of the takeover market (more than 90% in our sample), but very few 
studies have taken this into account. 
We use a sample of 4,173 UK acquisitions and we confirm Fuller et al's (2002) results. 
Namely, we find that bidders significantly gain when buying private firms or subsidiaries, 
but experience losses when undertaking public acquisitions. When we further partition our 
results on the basis of the method of payment used in the transaction (cash, stock or 
combination of cash and stock), we find that acquisitions of public targets have 
significantly negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs), irrespective of the method 
of payment, while the worst performance is detected for those bidders using stock as the 
means of payment. Nevertheless, cash and mixed offers for private firms and subsidiaries 
generate significantly positive returns while insignificant returns are obtained when stock 
is used as the means of exchange. 
Moreover, when we examine acquirers' returns according to the relative size of the target 
to the bidder, we conclude that the larger the target relative to the bidder, the larger the 
abnormal returns experienced by the acquirer (i. e. the more negative abnormal returns for 
public acquisitions, the more positive CARs when they acquire private targets or 
subsidiaries). In contrast to the literature, the negative return is not so much driven by 
stock offers to public targets, as we also identify negative abnormal returns for cash offers. 
Another interesting observation is that unlike public targets, as the relative size increases, 
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bidders who acquire private targets or subsidiaries with stock experience greater abnonnal 
retums than bidders who acquire private targets with cash. 
Subsequently, we explore whether target origin (domestic/foreign targets) plays a 
significant role to shareholders' wealth. The UK has been one of the leading takeover 
markets over the last decades and therefore examining this issue could lead to remarkable 
conclusions. We are also interested in checking whether the results obtained above remain 
similar when we control for the target domicile. Diversifying/non-diversifying acquisitions 
are also investigated to confirm whether our above main patterns are altered. Overall, the 
general return pattern holds even when target domicile and industry are taken into 
consideration. 
Further, we examine whether our patterns stand when we control for bidders' book-to- 
market ratio. Such analysis is also used to further confirm the robustness of our initial 
hypothesis (i. e. the research design we follow allows us to control for much of the 
information about bidder characteristics contained in the returns at the acquisition 
announcement). Therefore, we examine the announcement returns of bidders with low 
book-to-market ratio against bidders with high book-to-market ratio. We detect that low 
book-to-market ratio acquirers significantly outperform high book-to-market acquirers for 
private targets and subsidiaries, while the opposite patterns are reported for bids of public 
targets. The overall results enhance our assumption that announcement market returns are 
not affected by bidders' characteristics and also that the general patterns stand when we 
control for book-to-market ratio. 
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However, when we employ a long-run investigation of bidder returns we come up with a 
completely different picture regarding shareholders' wealth. More specifically, we find 
negative abnormal returns irrespective of the target ownership status (i. e. public, private or 
subsidiary) or the method of payment used in the transaction. This is very likely to be 
associated with market overreaction experienced by private targets and/or subsidiaries at 
the merger announcement, which subsequently leads to negative abnormal returns. In 
addition, we find consistent with the literature that stock acquisitions lead, on average, to 
worse share price performance of bidding firms. 
Furthermore, we underline and provide evidence of the impact of method of payment on 
bidders' returns. For public targets our results are not driven by the use of stock as a fonn 
of financing as the related literature suggests, since we obtain negative abnormal returns 
for both cash and stock offers. On the other hand, we encounter an opposite pattern for 
private targets and subsidiaries, since the bidders exhibit positive performance for both 
cash and mixed payments (insignificant returns are obtained for share exchanges). 
In Chapter 3 we seek to identify whether some factors, namely market conditions (market 
valuations or merger waves) affect bidder performance and consequently shareholders' 
wealth. A large body of the literature documents that mergers occur when the stock market 
has an upward trend. Particularly, recent studies connect takeover activity with stock 
market performance. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) correlate high merger activity with 
high market valuations, while Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) develop a model in 
which firm-specific and market-wide misvaluations can cause merger waves. Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) suggest that the impact of market valuation depends on method of payment, 
the performance of acquirers, and the occurrence of merger waves. Finally, Rosen (2005) 
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suggests a merger momentum in prices, providing evidence that acquirer stock prices are 
more likely to increase when the merger is announced in high valuation markets as 
compared to low valuation markets (hot versus cold markets). Hence, we explore whether 
stock market valuations or merger waves drive the performance of the acquiring firm's 
shareholders. 
We employ a sample of 3,512 domestic acquisitions announced between I January, 1984, 
and 6 May, 2004, and investigate short- and long-run bidder returns. We classify the 
market into high-, neutral- or low-valuation periods based on the P/E ratio of the 
TOTMKUK index and, for robustness reasons, on the TOTMUK index itself. Each month 
is classified as high (low) valuation when it lies in the top (bottom) half of month with P/E 
ratios above (below) the past five-year average P/E. All other months are classified as 
neutral. In addition, we examine the share price performance of acquiring firms according 
to the level of merger activity they experienced. We classify each month as a hot or cold 
merger month respectively, after ranking each month according to the number of mergers, 
and identifying whether this month lies in the top or bottom 30% quartile with the largest 
or smallest number of mergers respectively. 
Overall, acquirers enjoy significant profits during the five-day window surrounding the 
event announcement. Consistent with the literature, we find significant gains for cash 
acquisitions, while negative CARs are obtained when stock is used in the transaction. 
When we split our sample on the basis of target type, we find that bidders experience 
positive abnormal returns when purchasing private firms or subsidiaries, but loss is 
experienced when public targets are acquired. On the whole, the return pattern is 
qualitatively similar to the one obtained in Chapter 2 for frequent acquirers. When we 
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partition the sample by the market's valuation at the acquisition announcement, we obtain 
positive and significant abnormal returns in high-valuation periods, while insignificantly 
positive CARs are obtained during low-valuations periods. Results are robust when we use 
both the P/E TOTMKUK index and the TOTMKUK index itself to characterize market 
valuation and also when a different event window (-20, +20) is engaged. Such a finding 
indicates that the market is likely to reward acquisitions undertaken during a bullish 
market, while it appears indifferent to acquisitions initiated when stock prices are low. 
Moreover, when we explore bidder performance taking into account the merger activity, 
we find that cold markets (i. e. markets with a small number of successful acquisitions) 
lead to larger positive abnormal returns than hot markets, reflecting that acquirers are more 
careful in the evaluation of synergies before they decide to proceed to the completion of an 
acquisition during cold merger periods. Finally, when we investigate the interrelationships 
between the overall state of stock market valuations and merger activity, we identify that 
during high valuation periods more positive abnormal returns are enjoyed regardless of the 
number of mergers completed, while an inverse relationship is not the case. As a 
consequence, we argue that stock prices and not merger activity drive bidder performance, 
although a link is likely to exist between them. 
Subsequently, we examine bidder returns in the long run. We find consistent to the results 
obtained in Chapter 2 that acquirers experience negative and significant abnormal returns. 
Nevertheless, we report a worse performance on average for acquisitions conducted during 
high-valuation periods than low-valuation periods. In general, when we control for 
payment method used or target public status, low-valuation acquisitions outperform on 
average high valuation acquisitions. This pattern stands after acquirer's market valuation 
(B/M) is taken into account. The initial generally positive reaction of the market to high- 
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valuation acquirers reflects that the market learns only gradually that many of the mergers 
undertaken during boom periods were imprudent and careless. In contrast, when stock 
prices are low, acquisitions lead to insignificantly positive announcement returns but, in 
the long-run, these acquisitions exhibit better performance. This indicates that the market 
learns over time that, despite its initial skepticism, these acquisitions can have better 
potential. For both high- and low-valuation acquisitions the market reaction at the 
announcement stands in contrast to the market's long-run view of the firm's performance. 
Further we confirm that our results are not just capturing long-run stock price reversals by 
calculating the pre-event performance of each acquirer in the high and low-valuation 
period for the six-month period preceding the acquisition announcement. High-valuation 
acquirers are ranked in order of their pre-event abnormal returns and placed into two 
groups. The same procedure is followed for low-valuation acquirers. We document that 
high valuation acquirers who generated high pre-event returns have negative abnormal 
returns consistent to long-term reversal. However, high-valuation acquirers who 
experienced negative pre-event returns also do poorly in the long-run, suggesting that the 
negative average abnormal returns cannot be attributed to long-term reversals of stock 
returns since the acquirers had negative returns prior to the merger announcement. We 
conclude that high-valuation acquirers underperform relative to low-valuation acquirers in 
the long-run because managers are making poorer acquisition decisions during high- 
valuation periods. 
Finally, we seek to identify a plausible reason for the underperformance of high-valuation 
acquirers relative to low-valuation acquirers in the long run. In particular, we suggest that 
managers are likely to engage in herding behaviour. This means that managers are likely 
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to follow a created herd during a merger for personal prestige reasons and because they do 
not want to be considered as players out of the "merger game". We document empirical 
evidence consistent with herding. More specifically, early movers, defined as the earliest 
10% of all acquisitions announced during a high-valuation wave, have significantly worse 
performance than late movers (the remaining 90% of high-valuation merger waves), as 
suggested by the significant difference reported when employing a zero investment 
portfolio. This finding constitutes a reasonable explanation for the return pattern obtained 
in the long-run. 
In Chapter 4, we argue that psychological biases function as deterministic factors of a 
manager's corporate decision to get involved with M&As. Managers' acquisitiveness (i. e. 
propensity to acquire companies) within a short span of time is used as a proxy of 
overconfidence in order to examine whether mergers serve the interests of the acquiring 
fin'n's shareholders when managers are overconfident. In general, the main intuition lying 
behind our conjecture is that overconfident managers overestimate their abilities to select 
profitable investments and the synergy gains between their company and a target. In 
addition, they are less likely to negotiate efficiently and realize decisions that are in a great 
contradiction to rational managers' beliefs. 
We classify managers as overconfident when they are frequent acquirers (i. e. conduct five 
or more acquisitions within a three-year period) according to the exact definition provided 
by Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002). Intensive acquisitiveness is a direct measure of 
overconfidence and consistent with Heaton (2002) who argues that overconfident 
managers undertake more corporate investment projects. A larger number of transactions 
is suggested by the asset pricing literature to characterize overconfident traders. In the 
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corporate investment context, we expect overconfident managers to undertake a 
significantly greater number of acquisitions. In addition, overconfidence is related to lower 
abnormal returns and therefore overconfident managers acquiring many firms during a 
short period of time experience less profits. 
Using merger data from SDC and DataStream and employing standard event study 
methodology we find that overconfident CEOs exhibit worse performance than rational 
bidders after controlling for several effects (i. e. method of payment, target origin, core 
industry, M/B value, relative size). Our finding is also enhanced when we investigate the 
difference in returns within a multiple-acquirer sample and more specifically between the 
first and fifth-and-higher deals. Since the market reacts to first-deals of multiple acquirers 
just as it would do to casual acquisitions, our result shows that first-in-order deals behave 
like casuals and outperform significantly subsequent acquisition attempts providing a 
robust interpretation for the existence of overconfidence as reflected by our proxy (i. e. 
frequent acquirers). 
Due to the fact that the dynamic acquisitiveness of frequent acquiring firms could be 
associated with a number of different reasons other than overconfidence (e. g. growth 
opportunities via a merger deal), we proceed with several robustness checks to provide 
evidence that various components characterizing the overconfidence notion go together 
with the behaviour of frequent bidders. In particular, consistent with the literature, 
overconfident managers exhibit proportionally higher debt capacity and strongly prefer 
cash or debt-financed mergers to stock deals. In addition, the bulk of the empirical 
evidence suggests that overconfident managers conduct diversifying acquisitions, a fact 
that is also strongly approved by our results. 
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Further, multiple acquirers are likely to be influenced by aggressive investment strategies, 
which lead them to overinvestment and lower future stock returns. Our findings approve 
that high capital expenditures characterize frequent bidders prior to their corporate 
transactions. Finally, acquiring firms that make many acquisitions within a short-time 
interval are likely to be governed by less efficient managers than those of casual-rational 
bidders. Our finding supports the hypothesis that frequent acquirers exhibit weaker 
corporate governance than casual bidders, providing one more plausible explanation for 
the return patterns obtained. 
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Chapter 2: Bidder Gains and Losses of Firms Involved in Many 
Acquisitions 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we examine shareholders' wealth effects (value creation or destruction) of 
bidding firms that make many acquisitions over a short time horizon (three-year period). 
In general, the examination of merger participants' performance has been one of the most 
controversial researched areas in finance. Whereas the view that dominates the literature 
regarding the short-run perspective is that target firm shareholders enjoy significant 
positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the merger announcement, the effect 
of merger announcements on acquiring firms' share prices is far from clear! On the one 
hand, some studies have reported that zero or small significant abnormal returns accrue to 
acquiring firm shareholders while. On the other hand, some other researchers have found 
that acquirers experience significant but small negative abnormal returns during the same 
period. 2 
At the acquisition announcement there is a very high variation and it is not feasible to 
completely attribute the stock returns to the expected effect of the acquisition on 
profitability, since the stock market is more about reassessing the bidder's business plan 
than it does about the value of the acquisition (Grinblatt and Titman, 2002). 3 In other 
1 Note that the terms bidder and acquirer are used interchangeably for the purpose of this study because all the 
bids in our analysis lead to a completed acquisition. 
2 For evidence on acquirers' short-run stock returns see, for example, Dodd and Ruback (1977), Asquith, Bruner 
and Mullins (1983), Dennis and McConnell (1986), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Franks and Harris (1989). 
For evidence of combined firms see, for example, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Mutherin and Boone (2000), 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (200 1). 
' in the literature the concept 'mergers' differs to the concept 'acquisitions', since the first is usually described 
as representing a 'friendly' union of two firms of roughly equal size, while the latter implies a more hostile 
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words, the announcement of an acquisition appears to contain information about numerous 
issues. For instance, according to Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003), a merger 
announcement reveals information about the bidder's overpayment, the stand-alone values 
of the bidder and target or potential synergies in the combination. Hence, it is often 
impossible to isolate the above effects from the observed abnormal returns. 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) applied a sophisticated research design to control 
for (much of) the information about bidder characteristics contained in stock returns at the 
acquisition announcement. 4 They investigated the returns to US frequent bidders making 
five or more bids within a three-year time horizon. As they argue, the sample of frequent 
bidders allows holding bidder characteristics constant when examining the pattern of 
5 announcement returns. In general, the authors conclude that bidders experience 
significant wealth loss when buying public targets, while they earn substantial gains when 
private and subsidiary targets are purchased. This is, however, a premature conclusion as 
short-run event study conclusions rely strictly on the assumption of market efficiency. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that stock prices temporarily deviate from their fundamental 
values due to investors' systematic over- or under-reaction to acquisition announcements. 
In such case, serious doubts arise towards a short-run window's ability to distinguish real 
economic gains from market inefficiency. Accordingly, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) 
posit that: "From a stock price perspective, the anticipation of real economic gains is 
observationally equivalent to market mispricing". This view indicates that, indeed, short- 
character of a takeover. Note, however, that we use the terms 'mergers' and 'acquisitions' interchangeably in 
our analysis. 
" Fuller et at. (2002) is the first major attempt in examining takeover announcement returns of multiple bidders 
involved in acquisitions of public, private, and subsidiary targets with alternative methods of payment between 
1990 and 2000. 
' Fuller et al. (2002, p. 1792) argue, "Since we control for acquirer characteristics in that the same bidder will 
often choose to acquire targets with varying ownership status, and with different payment methods, we can 
examine the variation in acquirer returns as a function of these bid characteristics. " 
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run systematic under- or over-reaction to an event has gradually become accepted in the 
literature. Fama himself, the father of the efficient market hypothesis, has recently 
ý6 conceded that stock prices could become "somewhat irrational'. In a nutshell, the 
voluminous literature related to behavioural finance emphasizes that results generated by 
short-run event studies need to be interpreted with further scepticism. 
We thus believe that Fuller et al. 's (2002) conclusion needs to be treated with a certain 
caution. In this case, we argue that a complementary long-run analysis in this context is 
considered essential in order to reach a relatively thorough investigation of shareholders' 
wealth effects. If the long-run results mirror the short-run findings, we can then be more 
confident in accepting their short-run conclusions. However, if the short-run evidence is 
not supported by the long-run results, we can then cast doubt on whether Fuller et al. 's 
(2002) suggestion is economically sound and intuitive or merely a potential product of 
short-run market inefficiency. In addition, of course, such findings have not been tested in 
other countries apart from the US. 
We examine the largest feasible period (1985-2004) that Securities Data Corporation 
(SDQ has data available for the UK merger market of multiple bidders. Such a 
comprehensive (near exhaustive) sample has not been studied before and it provides an 
updated insight of the merger activity, also covering the takeover booming wave of the 
1990s. The UK market appears to have a significant proportion of multiple acquisitions 
over this period. In our sample the firms that acquired three targets within a three-year 
period make more than 40% of all the large, nonfinancial, nonutility takeovers in the UK 
6 'As two economists debate markets, the tide shifts. Belief in efficient valuation yields ground to role of 
irrational investors Mr. Thaler takes on Mr. Fama', The Wall Street Journal, October 18,2004. 
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as reported by SDC, providing a reliable testing ground for bidders' returns analysis. 
Another noticeable point is that we include in our sample private targets and subsidiaries, 
which are major components of the takeover market (more than 90% in our sample), a fact 
that very few studies have taken into account. 
We use a sample of 4,173 takeovers and we show that bidding firms experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns when acquiring public targets, while they exhibit 
significantly positive abnormal returns when buying private or subsidiary targets. When 
we differentiate our results on the basis of the method of payment used in the acquisition 
(cash, stock or combination of cash and stock), we find that acquisitions of public targets 
have significantly negative CARs irrespective of the method of payment, while the 
performance worsens when stock is used as form of financing. Nevertheless, for subsidiary 
and private targets, bidders' returns are significantly positive for cash offers but 
insignificantly positive when stock is used as medium of exchange. Interestingly, acquirers 
exhibit better share price performance when buying subsidiary targets. In addition, there is 
weak evidence that diversified parents will sell subsidiaries at a discount relative to non- 
diversified parents. 
Furthermore, when we portion acquirers' returns dependent on the relative size of the 
target to the bidder we find that for public targets, the larger the target relative to the 
bidder, the more negative the acquirer's CAR. In contrast to the literature, the negative 
return is not driven by stock offers to public targets, as we identify negative abnormal 
returns for cash offers as well. However, for both private targets and subsidiaries the return 
becomes more positive as the target size increases. Noticeably, unlike public targets, as the 
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relative size increases, bidders who acquire private targets with stock experience greater 
abnormal returns than bidders acquiring private targets with cash. 
We then examine whether target origin plays a significant role to the shareholders' wealth. 
The UK has been one of the leading participants in international takeover markets over the 
last decades and therefore stressing this issue could provide some motivating conclusions. 
In addition, and most importantly, the literature suggests that cross-country acquisitions 
have a significant impact on bidders' returns and in general affect their performance. We 
find that multiple bidders conducting foreign acquisitions outperform the performance of 
companies acquiring domestic firms. Another remarkable result is that stock payments for 
foreign targets offer outstanding returns to bidders' shareholders. Moreover, we examine 
whether corporate diversification affects shareholders' wealth. According to the literature, 
acquisitions of firms belonging to different industries than those of the bidder have an 
impact (positive or negative) to the acquiring firm's shareholders. Putting both together, 
we conclude that our findings are robust even after cross-country and cross-industry 
effects are taken into consideration. 
In order to further confirm the robustness of our initial hypothesis (that the research design 
we follow allows us to control for much of the information about bidder characteristics 
contained in the returns at the acquisition announcement) and also that our above patterns 
hold when we account for book-to-market ratio, we examine the announcement returns of 
glamour bidders (firms with low book-to-market ratio) versus value bidders (firms with 
high book-to-market ratio). We find that glamour acquirers significantly outperform value 
acquirers for private targets and subsidiaries, while the opposite patterns are reported for 
bids of public targets. The overall results enhance our assumption that announcement 
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market returns are not affected by bidders' characteristics, while similar to previous 
analysis patterns are obtained when we control for book-to-market ratio. 
In brief, the very different and relatively opposite performance of bidders acquiring private 
targets or subsidiaries compared to bidders buying public firm can be charged to the 
problem of liquidity that the former targets confront, meaning that they cannot be bought 
and sold as easily as public firms. Therefore, in order to create an incentive to the market 
as a profitable investment opportunity, they offer their shares at a discount. This strategy 
of liquidity discount becomes even more essential due to the lack of an auction-like 
atmosphere that is common for public targets. Moreover, managers of private firms are 
relatively more open than public firms to sell their company due to their desire to cash out. 
As a result this drives them to lose a large part of their advantage of effective bargaining 
position, and therefore to sell their companies at a lower value, rather than under different 
circumstances. 
ý4evertheless, in the long-run analysis, we find that abnormal returns reverse over time 
since bidders experience negative share price performance regardless of the public status 
of the target or the method of payment employed. Consistent with the vast majority of the 
literature, we confirm the significant underperformance of bidding firms that acquire 
public companies over a long-time horizon, while bidders who buy unlisted targets exhibit 
on average less negative abnormal returns. In addition, with respect to the method of 
payment used in a takeover, we provide evidence that stock as a means of exchange for 
public targets leads on average to the most damaging post-acquisition share performance 
of bidders. Moreover, we show that our results are not simply a manifestation of 
momentum and therefore the results are not just capturing long-run stock price reversals. 
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In general, our results demonstrate that positive abnormal returns are present only in the 
short-run (i. e. at the acquisition announcement). Bidders gain when buying private or 
subsidiary targets and lose when purchasing public targets. This finding is fully consistent 
with Fuller et al. (2002). In addition, we provide further evidence to the short-run study by 
taking into account bidders' book-to-market ratio (value/glamour), core-industry 
(diversified/non-diversified), and target origin (foreign/domestic). On the other hand, our 
long-run results show that bidders experience significant losses regardless of the type of 
target acquired. This finding implies that the stock market may overreact in the short-run 
and its prices are gradually corrected in the long-run. Hence, our evidence raises a big 
question mark about Fuller et al. 's (2002) conclusion as the short-run economic gains (i. e., 
the reflection of the acquisition synergies) of buying private and subsidiary targets cannot 
be materialized in the long-run. 
Moreover, we underline and provide evidence of the impact of the method of payment on 
bidders' returns. For public targets, surprisingly, our results are not only driven by stock 
acquisitions as the related literature suggests, since we obtain negative abnormal returns 
for both cash and stock offers. On the other hand, we draw exactly the opposite picture for 
private targets and subsidiaries, since the bidders exhibit positive and significant 
performance for cash (higher returns in this case), even in the case of almost simultaneous 
public and private bids. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section reviews the related 
literature. In section 2.3 we describe the data and the methodologies we follow. Section 
2.4 reports the empirical evidence of our research and the interpretations of the results, 
while in section 2.5 we provide a summary and conclude our chapter. 
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2.2. Literature review 
ZZI Bidder Returns: Puhlic Targets 
One of the most extensively researched, but at the same time argumentative, areas in 
finance has been whether mergers create value for the shareholders of the bidder and target 
firms. A clear conclusion in both US and UK studies proves that shareholders of target 
firms receive economically large and statistically significant wealth gains. However, 
reported returns to bidder firm shareholders are quite ambiguous, since either small 
positive, negative (the largest body in the literature) or zero returns have been recorded. 
In their widely cited survey of the share price consequences of takeover bids, Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) review the evidence on returns to acquiring firms over the inunediate bid 
announcement period and draw the conclusion that bidders' shareholders do not lose from 
acquisitions. Subsequent studies document considerable divergence in announcement 
period returns that is systematically associated with method of payment, as predicted by 
Carleton et al. (1983). 
Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) examined the data on returns to shareholders of 
acquiring companies for a sequence of decades. For the 1960s, they obtained quite similar 
results to Jensen and Ruback (1983). For a window of 15 days [-10, +5], the excess returns 
to successful bidders in tender offers were 4.4%. When the window was extended to 20 
days after the event date, the Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) rose to 4.95% and were 
statistically highly significant. For the 70s, the excess returns dropped to approximately 
2%, while for the 80s they became negative at about 1%, but were not statistically 
significant. 
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In another study for US companies participating in a merger activity, Bradley, Desai and 
Kim (1988) documented similar results for tender offers. In numbers, they reported that 
for subperiods approximating the 1960s, the excess returns to acquiring firms were slightly 
over 4% and in general the abnormal returns to acquiring firms for the total period 1963 to 
1984 were positive and significant. 
The first major study of UK acquisitions by Firth (1980) examines bidders in 434 
success is an 129 unsuccessful bids over the period from 1969 to 1975. It uses a 
market model with parameters estimated using pre-event data, and finds that bidding firms 
experienced statistically significant negative residuals (-6.3% for the announcement 
month). Limnack (1991) examines the post-acquisition performance of acquirers in 448 
successful and 81 unsuccessful bids announced during 1977-1986, where abnormal 
performance is measured relative to the market index (a market model using London 
Business School (LBS) beta and alpha values is applied). He finds that CARs for 
completed bids for the period from the beginning of the bid month to the end of the 
completion month are an insignificant -0.2% for bidders. 
A very interesting study was presented by Higson and Elliott (1993), who used the simple 
Dimson and Marsh (1986) size-decile control method (performance was measured by a 
'zero-one' market adjusted model) to consider size effects. The study covers 726 
acquisitions between 1974 and 1990 and concludes to announcement returns of -4.4% (- 
3.90% on a 'zero-one' basis). Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) investigate 
announcement period returns associated with 429 UK bidders over the period 1980-1990. 
Overall, they find significant CARs of -4.04% over the period [-20, +40] days around the 
bid announcement date. Gregory (1997) presents a rather exhaustive work on returns (six 
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models are used: CAPM, Dimson and Marsh Risk and Size Adjustment (DM), Simple 
Size control portfolio (SS), Multi-Index model (SML), Value-Weighted Multi-Index 
Model and Fama-French three-factor model). His sample has a maximum of 452 
acquisitions for models which do not require market capitalization, and a minimum of 403 
(for the Dimson-Marsh, 1986, size and risk control model). In all cases, announcement 
returns are significantly negative varying from -0.30% to -0.71%. Similarly, Holl and 
Kyriazis (1997) display significantly negative average residuals for the announcement 
month (-1.7%) for a sample of 178 bids covering the period 1979-1989. On the other hand, 
Higson and Elliott (1998) find positive bidders' announcement returns (0.43%), by using a 
sample of 30 successful takeovers during the period 1975 to 1990. In addition, 
Sudarsanam. and Mahate (2003) use a sample of 519 acquirers over a 1983-1995 period. 
The study applies the Buy-and-Hold Average Residuals (BHARs) model, using four 
different benchmark models, and concludes that the whole sample of acquirers experiences 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns of about -1.4%. Finally, in the most 
recent UK M&A study, Draper and Paudyal (2005) report that acquirers of listed targets 
do not experience any substantial change in their share price around the announcement of 
bids; they either break even or suffer a small loss, depending on the excess return metric. 
ZZZ Bidder Returns: Private Targets 
There is very little evidence on shareholders' wealth effects when the target is a private 
company and also the impact of its relationship with the method of payment used in the 
transaction. 
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Chang (1998) examines the announcement returns (two-day window) of bidding firms 
acquiring 281 privately held targets during the period from 1991 to 1998 and compares 
them to bidder returns for 255 public targets from 1981 to 1988. The main findings are the 
positive abnormal returns (2.64%) in stock offers (in contrast to the results in which the 
target is publicly traded) and also the zero abnormal returns when the method of payment 
is cash, consistent with the studies of Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993). One 
explanation, given by Chang (1998), for the above results is the information hypothesis. 
Although the bidding firm's managers disclose private information to the shareholders, in 
the case of a private target, its shareholders appear to be extremely careful in the 
evaluation of information and their final decision, because they will end up holding a large 
amount of bidding stock. One way to avoid the "double lemons" impasse is through the 
exchange of information among bidders and targets that reduces their joint information 
7 asymmetry. As a consequence, the acceptance of a stock offer conveys to the market 
favourable information on the prospects of a bidding firm and a signal that the deal is 
expected to create value (positive NPV of bidders) or, more weakly, that the bidder's 
shares are not overvalued. Furthermore, in general, the positive performance of bidders 
when the acquired firms are private is supported by the limited competition hypothesis. If 
the market is competitive, the acquisition will be a zero NPV project (no abnormal returns 
for acquisitions with cash). However, if competition is limited then positive returns are 
exhibited for bidders because the likelihood of underpayment is high. Finally, Chang 
(1998) suggests the monitoring hypothesis. By using stock as a means of payment, 
acquirers tend to create outside blockholders, because the targets are owned by a small 
group of shareholders. These can increase the firm's value because they can serve as 
Both the 'double lemons' problem and information asymmetry are explained in section 2.2.4. 
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effective monitors of managerial performance or facilitate takeovers! More specifically, 
he finds 4.96% and 1.77% announcement abnormal returns if a new blockholder is formed 
or not respectively. Large blockholders can be created for public firms as well, however, 
in fact these firms have less concentrated ownership9 and therefore higher agency conflicts 
than private firms. 
Hansen and Lott (1996) also examine the announcement returns to bidders acquiring both 
public and private targets. They show that bidders earn on average 2% higher returns when 
they acquire a private firm. The explanation they offer, in turn, for this result is that since 
investors are diversified the aim of the manager of a firm is not to maximize shareholder 
value but, instead, to maximize the value of the shareholder's portfolio. Hence, when a 
publicly traded firm acquires a public target, diversified shareholders will be indifferent to 
the way the gains from the acquisitions are divided, assuming they hold stock in both 
firms, a condition which is unlikely to be met for private firms. However, the opposite will 
happen in the case of a private target, since the bidder's shareholders will capture part of 
the gains of the acquisition, assuming the bid is value increasing. 
Da Silva Rosa et al. (2001) document more or less similar results (signalling implications 
of the method of payment are likely to differ across bids for public and private targets) in 
their research concerning a sample of private and public Australian bids. Cash based bids 
generate a significantly positive return of 3.26%, but share bids earn an insignificant 
8 On the other hand, increase in managerial ownership can decrease firm value if it allows managerial 
entrenchment or makes takeovers more costly. 
9 However, this differential may to some extent be offset if we take notice that the relative size of public targets 
is generally larger than the private target's one. Therefore they either hold a larger ownership stake in the 
bidder, or private managers may not be interested in becoming effective monitors, since they may use the 
takeover activity as an exit strategy. In addition, private deals are almost all completed, while the public deals 
may not be completed. 
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average return of 1.65%. In addition, in both cases the excess returns to bidders of private 
targets are significantly higher than the excess returns to bidders of public targets. Da 
Silva Rosa et al. (2001) argue that it is likely that the level of competition in the market for 
corporate control is lower for private targets and this can also be expected to affect 
acquiring firrns' returns from acquisitions. Auction-style takeovers (which are mainly 
accompanied by decreasing returns for acquiring firms) is a common phenomenon in 
public targets since there is no cost for obtaining information and more is known about the 
target. On the other hand, privately held firms are not obliged to release relevant valuable 
information to the public. Therefore the higher cost of obtaining information on privately 
held firins is very likely to be associated with higher returns for the acquiring firms since 
they capture a greater proportion of the expected gains, particularly if there are only few 
firrns with whom the target may reap synergistic gains. 
Ang and Kohers (2001) use a sample of 7,070 US acquisitions from 1988 to June 1992 
and document substantial gains for bidders regardless of the method of payment (positive 
and statistically significant for both cash and stock). Two main interpretations are 
provided: First, it appears, as already discussed above, that private firms have concentrated 
ownership which enables them to have lower agency conflicts, while public firms 
generally have more dispersed ownership. Second, bidders avoid the public pressure from 
outside investors and therefore they have the opportunity to avoid hubris-motivated 
takeovers. This gives them the 'privilege' to stop any negotiations without incurring high 
(prestige' costs. In addition, the nature of bidding private targets 'auto-protects' the 
acquiring company by the managers' empire building incentives, since in most cases such 
acquisitions do not offer them the prestige they pursue. 
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2.2.3. Bidder Returns: Subsidiary Targets 
There are three papers that we are aware of in the literature which examine bidding returns 
when the target is a subsidiary firm and which at the same time take notice of the method 
of payment. Fuller et al. (2002) use a sample of 539 US bidders that make many 
acquisitions (3135) within a three-year period. They provide evidence that acquiring firms 
exhibit significantly positive returns (2.75%) when purchasing subsidiary firms, and these 
returns become higher (3.23%) when stock is used as a method of payment. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) also find positive and significant abnormal returns for 
acquisitions of subsidiary targets. According to Fuller et al. (2002), one reason why a firm 
sells a subsidiary is to gain from increased focus, and therefore diversified firms might 
accept a relatively lower price for an asset sale than a non-diversified firm. However, there 
is poor evidence that diversified parents will sell subsidiaries at a discount relative to non- 
diversified parents. 
In addition, Faccio and Masulis (2005) posit that when a subsidiary acquisition takes place 
cash is preferred as a method of payment. Bidders are likely to prefer cash, given the 
illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio holdings and the often-impending 
retirement of a controlling shareholder manager. Similarly, corporations selling 
subsidiaries are often motivated by financial distress concerns or a desire to restructure 
towards their core competency. Consequently, there is strong preference for cash 
consideration in order to realize these financial or asset restructuring goals and also due to 
the fact that bidders are frequently motivated to divest subsidiaries to finance new 
acquisitions or to reduce their tax burden. 
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ZZ4. Method ofPayment in Mergers and Acquisitions 
2.2.4.1. Empirical Findings 
Fishman (1989), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990), Brown and Ryngaert (199 1) document 
higher retums for cash offers than stock offers at the bid announcement. Travlos (1987), 
among others, by using a sample of US public targets, finds negative returns because of 
stock financing regardless of the outcome of the bid (successful/unsuccessful) and positive 
returns for cash offers. His results are also independent of the type of takeover (merger, 
tender offer). In sum, generally the stock (or mixed) offer reflects negative information 
about the bidder, whereas zero returns are displayed for cash offers. Therefore, it seems 
that a crucial issue concerning the determinants of acquiring firms' returns is the means of 
payment that is used at the acquisition. 
ZZ4. Z Determinants of Method of Payment 
ZZ4. Zl. Asymmetric Information - Signalling Hypothesis 
Bidding companies pay the shareholders of the target firms using a variety of means. 
Common practices include payment in cash, exchange of shares, and a combination of 
both (shareholders may be given a choice). The most common argument for the choice of 
cash or stock, as the method of payment, is the information asymmetry-signalling 
hypothesis that arises. In the absence of full information regarding the value of a merger 
(for example, the estimated value of potential benefits to be achieved through synergy) the 
mode of payment conveys a signal to investors. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Leland and 
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Pyle (1977) argue that the premise of information asymmetry raises the proposition that 
managers with private information that their firm's shares are overvalued offer these 
shares in takeover bids. Outside investors, recognizing the adverse selection problem, 
consequently revise their estimate of the offer's value downwards. The target's 
shareholders also demand a higher premium to compensate for the 'lemons' problem in 
share-based bids, and therefore this seems a plausible explanation for the negative share 
price performance of bidders when they use stock in takeovers. 
Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989) enrich the asymmetric information hypothesis by 
considering the case where the target firm's managers are better informed about their 
firm's value. Hansen (19 87) posits that when bidders and targets have private information, 
then a double lemons' problem is set up, since bidders do not offer stock when they 
believe their shares are undervalued and targets only accept cash when their share value 
(based on their private information) is less than the offer. In other words, the double lemon 
problem sources from both bidders' and targets' managers recognizing the adverse 
selection bias in the other's decision. Hansen's (1987) model addresses the issue of 
uncertainty in target valuation, and therefore in this case a stock offer is suggested as it has 
ta contingency pricing effect'. In such a case, targets are forced to share part of the risk 
that the stock is overvalued. 10 In any case, Hansen's (1987) model predicts that cash offers 
always send a credible signal that the bidder's shares are undervalued and also they should 
be selected when there is high uncertainty on their own firm's value, while a stock offer 
should be made when there is high uncertainty on the target's value. " This uncertainty 
(asymmetry) is likely to rise as the targets' assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder 
(Faccio and Masulis (2005)). 
10 In cash offers the bidder bears the entire cost of overpayment (Eckbo et. al., 1990). 
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In Fishman's (1989) analysis, bidding firms decide between cash and share offers on the 
basis of their private information about the value of the merger. Bidders who estimate a 
high value make high preemptive cash bids to deter potential competing bidders, assuming 
that the bidder's expected pay off is decreasing in the initial bidder's valuation of the 
target. However, targets with private information about their own value make cash 
exchange risky for the bidders because of the adverse selection problem. In sum, a cash 
offer has the advantage of preempting potential competing bidders, while the advantage of 
a share offer is that it induces the target to make an efficient accept/reject decision and 
thereby reveal its private information about expected future cash flows. Fishman (1989) 
predicts that an initial bidder's expected pay off is higher if cash is offered rather than 
shares. Similarly, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) argue that bidders whose private 
information is more favourable regarding either their own pre-merger values or the 
synergy use cash and this explains why bidders' prices react more favourably to cash 
rather than stock offers. 
ZZ4. ZZ Relative Size Proposition 
Numerous studies have also been launched with regard to the impact of relative size of 
target-to-bidder on payment methods. According to Jensen and Ruback (1983), the return 
of bidders depends on the relative size of targets. The main findings are: i) the larger the 
relative size of targets to bidders, the higher the CAR will be (Asquith et al. (1983), Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1989) and Kang, (1993)). This is linked to the suggestion made by Loderer 
and Martin (1990) who claim that large firms seem to pay too much for their targets and 
large bids seem to be overpriced on average- facts that deteriorate the share price 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) and Eckbo et al. (1990) show that higher valued bidders will use cash or a 
higher proportion of cash to signal their value to the market. 
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performance. Ang and Kohers (2001) proceed to a further analysis concerning relative 
size, supporting first that the relative size of target to bidder is critical to the bidder's 
performance, and second that the acquiring return when bidding for a public target is 
significantly smaller than the return when bidding for a private target. ii) The larger the 
size of the target firm, the more likely the acquirer is to use share financing in M&A deals 
(Myers and Majluf (1984) and DeAngelo et al. (1984)). Grullon, Michaely and Swary 
(1997) examine 146 mergers during the period 1981-1990 to explore the determinants of 
payment methods by testing the capital position of the merged companies, the relative size 
of targets, and the return on equity of both parties. They find that share exchange is more 
likely to be used in mergers where targets have a high capital adequacy relative to the 
bidders as indicated by the higher ratio of share-to-cash, which is equal to 2.12%. 
ZZ4. Z3. Managerial Ownership Proposition 
The choice of financing alternatives in corporate acquisitions must be related to the 
managerial ownership fraction of both parties (acquirer and target). It is often viewed that 
the greater the management's share of the acquiring or target firm, the more likely cash 
financing is adopted. One explanation of this strategy in M&A deals is that the managers 
of both parties offer (or accept) cash as the medium of exchange in order not to dilute their 
already existing control after the acquisition. Stulz (1988) examines the relationship 
between the choice of payment methods and the managerial ownership of acquiring firms. 
His study shows that the larger the fraction of the ownership held by the acquiring firm, 
the less likely an acquisition is financed by using a share exchange. Under such a 
circumstance, the management of the bidder is reluctant to offer shares in order to avoid 
diluting their original control after the acquisition. 
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Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) use a sample of 209 US acquisitions during the years 
1981-1983 and document negative returns for bidders that use stock financing, as a means 
of exchange, and have low managerial ownership. They find that in cash financing deals , 
the top five officers and directors of the firm hold about 11% of the company's shares, 
while in share financing, less than 7% are held by them. This result indicates that 
managers with relatively higher shareholdings in their firms prefer financing acquisitions 
with the use of cash to share, because, as Amihud et al. (1990) point out, they do not want 
to increase the risk of losing control after the acquisitions. 12 However, given the above 
argument, the use of stock may signal to investors that the acquisition is not value 
decreasing. 
Finally, Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that cash is the method of payment that should 
be preferred when preserving control is important for bidders, especially under 
circumstances where continued corporate control is threatened. The corporate control 
incentives to choose cash are likely to be strongest when a target's share ownership is 
concentrated. On the other hand, stock financing would have better effects if the 
shareholder has supermajority voting rights because, in this case, it would not have the 
opportunity to threaten the continued control of shareholder. 
ZZ4. Z4. Taxation Implication Proposition 
It is well known that any capital gains must be realised immediately for tax purposes due 
to higher depreciation tax shields (Carleton et al. (1983)). Therefore, a cash offer in M&As 
could, in theory, bring about higher premiums when compared with a share exchange. In 
other words, due to the existence of different tax treatments, the acquirer must pay a 
12 The same view is analyzed by Martin (1996). 
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higher acquisition price in the case of the cash offer to offset the tax burden of the target 
shareholders, while many stock exchanges will be treated as tax-free transactions. This 
proposition has long been addressed and confirmed by earlier studies. 
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) link their study to the relationship between the tax status 
and payment methods. They find that targets' returns are higher when financed by cash 
(33.54% by cash versus 17.47% by stock) and contribute this result to the taxation 
implication theory. They conclude that the fact of the substantially higher returns to target 
shareholders when financed by a cash offer indicates that acquirers need to pay the 
additional tax burden for the targets under such a circumstance. In this respect, a share 
exchange will defer the tax consequences until the share is eventually sold. If this is 
valuable, they may accept a discounted price and therefore, due to the lower price, bidders 
will perform higher returns under a stock offer. 
According to Harris, Franks and Mayer (1988), however, there seems to be no clear 
evidence showing that the capital gain taxes are the main concern of the acquisition 
financing when cash is used in this circumstance. As they show, cash financing in the 
period 1965-1969 declines (with a percentage of 18.6%) when compared with that of the 
previous period 1960-1964 (29.2%). However, this trend was reversed from 1975 to 1979 
with the proportion of cash financing rising to 33.6%. Consequently, this empirical 
evidence does not show a strong linkage between the capital gain tax and the use of cash 
as the medium of exchange. 
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ZZ4. Z5. The Growth Opportunity Proposition (Glamour Vs Value Acquirers) 
Glamour acquirers are those firms that are highly valued as a result of their prior stock 
market performance. Their stocks receive premium ratings in the form of low B/M value. 
In contrast, firms with high B/M value ratings are undervalued, but they may have the 
potential for subsequent value gains (high growth opportunities). In other words, glamour 
stocks are high growth finns and value stocks are low growth firms. Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) suggest that glamour acquirers outperform value acquirers after merger, 
irrespective of the payment method used. 13 In some ways the market fails to understand 
that past managerial performance is not necessarily a good indicator of future 
performance, at least in the case of acquisitions. 14 This result is in contrast to their findings 
for the long-run performance of bidding firms. They also report a significant tendency of 
glamour acquirers to finance their acquisitions with their own stock" and this tendency is 
stronger in mergers than in tender offers. 16 
Taking the above into consideration, the alternatives for payment methods used in M&A 
deals depend, to some extent, upon the acquiring firm's growth opportunities. Martin 
(1996) uses a sample of 846 US acquisitions for the period 1979-1988 and finds, in 
contrast to Rau and Vermaelen (1998), that acquiring firms with greater growth 
opportunities (value acquirers) are more likely to use share exchange in acquisitions. A 
13 The main argument here is the extrapolation hypothesis that explains the differential performance of glamour 
and value acquirers. Acquirers commanding a high market rating due to their recent performance and expected 
future performance (glamour acquirers) may act out of overconfidence or hubris in making acquisitions. The 
stocks of such companies may also be overvalued and although the managers may be aware of such 
overvaluation, the stock market may be not. 
14 However, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) find, by using a sample of UK public firms, that overall value 
acquirers outperforin glamour acquirers at bid announcement. 
13 Consistent with the infon-nation asymmetry argument, glamour acquirers tend to have high past share price 
returns, while the opposite is true for value acquirers. Hence, it seems plausible for glamour acquirers to use 
their 'overvalued' equity as a method of payment and value acquirers to use cash for the opposite reasons. This 
view is also supported by Dong et al. (2005). 
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possible interpretation of this result is that acquiring firms would need more cash (if 
available) under such a circumstance to satisfy their growth opportunities, while they 
would also aim to mitigate the possibilities of overpayment (especially when the target's 
B/M value is also high). 
ZZ4.3. Joint Method of Payment 
The form of cash-share combination has most commonly been used in the UK rather than 
in the US. The literature provides ambiguous results with regards to the empirical evidence 
from acquiring firms' abnormal returns when they select to use both cash and stock as the 
method of payment. For example, Eckbo et al. (1990) find significantly positive abnormal 
returns for mixed offers, which are also higher than for either all stock or all cash bids. On 
the other hand, Travlos (1987) and Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) find negative 
excess returns for combined cash/stock offers. 
According to Eckbo et al. (1990) it appears that there is a relation between mixed payment 
and the bidder's private information about its value and the value of the synergy, as well 
as that only mixed payments contain signalling information and synergy revaluation 
components. As they suggest, two-sided information asymmetries between the bidder and 
the target firms can lead to an optimal mix of cash and stock as payment in the transaction, 
while the value of the bidder's residual claim increases with the size of cash offer. 
Blackburn et al. (1997) argue that the joint method of exchange functions as a viable 
mechanism for overcoming the information asymmetry dilemmas (pure cash or stock). In 
16 in our study, we will not investigate the differential performance of mergers and tender offers, since in the UK 
the vast majority of offers are tender offers. 
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addition, the combination of cash with stock payment may represent the only instance in 
which both signalling and re-evaluations exist. 
2.2.5. Domestic Vs Foreign Targets 
The growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been one of the most remarkable 
features of the worldwide economy. A key characteristic of this growth is the form it has 
taken. FDI can take a variety of forms including the establishment of 'green-field' sites 
and joint ventures. Nevertheless, the most dominant form of FD1 is via cross-border 
acquisition activities, which have been, to an extent, extreme both in the US and UK. For 
example, in the US, on average over the 1984-1995 period, cross-border acquisitions 
accounted for over 90% of US FDI inflows, while in 1998 in the UK, 17 cross-border 
acquisitions accounted for around 80% of FD1 outflows. Moreover, cross-border 
acquisitions have risen substantially in recent years; Gregory and McCorriston (2001) 
report that in 1995 the value of acquisition purchases by the UK was almost 30 million 
dollars, while in 1999 this had risen to 209 million dollars. 
Results from prior research are ambiguous. Some studies suggest that returns to cross- 
border M&As are generally negative, confirming that FDI is inherently risky (Lee and 
Caves (1998)) while others provide evidence that there is no wealth effect to shareholders. 
Doukas and Travlos (1988) found by using a US sample that, on average, there is no 
significant impact on returns of bidding firms. Other US studies focusing on returns to 
bidders include Fatemi and Furtedo (1998) and Markides and Ittner (1994) who reported 
" This data comes from World Investment report 2000: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and 
Development, UNCTAD (2000). 
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non-significant positive abnormal returns, and Datta and Puia (1995) who suggested 
negative abnormal returns for acquirers buying foreign targets. For non-US countries, 
Kang (1993) concluded that positive abnormal returns to Japanese bidders buying US 
firms were most probably due to the weakness of the US dollar. In addition, for UK 
bidders, Eun et al. (1996) obtained considerable negative abnormal returns, while Cakici et 
al. (1996) found significantly positive abnormal returns around the event date for acquirers 
whose gains are more likely to be affected by the presence of hostile bidders. Moreover, 
Gregory and McCorriston (2001) report insignificantly negative returns. Finally, Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) provide evidence of higher CARs for UK bidders (1.5%) than the 
CARs of bidders coming from the Continental Europe (0.9%). 
With respect to the method of payment, until very recently, foreign acquisitions by UK 
companies almost universally involved cash as the targets were frequently unwilling to 
accept foreign equity (Gaughan (2002)). Therefore, a positive signal from paying with 
cash might be diminished or non-existent for cross-border transactions. Most studies in the 
US and the UK document that domestic acquisitions financed by cash exhibit returns not 
significantly different from zero. ' 8 The dominance of cash form of financing may also 
occur due to corporate governance issues. Bidders coming from countries with poor 
corporate governance are forced to conduct a merger more expensively when they use 
stock as the medium of exchange rather than cash. However, common sense would 
indicate the use of equity when the target is assumed to have proprietary information about 
its value. In this way, acquirers would be able to take the opportunity to make the pay off 
to the target shareholders contingent on the overall value created by the acquisition 
18 However, Gregory (1997), in a study of UK domestic acquirers for 1984-1992, provides weak evidence that 
cash acquirers may underperform. He finds that returns are just significantly negative under some benchmarks. 
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(Hansen, 1987), reducing the cost of adverse selection. Finally, according to Moeller and 
Schlingemann. (2004), cross-border acquisitions often involve fewer private targets. 
Z2.6. Multiple Acquirers 
Numerous studies -especially recently- have examined the performance of multiple 
bidders. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) find that most bidding firms make multiple 
bids: 45% of their sample made four or more subsequent bids during the period from 1963 
to 1979. By analyzing the abnormal returns for successive merger bids (up to four) of 156 
firms that initiated merger programmes, they find that bidder returns remain positive at 
roughly 2.5% through the fourth bid. They also suggest that the market's reaction to 
mergers may differ at various times in a merger programme. 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) examine bidder returns for 55 firms that engaged in 
acquisition programmes between 1952 and 1968. They report positive abnon-nal returns of 
13% in one year up to and including the announcement of the acquisition programme. 
However, they find little stock price reaction 19 to subsequent acquisition announcementS20 
because, as they argue, most of the benefits of a merger programme are capitalized at or 
before the announcement of the programme (in contrast to Asquith et al., (1983), who find 
conflicting evidence). 
19 Stock price reactions reflect both the economic importance of events and the extent to which events are 
surprises. Economic impact: Capitalized value of future net cash flows resulting from the event's occurrence. 
Hence, it is the difference between the f inn value given that the event occurs now and the f inn value given that 
the event does not and will never occur (NPV of the event). Event announcement: Event occurrence. 
Announcement resolves uncertainty concerning the event's timing. An effect is the change in firm value 
attributable to this resolution and uncertainty. 20 Malatesta and Thompson (1985) use Schipper and Thompson's (1983) data to test a model of stock price 
reaction to partially anticipated events. They find significant bidder returns at the acquisition announcement 
even by firms that had previously announced an acquisition programme. They also claim that the investor's lack 
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Loderer and Martin (1990) use a sample of 1,538 bidders acquiring 5,172 targets from 
1966 to 1984 to explore the impact on short-run returns of acquirers. They show that first 
acquisitions lead to significantly larger announcement returns 21 than other acquisitions and 
are more positive when they are the only acquisitions in the series than when they are the 
first of two acquisitions. They conclude that acquisitions are profitable and that partial 
anticipation causes estimation bias, because frequent acquirers experience a positive 
revaluation while announcing the first acquisition in a series, and then weaker positive 
revaluation's when announcing subsequent acquisitions. 
Past literature predicted positive relationship between acquisition experience and 
performance based on: i) acquisitions similar to each other and ii) past acquisition 
experience is generalized from one organizational acquisition to another. 22 With regards to 
the above arguments, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) posit that the greater the extent to 
which two targets are from the same industry, the more likelihood the positive outcome. 
This is because multiple bidders generalise past acquisition knowledge, which is consistent 
with the findings of Hayward (2002). In addition, a negative relationship might be 
expected between first and subsequent acquisitions when the programme announcement 
and the announcement of the acquisition occur together. 23 
Rovit and Lemire (2003) examine the performance of 724 large US companies that made 
7,475 acquisitions from 1986 to 2001. They reported that acquirers carrying out more than 
of perfect foresight regarding the timing of acquisitions' attempts and that previous attempts do not convey 
much information about future attempts. 
21 Rosen (2002) examines a sample of US bidders over a three-year period and finds that the short-run reaction 
is independent of whether the announcement is the first by a firm in the previous three years, but the first time 
bidders do better than subsequent ones in the long run. 22 For example, see Lubatkin (1983). 23 This is in contrast to the findings of Schipper and Thompson (1983), suggesting that positive abnormal return 
is associated with the announcement of acquisition programmes. 
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twenty deals in 15 years outperformed firms that made one to four deals. Furthermore, 
they suggest that those acquirers that buy in specific parts of the economic cycle 
(recession, growth, and in between) lag behind constant buyers in performance. 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) investigate the short-run returns to 539 acquirers 
that carry out at least five acquisitions over a three-year period from 1990 to 2000. They 
find that first bids are associated with significantly positive returns, whereas returns to 
fifth and higher bids are insignificant and sometimes negative. As they claim, this finding 
stems from the fact that after making many quick acquisitions, 24 bidders either negotiate 
less efficiently or create less synergy in later deals. In addition, they find that the shorter 
the time period surrounding acquisitions, the lower the acquirer's return, which is 
consistent with their above explanation. Finally, they posit that the method of payment 
used or the public status of the target firm may actually be key issues in explaining the 
acquiring firm's performance. 
2.3. Data and Methodology 
Z3.1. Sample Selection 
We identify a sample of successful acquisitions by UK public companies that acquired 
25 both domestic and foreign targets, announced between I January, 1985 and 6 May, 2004 . 
The sample acquisitions are drawn from the Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Database and the period selected 
24 However, Hayward (2002) argues that very long intervals increase the likelihood that inferences from prior 
experiences are 'unavailable, inaccessible and unapplicable'. 25 Fuller et al. (2002) find that the SDC announcement date is within two days of the announcement date found 
by a search of other sources for each of the 500 mergers they examined. 
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is driven by the total availability of SDC Database and the definition of multiple bidder we 
26 
set (acquiring three targets within a three-year period). The following criteria are used in 
selecting our final sample: 
- Acquiring firms are UK firms publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
have five days of return data around the takeover announcement listed on the Datastrearn 
Database. 
- The acquirer completes bids for three or more targets in any three-year window during the 
sample period. 
- The bidder acquires at least 50% of the target's voting shares as a result of the takeover. 
- The target is a public firm, a private firm, or a subsidiary. 
27 
28 
- The deal value is one million dollars or more. The definition of value of transaction is 
the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. The 
dollar value includes the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, 
preferred stock, debt, options, assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six 
months of the announcement date of the transaction. Transaction values in foreign 
currencies were converted to sterling using the exchange rate at the end of the 
announcement month. 
- We delete financial and utility firms (following Fama and French (1992)) for both bidders 
and targets. 
26 SDC is a commercial database that includes information on UK takeover bids since 1980. However, the first 
multiple bidder appears to do the first bid in 1985. 27 We examine subsidiary targets, as they are one of the three main categories of the market for corporate 
control. All subsidiary targets are unlisted companies after checking the Target Public Mid Code from the SDC 
database. 
28 We employ a one million dollars cut-off point to avoid results being generated by very small deals. Similarly, 
studies like Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) in the US use a 
cut-Off point of one million dollars. 
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Finally, we exclude from the main analysis clustered acquisitions where the bidder 
acquires two or more firms within a five-day period, as under such a circumstance we are 
unable to isolate the bidder's return for a particular target. Therefore, we only include the 
first of the clustered bids. Eventually, our sample that satisfies all the above restrictions 
consists of 618 unique bidders acquiring 4,173 targets. As we use Dimson, Nagel and 
Quigley (2003) UK three-factors to account for UK book-to-market peculiarities, we 
include in our long run analysis bids carried out between 1985-1998 for three-year 
analysis (2,607 firms), bids up to 1999 for two-year analysis (2,995 firms), and 
acquisitions from 1985-2000 (3,383 firms) for one-year analysis respectively. 
Similar to Ang and Kohers (2001), we group the method of payment into three categories: 
(1) cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt; 29 (2) stock 
offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock; and (3) combination 
financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and 
methods classified as "other" by SDC. 
23.2. Sample Description 
We display the summary statistics for the firms making multiple acquisitions and their 
targets in Table 2.1. In Panels A, B, C, and D we report the annual mean and median 
bidder and target size for all bids, only public bids, only private bids, and only subsidiary 
bids, respectively. The mean and median size for each bidder and each target are presented 
in the year of bid announcement. A particular bidder is represented only once per year, but 
29 We examine a sample of 100 random companies with same average MV to the overall sample and we exclude 
loan notes from cash payments. Our results are robust to this exclusion. We also investigate whether the cost of 
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may be represented multiple times over the 20-year period. The acquirer's market 
capitalization equals the price per share one-month prior to the bid announcement times 
the number of common shares outstanding. For public targets market, capitalization is 
defined similarly to the acquirer's one, whereas for private and subsidiary targets, the 
market capitalization is assumed to be the value of the deal when announced. The final 
row of each panel represents the mean and median size for each unique bidder and target, 
counted only once. Hence, for the entire sample in Panel A, the mean (median size) of the 
bidder is 488.19 million sterling (77.335 million sterling) for 618 unique acquirers, while 
for 4,173 unique targets the mean (median) size is 37.213 million sterling (6.16 million 
sterling). Panel A also provides a general trend in M&A activity; after the mid-80s there 
was a gradual increase in the number of takeovers for public, private and subsidiary 
targets, dropping slightly by 2000.30 
In Panels B, C, and D we provide the mean and median size based on the distinction of 
whether the target is public (Panel B), private (Panel Q, or a subsidiary of a public firm 
(Panel D). In sum, Panel B provides that the mean (median) size is 159.058 million 
sterling (42.33 million sterling) for 195 unique public targets. Panel C shows that the 
private target mean (median) size is much smaller than for public targets (15.807 million 
sterling (4.75 million sterling) for 2,459 unique private targets). Panel D reports that the 
1,519 unique subsidiary targets are also smaller than public targets (mean (median) size of 
56.23 million sterling (8.7 million sterling)). 
debt contaminates the results we get on cash payments and we find that it has no effect enhancing the validity of 
our results. 
30 Despite the decrease in number of deals after 2000 the total value of transactions has significantly increased. 
As an indication of the latest data evidence, the total value of takeovers in the first quarter of 2004 is almost double than that of the first quarter of 2003. 
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Z3.3. Methodologies 
Z3.3.1. Short-Run Event Study 
Event studies, introduced by Fama et al. (1969), produce useful evidence on how stock 
prices respond to information. Many studies focus on returns in a short window (a few 
days) around a dated event. An advantage of this approach is that because daily expected 
returns are close to zero, the results are typically insensitive to the model chosen for 
expected returns and therefore the model does not have a big effect on inferences about 
abnormal returns. Hence, in the short-run, different event study methodologies provide 
approximately consistent abnormal returns. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) refer to 
short window event studies as: 'The most statistically reliable evidence on whether 
mergers create value for shareholders. ' Literature also provides evidence that, in the short- 
run, the choice of benchmark used is not important (in contrast to long-run studies) for the 
measurement of abnormal returns. 
Event study analysis provides a direct measure of value created for investors and a 
forward-looking measure of value creation. In theory, stock prices are the present value of 
expected future cash flows. However, this requires significant assumptions 31 about the 
functioning of stock markets: efficiency, rationality, and absence of restrictions on 
arbitrage. Research suggests that for most stocks these are not unreasonable assumptions, 
on average and over time. 
The basic assumption in studies that focus on short return windows is that any lag in the response of prices to 
an event is short-lived. 
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A substantial amount of evidence can be assembled to support the market efficiency 
argument. If markets were not efficient they would adjust slowly (or not at all) to new 
information. Results from over 100 studies carefully documented by Elton and Gruber 
(1987) show that the market responds rapidly to new information. In fact, the typical result 
in event studies using daily data (as we do) is that, on average, stock prices seem to adjust 
within a day to event announcements. As Jensen (1988) notes, 'although the evidence is 
not literally 100 percent in support of the efficient market hypothesis, no proposition in 
any of the sciences is better documented. ' Thus, there is ample evidence for the market 
efficiency assumption underlying event study methodology. 
Z3.3.1.1. OurApproach 
For the purpose of our study, we follow the standard event study employed by Fuller et al. 
(2002) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh, (2005) to calculate Cumulative 
Average Returns (CARs) for the five-day period [-2, +2] around the announcement date as 
supplied by SDC. We estimate the abnormal returns by using a modified market-adjusted 
model: 
ARit = R, l - R. f 
where, 
R,, is the Return on firm i and 
Rm, is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share) 
Briefly analyzing our approach, the model used provides that the residual represents the 
abnormal return, which is part of the return that is not predicted, and it is therefore an 
estimate of the change in firm value on that day, which is caused by the event. Then, we 
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cumulate the average retums for each firm over the five-day period to produce the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return CAR, where 
2 
CARIt = LARil 
9-2 
The final step is to average the CAR in order to get the Cumulative Average Residual or 
Return, which represents the average total effect of the event across all firms over a 
specified time interval (five days in our circumstance). 
The market adjusted return method can be thought of as an approximation to the market 
model where a, =0 andA= I for all firms. Because a, is usually small and the average 
Aover all firms is 1, this approximation usually produces acceptable results. 
We do not estimate market parameters based on a time period before each bid since, for 
frequent acquirers, there is a high probability that previous takeover attempts would be 
included in the estimation period, hence making beta estimations less meaningful. 
Additionally, it has been shown that for short window event studies, weighting the market 
return by the firm's beta does not significantly improve estimation (Brown and Warner 
(1980)). 
Z3.3. ]. Z Conventional Parametric Student Nest 
The t-statistics are estimated using the cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns. More 
specifically, the test statistic of the null hypothesis that the mean CARs is equal to zero for 
a sample of n firms is as follows: 
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tC4R 
-,: CA R,, 
/ (a (CA R,, )/-, rn-) 
where CAR,, is the sample average and cr(CAR,, ) is the cross-sectional sample standard 
deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. 
Z3.3. Z Long-Run Event Study 
We are interested in examining the long-run performance of frequent acquirers within a 
maximum 36-month post-acquisition period. It is obvious that in our analysis a subsequent 
acquisition will occur within less than 36 months after a previous acquisition, since our 
sample consists of multiple acquirers. Therefore, for the purpose of our study we use the 
erolling portfolio approach' (or Calendar Time Analysis as it is more commonly known), 
which sidesteps the problem of cross-sectional dependence of observations. 32 The 
Calendar Time Approach was originally used by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974), 
advocated by Fama (1998), and later applied by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and 
Gompers (1997) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). Instead of computing abnormal returns, 
for example for three years after an event, all firms that have had an event in the last three 
years are collected into a portfolio. Time series regressions of monthly returns on this 
portfolio based on factors that determine expected returns are estimated, yielding point 
estimates of abnormal returns and significance levels. However, Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) strongly oppose the calendar time approach and argue that it is the least powerful 
test of market efficiency as it weights each month equally. But usually there will be more 
events in some months than others due to firms picking periods of misvaluation to 
announce corporate events such as takeovers. According to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), 
due to the number of firms being different for each month, heteroscedastic residuals are 
50 
Chapter 2 Bidder Gains and Losses of Firms Involved in Many Acquisitions 
likely to be present when regressing calendar time average portfolio returns in excess of 
the risk free rate against the factors of an asset-pricing model. Hence, when performing 
our regressions we control for heteroscedasticity using Andrews' (199 1) heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The same procedure is followed for the one 
and two-year period after the event respectively. 
Z3.3. Zl. OurApproach 
For each calendar month, a portfolio is formed by including all qualifying takeovers 
during the last three (one and two as well) years. On the first month only takeovers with 
effective dates on this particular month are included. 33 Each month we rebalance our 
portfolio to include all acquirers that have just completed an event and to disregard all the 
ones that have just completed 36 (12 and 24 as well) months in our calendar approach. 
Equal weighted returns are used to average the performance of individual returns in our 
sample following the suggestion of Loughran and Ritter (2000), who prove by using 
simulation and sensitivity analysis that value weighted returns tend to underestimate 
abnormal returns to managerial choice variables such as takeovers. 
Our next step looks at the estimation of the calendar time return by using the well-known, 
and commonly accepted in the UK, three-factor regression model, as identified by Dimson 
" Cross-sectional dependence caused by overlapping observations drives standard errors downwards and 
therefore causes t-statistics to be biased upwards. 
33 Price data for each acquirer are downloaded starting from the effective month of the takeover in each case. 
Consequently the returns data generated for each acquirer are available from the month following the effective 
month and for 12,24 and 36 subsequent months (i. e. t+l.. t+12 .... t+24 ... t+36). This approach is preferable in 
our case as we are more interested in whether slow information diffusion generates overpricing and subsequent 
long-run underperformance. 
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et al. (2003) to account for the UK B/M ratio peculiarities 34 (originally used by Fama and 
French (1993)): 
Rpt - Rfi = a, + ß, (R., -RB, + hi HML, +ei, . fl) 
+ sisM 
where RP, is the simple average monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio, R. is the 
monthly return on three-month Treasury bills, R., is the return on a value weighted 
market index, SMB, is the zero-cost portfolio capturing the difference in the returns of a 
value weighted portfolio of small stocks and large stocks, and HML, is the difference in 
the returns to a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to- 
market stocks. In addition, A, si and h, are regression parameters specific to the portfolio 
and et is the error tenn. The intercept is interpreted as the average of the individual, firm- 
specific intercepts. A positive (negative) intercept indicates that after controlling for 
market, size and book-to-market factors in returns, a sample firm has performed better 
(worse) than expected. The above procedure is repeated three times (for one, two and three 
years respectively) for all seven portfolios identified. 
34 Dimson et al. (2003) use different breakpoints to those of Fama-French (1993) to construct size and book-to- 
market portfolios mainly due to size and value being negatively correlated in the UK and large firms (small 
firms) being concentrated in the low (high) B/M quartile. 
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2.4. Empirical Evidence 
Z4.1. AbnormaiReturns by Target Type and Method ofPayment 
We present (in Tables 2.2,2.3,2.4, and 2.5) the five-day cumulative average returns 
(CARs) to multiple bidders classified by type of target and method of payment. In Table 
2.2 (Panel A) we report the CAR for the full sample of bidders, where several patterns are 
identified. In numbers, for all bids, the CAR is statistically significant and positive 
(0.74%). However, when we differentiate the returns on the basis of whether the target Ql- 
was public or not, we obtain significantly negative CARs of -1.95% for public targets, but 
significantly positive CARs for private and subsidiary targets of 0.73% and 1.09% 
respectively. This is consistent with the UK studies of Firth (1980), Draper and Paudyal 
(1999,2004), Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) and Sudarsanarn. and Mahate (2003) 
who find negative and significant bidder abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. 
We observe that for public targets the CAR is, surprisingly, significantly negative 
irrespective of the method of payment (cash, 35 stock or combination), while the 
performance worsens when stock is used as the method of payment (-4.05% relative to - 
1.16% for cash financing). This is consistent with Myers and Majluf's (1984) hypothesis 
which suggests that the greater information asymmetry associated with stock payments 
leads to more negative performance. 36 The negative returns we obtain for cash payment 
may be due to higher offers (premium) for cash exchanges to compensate target 
shareholders for the immediate payment of taxes. 
35 Draper and Paudyal (1999) find insignificant returns for cash payments. They argue that this is consistent with 
the competitive takeover market hypothesis suggesting that the acquisition of a firm is a zero net present value 
transaction. 
36 Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the premise of information asymmetry raises the proposition that 
managers with private information that their firm's shares are overvalued offer these shares as consideration in 
takeover bids. Outside investors, recognizing the adverse selection problem, consequently revise their estimate 
of the offer's value downwards, a plausible explanation for the negative performance of stock deals. 
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If the target is private, overall bidder returns are significantly positive, insignificant if the 
bid is made with stock but positive and significant if the bid is made with cash or 
combination (0.46% and 1.02% respectively). In addition, the market views acquisitions of 
subsidiaries positively, regardless of the method of payment: more specifically, we obtain 
a positive and significant CAR of 0.98% and 1.26% for cash and combination financing 
respectively. For stock acquisitions insignificant returns are realized. It is interesting that 
subsidiary targets offer acquiring firms the largest abnormal returns. 37 Another noticeable 
point is that when comparing the frequency of payment types by listed targets, we find a 
'balanced picture', since the frequency of cash deals for listed targets (48%) is almost the 
same as the frequency of stock and mixed deals (52%). Nevertheless, unlisted targets 
exhibit substantially lower levels of stock financing (3.5% and 1.8% respectively). Note 
that private companies are very closely held. Consequently, according to Martin (1996), 
since stock-financed acquisitions typically reduce the wealth of the acquiring firm's 
shareholders, the likelihood of acquisitions being financed in this manner should be lower 
when blockholdings are higher. 
In Panels B and C of Table 2.2 we differentiate our results on the basis of whether the 
acquisition return reflects the first bid or the third and higher bids. We expect that bidder 
returns on the third and higher bids will contain relatively less information about the 
bidder than the first bid since the market has learned about the bidder, and correspondingly 
contain relatively more information about the synergies and division of gains in the deals 
than earlier bids. Consistent to Asquith et al. (1983), our results suggest that the market 
reaction to later deals is different than the reaction to the first bid. For public targets, we 
37 Note that more than half the acquisitions are made with cash. Hence, especially when one includes private 
targets and subsidiaries, the comment of Andrade et al. (200 1) that mergers in the last decades are dominated by 
a friendly stock swap negotiation is not consistent with our data. 
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find significantly negative abnormal returns (-2.29%) to the first bid, interestingly, for 
both cash and stock (-2.39% and -2.17% respectively), although the sample sizes are quite 
small. Similarly, we obtain significantly negative abnormal returns (-1.95%) for the third 
and higher bids for public targets. Public targets acquired with stock (-5.13%) 
impressively drive this result. This greater (more than double) negative return for later 
deals may be due to the dilution of ownership from offers made for large public firms. The 
CAR for the first bids for private and subsidiary targets is positive and significant (1.12% 
and 1.46%), regardless of the method of payment. Consistently, returns are also 
significantly positive for the third and higher bids for private and subsidiary targets. 
However, the magnitude of the positive reaction is less for the later bids and insignificant 
for stock financing for both private and subsidiary targets. According to Loderer and 
Martin (1990), the evidence of higher abnormal returns for first bids is consistent with the 
notion that acquisitions are beneficial to bidding firms and that partial anticipation makes 
it more difficult to observe supporting evidence. In addition, Roll (1986) sets the 
hypothesis that hubris may cause managers to bid too much for acquisition targets and that 
they may not get to do a sufficient number of acquisitions in their career to fully 
understand the winner's curse problem. The tendency to overbid should be particularly 
acute for 'novice' bidders that, according to previous empirical evidence, do not fare badly 
at all. 
We could also interpret these results for later bids for private firms and subsidiaries, as a 
consequence of the less favourable price that bidders receive when they acquire multiply 
private firms and subsidiaries in a short period of time. Another possible explanation is 
55 
Chapter 2 Bidder Gains and Losses of Firms Involved in Many Acquisitions 
that bidders who proceed to quick (i. e. many in a concentrated period) acquisitions seem to 
create a relatively small amount of synergies or to negotiate less efficiently. 38 
We test these ideas by examining a sample of clustered bids (two or more bids for private 
firms made on the same day). The average size of these bids (and the target's relative size 
compared to the bidder) is essentially the same as in the ftill sample in Table 2.2. In Table 
2.3 we display the five-day CARs for all bids (238 bids) for clustered private targets, 
which is a significant 1.43%, an insignificant 0.92% for 140 cash bids, an insignificant 
0.51% for 14 stock bids, and a significant 2.45% for 84 combination bids. Since these 
targets are of a similar size to those in the our original sample and there are two or more 
targets acquired on the same day, these CARs are smaller in magnitude on a per bid basis 
than if only one private firm was acquired on that day. Therefore, according to Fuller et al. 
(2002), we can support that bidders do not do as well, per acquisition, either because they 
pay too much or create less synergy when they buy multiple private firms in a short period 
of time. 
Z4.2. Empirical Evidence on Subsidiary Acquisitions 
In Table 2.4 we provide the results of subsidiary acquisitions. According to Fuller et al. 
(2002), a reason why a firm sells a subsidiary is the gain from increased focus. Therefore, 
we assume that diversified firms might accept a relatively lower price for an asset sale 
than a non-diversified firm (a diversification discount). We divide our sample of 
3' Acquisition fieldwork and laboratory experiments show that managers cannot carefully evaluate acquisitions 
that occur in quick succession (Haunschild et al. (1994)). Managers often experience an adrenaline rush or over- 
exuberance to acquire (jernisson and Sitkin (1986)) and hence they ignore inferences from prior acquisitions, 
particularly if those inferences raise doubts about the merits of the focal acquisition. 
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subsidiary targets based on whether their selling parent was diversified or not and we find 
that the returns to acquirers buying subsidiaries from diversified or non-diversified parents 
are relatively similar for all bids and first bids. First of all, we observe that cash financing 
is the significantly dominant method of payment in acquisitions of subsidiaries consistent 
with Faccio and Masulis (2005). Another noticeable result is the very high positive and 
significant CAR for stock offers to non-diversified firms for all and first bids (9.75% and 
13.63% respectively). A possible explanation in the case of non-diversified parents is that 
targets have sufficient information regarding the fundamental value of bidders' shares and 
therefore they avoid being 'victims' of overvaluation, or bidders offer stock at a discount 
price for tax reasons. For third and higher bids, only acquisitions made using cash or 
combination provide the bidder with significantly positive returns. However, stock 
financing provides insignificant results to diversified bidders for all, first, and third and 
higher bids respectively, while cash and combination offers exhibit more positive 
performance for diversified than no-diversified subsidiaries. Therefore, there is weak 
evidence that diversified parents will sell subsidiaries at a discount relative to non- 
diversified parents. 
2 4.3. Bidders Acquiring Both Public and Private Targets 
The above results indicate that the market views bids for private firms and subsidiaries 
from a different point than those for public firms. As we have already suggested, 
consistent with Fuller et al. (2002), this is due to either a difference in the synergies 
between acquisitions of public, private, and subsidiary targets or in the division of gains 
from the bid. However, one could also argue that these results are due to differences in the 
characteristics of bidders for public and private targets. Hence, we examine the returns to 
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acquirers separated by those made bids for only private, only subsidiary, and those 
acquired both public and non-public targets. Unfortunately for our examination, there is no 
bidder in our sample that acquired only public targets. This may be due to the fact that 
bidding firms that are involved in merger programmes are very careful in their first 
acquisition attempt. A successful completion of an acquisition is a 'necessary prerequisite' 
for the bidders in order to resolve the uncertainty that exists in the market with regards to 
the value of their firm (Asquith et al. (1983)). Therefore, it seems plausible that we have 
no bidder that acquired only public firms within a three-year period, since the acquisition 
of private targets or subsidiaries would have more possibilities for success, due to their 
smaller size or if we take notice of the agency problems that exist in public companies. In 
Table 2.5 we present the returns to bidders that purchased public, private and subsidiary 
targets and we observe very similar results to those of the main sample in Table 2.2. As in 
Table 2.2, the average CARs for bidders are significantly negative if the target is a public 
firm but significantly positive if the target firm is a private firm or a subsidiary. We could 
argue by saying that it is the characteristics of the target firm and its potential relationship 
with the bidding firm rather than the bidding firm itself that determines these results. 
In Panels B and C of Table 2.5, we examine the returns to multiple acquirers for bids of 
only private or only subsidiaries in order to confirm the above results. The CARs to a 
bidder that only acquired private firms (Panel B) are positive and significant (0.99%) 
similarly to the result we got in Panel A for private acquisitions when the bidder acquires 
both public and private firms. However, when we partition the sample according to the 
method of payment we obtain insignificant abnormal returns. The same pattern with Panel 
A is presented in the CARs of bidders that acquired only subsidiary targets (significant 
positive 1.35% CAR compared to significant positive 1.07% CAR of Panel A). Due to this 
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consistency between Panel A and Panels B and C, we suspect that bids for only public 
firms are likely to exhibit the same picture with those engaged in bids of firms acquiring 
both public and private firms. The fact that there are no acquisitions made for only public 
firms enables us to conclude that most acquirers prefer to purchase both public and non- 
public targets. 
In sum, Table 2.5 offers the opportunity to enforce one of our main arguments, which is a 
positive market reaction to acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets, while negative 
returns are suspected for acquisitions of public targets. Therefore, whether the market 
views positively or negatively the same bidder depends on the type of target, even after 
controlling for the method of payment. 
Z4.4. Abnormal Returns by Relative Size and Method ofPayment 
A very important component affecting bidder returns is the target size. Since private 
targets are, on average, much smaller than public targets we expect the impact on the 
bidder of a private acquisition to be smaller than a public acquisition. Therefore, we 
control for the effect of target size on bidder returns in order to be able to compare in a 
relatively better manner public and private acquisitions. We use the relative size of target 
to bidder by defining it as target market value (when the target is public) or the deal value 
(when the target is a private firm or subsidiary) divided by the bidder market value. 
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First of all, in Panel A of Table 2.6 for the full sample, we observe that, consistent with the 
previous empirical evidence, 39 as the target size increases the CAR also increases. In Panel 
B, for public targets, the larger the targets relative to the bidder, the more negative the 
acquirer's CAR. Once again, and in contrast to the literature, the negative return is not 
driven by stock offers to public targets, as we identify negative abnormal returns for cash 
offers as well. However, for private targets and subsidiaries (Panels C and D) there is a 
positive relationship between the target's relative size and the acquirer's positive abnormal 
returns. 40 Interestingly, we observe that, unlike public targets, as the relative size 
increases, bidders that acquire private targets with stock have, on average, larger CARs 
than bidders acquiring private targets with cash . 
41 This pattern of higher returns on average 
for stock offers than cash offers does not hold for subsidiary targets except for the larger 
than 20% relative size level. Finally, in all panels (A, B, C, and D)42 we observe that for 
relative size lower than 5% cash is used in greater amount than all the other higher size 
levels. This occurs because for 5% relative size level most of the larger bidders are 
included. Larger firms are more diversified and, thus, have proportionally lower expected 
bankruptcy costs. They also have lower flotation costs and are likely to have better access 
to debt markets, making debt financing more readily available. Hence, Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) suggest that cash financing should be more feasible in the case of larger firms. In 
addition, larger firms prefer to use cash financing in small deals, due to its ease of use, 
provided they have sufficient unused debt capacity or liquid assets. Further, the use of cash 
allows the bidder to avoid the significant costs of obtaining shareholder approval of pre- 
39 Asquith et al. (1983) found greater abnormal returns for larger public targets in the 1970s. 
40 Consistently to Ang and Kohers (2001), bidder return results are robust to size differences between private 
and public target takeovers. 
41 Fuller et al. (2002) identified a similar pattern for a sample of US takeovers. 
42 Percentage of cash of the sample with relative size lower than 5% compared to relative size levels 5%-9.99%, 
10%-19.99% and higher or equal than 20%: (Panel A): 66.240/o> 54.95%, 53.24%, 44.44%, (Panel B): 72.720/o> 
60%, 43.47%, 32.5%, (Panel Q: 57.6%> 42.53%, 46.36%, 34.54%, (Panel D): 81.120/o> 74.39%, 67.24%, 
59.27%. 
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emptive rights exemptions and stock authorizations and the higher regulatory costs of 
stock offers. 
Z4.4.1. Erplanationsfor the Identified Patterns ofAcquiring Returns 
There are several possible explanations for the deteriorating performance of bidders 
completing many acquisitions in a short period of time. As already discussed, one possible 
reason is that they are unable to integrate subsequent acquisitions, due to the short interval 
among them, and hence each subsequent acquisition results in a worse performance than 
the previous one. 
According to Conn et al. (2004), the Diminishing Returns Hypothesis applies the 
diminishing efficiency of investment schedule to a firm's acquisition programme. As it 
suggests, the best opportunities are taken first and therefore the value derived from 
subsequent takeovers follows a declining performance over time. It does not have to be 
static, but it does require that the dynamic creation of new investment opportunities does 
not keep up with the speed of the acquisition programme. It predicts that the longer the 
gap between subsequent acquisitions, the lower the fall in acquisition performance. 
43 
The Hubris Hypothesis takes the view that worsening performance is high owing to less 
care being taken with the next takeover due to overconfidence drawn from the success of 
the previous one. This could manifest in several ways: a less careful choice of targets leads 
to a higher price paid for those targets, or a higher leverage being taken on to pay for 
subsequent acquisitions. Under this hypothesis, it seems plausible that a decline is much 
43 However, Hayward (2002) suggests a U-shaped relationship between the acquisition performance and the 
intervals between acquisitions, which means that the performance is worse either when acquisitions occur in 
quick succession or in very long intervals. 
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more acute for acquirers whose initial acquisition is successful. Furthermore, the 
subsequent acquisitions may sometimes tend not only to create less synergy, but could 
also be of destructive value. 
In addition, the Merger Programme Announcement Hypothesis explains the decline by 
saying that on the announcement of the first acquisition the market both reacts favourably 
to that event and also that because the first acquisition is part of a merger programme. This 
leads to the first acquisitions being looked on very favourably. When a second acquisition 
is announced then there is some announcement gain since it is now a known event, but 
part of the value was already discounted in the share price. While this theory predicts a 
zero effect on share returns of later acquisitions, it makes no prediction about a decline in 
profitability associated with subsequent acquisitions. 
The Accounting Manipulation Hypothesis suggests that the market may only initially 
(short-run) be fooled by the accounting manipulations associated with mergers. In simple 
words, one accounting explanation for the declining performance is the P/E game that 
focuses on increasing Earnings Per Share (EPS) through purchases of targets with 
relatively low P/E ratios (compared to the bidder's P/E). This motive, which has been in 
fashion lately, has the qualities of being completely irrational, shortsighted and 
unsustainable. 
There are several possible interpretations for the negative performance of large public 
firms. One could argue that the larger the target is relative to the bidder, the stronger the 
target's negotiating position and ability to extract more of the gain from the transaction. Or 
alternatively, bidding firms may find it more difficult to integrate larger public targets into 
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their business. However, neither of these explanations clarifies the different relationship 
between the returns to bidders and the relative size of the target for bids for private targets 
and bids for public targets. Finally, another explanation is that there are fundamental 
differences in the division of gains and/or synergies between acquisitions involving public 
and private targets, and these differences are magnified by greater the relative size of the 
merger. According to Fuller et al. (2002), this may be partially due to a liquidity effect. 
Private firms and subsidiaries confront the problem of liquidity, meaning that they cannot 
be bought and sold as easily as public firms. Therefore, in order to create an attractive 
image for their company and a plausible incentive as a profitable investment opportunity 
for potential acquirers, they offer their shares at a discount (liquidity). This strategy of 
liquidity discount becomes even more essential due to the lack of an auction-like 
atmosphere within private firms, which is in opposition to the auction-like nature and, 
obviously, liquidity of public firms, enhanced by the presence of risk arbitrageurs. Risk 
arbitrageurs, are professional investors that take position in both target and bidder stocks to 
provide liquidity to the market and more specifically to public companies (both bidders 
and targets). 
Takeover bids and substantial acquisition of shares are governed in the UK by the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the City Code), by non-statutory regulation issued by 
the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (The Panel), and by the Rules Governing 
Substantial Acquisitions of Shares (SARs). The entire structure of the regulation 
framework of takeovers 44 favours public targets more in the bidding process than a private 
44 The Companies Act (1985) (sections 198 and 199) require that if a holding reaches or exceeds 3% of the 
company's capital, it must be declared. At the same time, the SARs restrict the speed with which a person may 
increase his/her holding of shares in a company. Except under specific circumstances, Rule I dictates that 'a 
person may not, in any period of 7 days, acquire shares carrying voting rights in a company, or rights over such 
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target. For example, Rule 3 of SARs requires a person to disclose, no later than 12 noon on 
the business day following the day of the acquisition, the acquisitions and holdings if the 
holding exceeds 15% or any whole percentage figure after that. These requirements apply 
to public targets, but not to private or subsidiary targets. In addition, firm takeover 
defenses apply, in fact, only in the case of public firms which have the 'privilege' to resist 
any offer, something which sounds very difficult, if not impossible for a private firm that 
is for sale. 45 One could argue that private firms, due to their concentrated blockholder 
formation, could very easily reject any takeover offer. However, it has been proved that, in 
fact, managers of private firms are relatively more open to the idea of selling the company, 
either for reasons of retirement or ownership of illiquid stock options. 46 As a result, this 
drives them to lose a large part of their advantage in effective bargaining position, and 
therefore to sell their companies at a lower value rather than under different circumstances. 
However, the liquidity effect alone cannot explain why, as the relative size of the merger 
increases, so does the disparity in returns between cash and stock bids for private targets as 
shown in Table 2.6 (Panel C). 
shares, representing 10% or more of the voting rights if such acquisition, when aggregated with any shares or 
rights over shares which he already holds, would carry 15% or more, but less than 30Y6, of the voting rights of 
that company'. According to the City Code (Rule 9) as soon as 30% or more of the voting rights are acquired, 
the person acquiring those shares is required to make a mandatory offer. If the holding is just under 30%, under 
certain circumstances, the holder may also be required to make a general offer. 
45 Holl and Kyriazis (1997) suggest that high director holdings (existing in the vast majority of private firms) 
from target are more likely to accept the bid and therefore a discounted price should be expected. 46 The examples of family firms selling out to conglomerates in the 1960s and of entrepreneurial firms selling 
Out to Cisco and Intel in the 1990s fit nicely with this view. 
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Z4.5. Abnormal Returns by DomesticlForeign Targets and Method of Payment 
Since the UK is a leading player in international acquisitions, the study of UK acquisitions 
abroad is an important aspect in determining the overall success of FDI by acquisition. 47 
Generally speaking, we would expect a worse performance for the acquisitions of foreign 
firms. Firms engaging in cross-border M&As are faced with unique risks such as 'liability 
of foreignness' (Zaheer (1995)) and 'double-layered acculturation' (Barkema et al. 
(1996)). Differences in national culture, customer preferences, business practices, and 
institutional forces, such as government regulations, can obstruct firms from fully realizing 
their strategic objectives. Uncertainty and information asymmetry in foreign markets make 
it difficult for firms to adjust and learn from both the local market and target firm (Kogut 
and Singh (1988), Zaheer (1995)). As a consequence, liability of foreignness and double- 
layered acculturation serve as barriers to learning new knowledge and capabilities in a 
cross-border M&As. 
In Table 2.7 we display the CARs of acquiring firms buying domestic (UK companies) or 
foreign (non-UK companies) targets. Panel A reports the results for domestic acquisitions, 
which mirror the previous finding obtained in the full sample of Table 2.2. The CARs for 
public targets are significantly negative (-4.27%) under stock payment and marginally 
significant for joined payment. However, CARs are positive and significant for private 
targets and subsidiaries regardless of the means of payment. For cross-border acquisitions, 
Panel B virtually reports the same pattern as Panel A although CARs for public targets are 
not significant. Given that the sample size for public targets is small, it would not be 
prudent to draw fruitful conclusions from these results. Domestic acquisitions outperform 
47 Healy and Palepu (1993) note that, during the late 1980s, the UK was the lead acquiring nation in 
international acquisitions accounting for almost 30 per cent of international corporate investments over that 
period. 
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on average foreign ones only for private targets, possibly due to more imperfect 
information in non-domestic deals. The larger on average profits for stock versus cash 
payments (4.80% vs 0.69%) in foreign acquisitions could be explained by the attempt of 
bidders to offset the greater uncertainty connected with the information problems 
associated with acquiring abroad. This comes along with the findings of Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004), who imply that the choice of means of payment does not act as a 
signal to the market about the over/undervaluation of the bidder's equity. Overall, results 
reported in Panel A and B confirm to a major extent the return pattern documented in 
Table 2.2. This empirical evidence is considered critical since one could argue that our 
results are contaminated by the initial selection of the sample including both domestic and 
foreign targets. In a nutshell, the general pattern holds even after target origin is taken into 
consideration. 
2.4.6. Abnormal Returns by DiversifyinglNon-Diversifying Acquisitions and Method of 
Payment 
Previous empirical evidence suggests that corporate diversification may indeed affect 
shareholders' wealth. Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) 
found that the announcement of a diversifying acquisition was generally associated with a 
small positive impact on the shareholders' performance. 48 However, there is a large body 
in the literature providing evidence that diversification may diminish shareholders' wealth 
(e. g. Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes, (1996)). Doukas and 
Kan (2004) argue that bidders who acquire unrelated targets experience greater excess 
48 For more recent evidence of positive abnormal returns from diversifying acquisitions see: Billett and Mauer 
(2000) and Hadlock, Ryngaert and Thomas (200 1). 
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cash flow declines and valuation discounts than do bidders involved in related 
acquisitions. In addition, Fuller et al. (2002) examine only the diversification wealth effect 
of a bidder acquiring a subsidiary target that is core or non-core-related with the bidding 
company. They argue that the reason why a firm sells a subsidiary is the gain from the 
increased focus. However, they find weak evidence that diversified firms will sell 
subsidiaries at a discount relative to non-diversified companies. 
Table 2.8 reports the results of bidders acquiring public, private and/or subsidiary targets 
that are diversified or non-diversified from the bidder's industry. A diversified company is 
defined as a firm whose three-digit SIC code is different from that of the target firm. 49 
Panel A presents, for diversifying acquisitions, a similar finding as the one obtained from 
the overall sample in Table 2.2. The CARs are positive and significant for the full sample 
(0.77%) and for private targets and subsidiaries (0.80% and 1.01% respectively), while 
significantly negative abnormal returns are experienced for public targets (-1.32%). 
Bidders buying public targets generate significant losses regardless of the method of 
payment used (cash or stock), while private targets earn significant gains when they 
purchase by cash. Panel B displays our results for non-diversifying acquisitions, which are 
relatively similar to Panel A. More specifically, we obtain significantly positive abnormal 
returns for the overall sample and for private targets and subsidiaries, and negative CARs 
for public acquisitions. Therefore, as a whole, we conclude that our findings are robust 
even after cross-industry effect is taken into consideration. 
49 Servaes (1996) points out that a straightforward examination of the four-digit SIC codes of the segments of 
the firm does not necessarily reveal the degree of diversification of the firm. He argues that the use of the 4-digit 
SIC code would be too wide to identify the industrial structure of the firm. Similarly, Kahle and Walkling 
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2.4.7. Abnormal Returns by Book-to-Market Ratio and Method ofPayment 
In Table 2.9 we examine the announcement returns of glamour versus value bidders to 
confirm our initial hypothesis that the research design we follow (selection of a sample 
containing bidders that acquired three firms within three years) allows us to control for 
much of the information about the bidders' characteristics contained in the returns at the 
announcement of the takeover. In addition, of course, we seek to identify whether the 
return patterns obtained in Table 2.2 stand when we control for book-to-market ratio. We 
define value acquirers as those with high B/M ratio (high-growth opportunities), while 
glamour acquirers are the bidders with low B/M ratio (low-growth opportunities). 
For the overall sample (Panel A), consistent with Rau and Vermaelen (1998), we 
document that glamour acquirers significantly outperform value acquirers on average 
(0.87% versus 0.75%). While the past performance of bidding firms may affect their share 
price behaviour in the long-run, 50 it seems that the market fails to initially (short-run) 
understand that past managerial performance is not necessarily a good indicator -at least in 
the case of acquisitions- of future performance. The same pattern is followed for private 
targets and subsidiaries (Panel C, D). For public targets (Panel B) we report, consistent to 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), 51 an inverse relationship, since glamour bidders 
significantly underperform on average value bidders irrespective of the method of 
payment (only for cash payment both value and glamour bidders exhibit insignificant 
return). Results that are worth a comment are the significantly high returns of glamour 
acquirers that select stock as method of payment (10.85%) and the fact that (apart from 
(1996) demonstrate how a four-digit SIC code firm assigned to a firm might be misleading with regard to the 
most reasonable two- or three-digit classifications. 50 Rau and Vermaelen (1998), by using a sample of US takeovers suggest that low B/M 'glamour acquirers' 
perform much worse than value firms. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) use a sample of UK public acquisitions. 
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subsidiaries) low B/M glamour acquirers exhibit better performance on average for cash 
offers. 
In sum, our findings are robust for all book-to-market groups of acquirers, enhancing the 
full sample evidence (Table 2.2). In addition, we can conclude that announcement market 
returns are not affected by bidders' characteristics. Independently of the explanation given 
for the above results (our sample selection or the nature of the market itself), they indicate 
the robustness of our study. 
Z4.8. Regression Analysis 
So far, we have analyzed returns to acquirers on a univariate basis. In this section, we 
examine the interaction of various determinants on the acquirer's returns by performing 
multivariate tests. In Table 2.4.10, we display the outcomes of regressing the bidder's 
CARs on factors that may impact its returns. As with all regressions that explain returns to 
acquiring firms, results may not exhibit quite sufficient explanations, due to the low 
explanatory power of the regression (R2). As we have shown above, our results suggest 
that there are fundamental differences between public, private, and subsidiary targets. 
Consequently, we regress CARs on factors that determine the performance of bidders for 
each group separately. However, we should note at this point that there is an overlapping 
effect between the bidders in the three regressions, since bidders were involved in all three 
types of acquisitions (public, private, subsidiary targets). 
The estimation of bidder returns is conducted on the basis of several bid characteristics, 
such as whether the target is acquired with stock or with a combination of cash and stock. 
We also include the log of the relative size of the target to the bidder, the log of the 
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target's size, and dummy variables to indicate if the target and the bidder belong to the 
sarne industry, if the bid is the first bid or if the bid is a third or higher bid. In addition, 
other variables include interaction variables between the method of payment (cash, stock 
and combination of cash and stock) and the relative size of the target, and if the target is 
foreign or if the subsidiary is from a diversified firm. 52 
We incorporate these specific explanatory variables into our model due to the literature, 
sugg . esting that they are determinants of the market's perception of an acquisition. For 
example, we have already provided evidence that the larger the target compared to the 
bidder, the greater the abnormal returns that the bidder enjoys. Interaction variables 
between the method of payment used and the relative size are included to capture the 
interaction that may exist between the relative magnitude of the acquisition and any news 
conveyed by the choice of the bidder's method of payment. We also use dummy variables 
for whether a bid was a first bid or a third and higher bids to confirm the results we 
obtained from the univariate analysis. Bidder returns in later acquisitions may contain 
relatively less information about the bidder than the first deal, since we assume that the 
market has learned about the bidder, and correspondingly contain relatively more 
information about the synergies and division of gains in the deal than in earlier 
acquisitions. The foreign dummy accounts for the potential that bids for non-UK targets 
are different than bids for UK firms. Finally, we examine whether industry effect (bidder 
and target belong in the same industry) may account for the bidder's return. 
Generally speaking, we achieve similar results to what we have found by using a 
univariate analysis. For subsidiary targets, the coefficient on the interaction between stock 
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and relative size is positive and significant. This suggests that, similar to the univariate 
results, the larger the relative size of the target for private firms, the greater the positive 
abnormal returns to the bidder who makes a stock offer. The coefficient on the relative 
size is also positive and significant. This indicates that as the size of the target to the 
bidder increases, the bidder's CARs are also affected. In addition, we confirm the 
interesting result of significantly positive CARs for acquisitions of foreign targets as we 
have found in univariate regressions. This result provides evidence that UK public firms 
exhibit positive share price performance after acquiring foreign subsidiaries. Finally, the 
variables appear to have joint significance, as the F-statistic is positive and significant. 
There are fewer variables that have significant coefficients in the sample of acquisitions of 
public or private firms. For public firms, we notice that they experience significantly 
negative CARs when they acquire a target within the same industry. This may be due to 
the fact that, in the case of share exchange, a target's firm managers have sufficient 
information about the fundamental value of the bidder's shares and do not accept 
overvalued shares or, in the case of cash exchange, their bargaining power is better than, 
for example, private firm's managers, and therefore require a higher premium from the 
bidder. All other variables are insignificant. Finally, for private firms the relative size of 
the target to bidder is positive and significant. This result can be explained by the fact that 
the market views larger deals even more favourably. Similarly here, all other variables are 
insignificant. 
The interaction variables may cause multicollinearity so we run 3 regressions excluding these variables. Our 
results remained similar to the results we got with interaction variables included in the regressions. 
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Z4.9. Post-event Stock Price Performance 
Up to this point, we have assumed that the market incorporates information in stock prices 
efficiently, so that the announcement return is an unbiased estimate of the impact of an 
acquisition on wealth of the acquiring firm shareholders. Our aim is to obtain a more 
spherical and complete view concerning the profits that acquiring firms experience when 
they proceed to a takeover of a target. This can only be achieved if we examine the 
abnormal returns both in the short-run and long-run. Such a process seems necessary 
insofar as one could argue that the returns we report for the five-day interval may easily 
represent market inefficiency, and therefore the wealth gains observed for private targets 
and subsidiaries are actually equivalent to market mispricing. So far, we have shown that 
in the short-run (five-day window) bids for private targets and subsidiaries lead to larger 
on average returns than bids for public targets. In order to be confident to accept short-run 
conclusions and reach a relatively thorough investigation of shareholders' wealth effects, 
we examine the long-run performance of bidding firms over one, two and three years after 
the acquisition event respectively. 
Although the issue is clearly unsettled, the long-run underperformance gains a support 
from the bulk body in the literature. The literature provides evidence that long-run event 
studies exhibit some problems in the calculation of accurate abnormal returns. 53 First of 
all, the methodological problem associated with long-run event studies arises, such as the 
bad model problem (CAR/BHAR) and biases 54 in calculating long-run abnormal stock 
returns (i. e. the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias, the skewness bias, and the cross- 
sectional correlations) which lead to biased test statistics and obviously flawed long- 
53 In Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.2) we present analytically the problems and biases concerning long-term event study 
methodologies. 
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horizon test results. Secondly, the benchmark against which we calculate our abnormal 
returns is usually a controversial issue, as in the long-run studies the use of a different 
benchmark leads to controversial results. Further, on a more general framework, 
Viswanathan. and Wei (2004) provide a mathematical proof that the usual abnormal return 
(CAR/BHAR) calculated in event studies has a negative expectation. They prove that, in 
any finite sample, the expected event abnormal returns will invariably be negative and 
become even more negative as the event window is lengthened. Apart ftorn the 
methodological errors discussed above, an alternative explanation for the long-run 
underperformance is that returns represent a delayed market reaction to overpriced 
acquisitions. In other words, an acquiring firm might have overvalued and paid too much 
premium to the target, and this leads to a delayed price correction in their post-acquisition 
period. Finally, previous studies have consistently found that acquiring firms' shareholder 
returns are a 'method of payment' dependent. Almost all studies have reported that cash 
financed bidding firms consistently outperform their equity-financed counterparts. 55 
2.4.9.1. Empirical Results 
OLS estimates of monthly average, abnormal returns (AARs) in excess of the Fama and 
French (FF) three-factor model for one-year calendar time portfolios formed on the basis 
of target public status are displayed in Panel A of Table 2.11. Jensen's alpha that measures 
the degree of mispricing, assuming that the model may accurately capture abnormal 
returns, is negative (-0.70%) and significant for the first portfolio comprising of all 3383 
54 See, for example, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997). 55 See, for example, Travlos (1987), Huang and Walking (1987), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), and 
Loughran and Vijh (1997). 
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acquisitions. 56 Both the market factor (Rm-Rf) and the size factor (SMB) are significant, 
while the coefficient of determination appears to explain sufficiently the variation in 
excess returns (R2=84.1 1%). Finally, the B/M factor (HML) is smaller in magnitude (as in 
all our portfolios) than the size factor (SMB). This is consistent with the literature, which 
suggests that size effect is most pronounced in the UK. 
Subsequently, this 'All-Acquisitions' portfolio is divided into the 'Public', 'Private' and 
'Subsidiary' groups, according to the target public status. We find that acquisitions of 
public firms exhibit negative and statistically significant monthly abnormal returns (- 
1.50%). This evidence is consistent with the literature that suggests underperformance of 
bidding firms involved in public acquisitions in the long run. Complementary details are 
that all three factors are individually and jointly significant and R2 is 55.20%. 
Accordingly, proceeding to the analysis of private and subsidiary groups, our findings 
indicate that private firms and subsidiaries follow the short-run pattern, meaning that they 
have better performance on average than public firms (in this case less loss). In numbers, 
both groups have negative (-0.55% and -0.70% respectively) and significant monthly 
AARs, while only HMB (the B/M factor) is insignificant in both groups. Note that we 
provide results of monthly abnormal returns and the differentiation of approximately 1% 
on average between public and private targets is of great magnitude to enhance our 
56 For US empirical evidence on acquirers' long run stock returns, see for example: Asquith (1983), Malatesta, 
(1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Magenheim and Mueller (1988), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), 
Loderer and Martin (1992), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), 
and Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2004). For evidence from the UK, see for example: Firth (1980), Franks and 
Harris (1989), Kennedy and Limnack (1996), and Gregory (1997). There are, however, other studies (e. g. 
Bradley and Jarrell (1988), and Franks, Harris and Titman (1991)) that do not find significant underperformance 
in the three years following the merger. We are aware of very few papers examining post-acquisition 
performance of privately held and subsidiary firms. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find insignificantly 
positive three-year post-acquisition abnormal returns for private targets and zero abnormal returns for subsidiary 
targets. 
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conclusion that bidders experience on average less profit when acquiring public targets. 57 
The better performance of private firms on average could be explained by the monitoring 
hypothesis, which suggests that the private firm's blockholders become effective monitors 
of the bidder's management. Jensen (1991) argues that active investors provide benefits 
because of their incentive to undertake costly monitoring. Blockholders of private firms 
are examples of potentially active investors. In addition, we should not be surprised by the 
fact that subsidiaries perform worse on average than private targets if we bear in mind that, 
although they are unlisted, public firms mainly still own them and therefore their share 
price performance might be infected. 
We then differentiate our results on the basis of the method of payment used during the 
merger (Panel B). Consistent with the literature 58 on long-run event studies, we observe 
the worst performance when the stock method of payment is used. In numbers we obtain 
significantly negative AARs of -1.73% for stock exchanges. Correspondingly, the 
consistency of the above results to the five-day CARs' findings appears once again, since, 
surprisingly, we also obtain significantly negative abnormal returns for cash exchange (- 
0.74%). Finally, a combination of cash and stock as means of payment exhibits 
significantly negative returns as well (-0.49%). 
57 Bruner (2001) suggests: 'Statistical significance is not the same as economic materiality. To say that M&A 
transactions create or destroy value on average, one needs not only the proof of significance (i. e. that the result 
is not due to chance) but also materiality, that the wealth effect is something that shareholders or society should 
worry about. Many of the significant abnormal returns reported in event studies are as low as one or two percent 
-one might ask whether this is enough to care about? The answer is emphatically 'yes'. Abnormal returns of this 
magnitude in a short period of time are enough to cause concern or elation among institutions or other 
sophisticated investors whose performance in turn can be greatly affected by these kinds of events. One also 
needs to compare apples to apples: the M&A event returns must be annualized to compare them to other rates of 
returns that investors experience. 
" See, for example, Loughran and Vijh (1997). 
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Further, we follow the same procedure to identify the performance of bidders two years 
(24 months) after the acquisition. In Panel A of Table 2.12 we present the AARs of the 
overall portfolio, including all 2,995 takeovers, as well as the AARs dependent on the 
public status of target. Similarly to a one-year calendar time analysis, we also find that a is 
negative (-0.86%) and statistically significant for the first portfolio consisting of all 
acquisitions up to 1999. In addition, all three factors are significant and the coefficient of 
determination RI equals to 82.36%. 
After observing the overall picture of our sample, we provide the results of the three 
subgroups in order to examine if different public status leads to differing performance. We 
identify that bidders acquiring public firms experience economically and statistically 
significant negative monthly AARs (-1.60%). A similar pattern to the results obtained for 
the one-year analysis is observed when examining acquisitions of private targets and 
subsidiaries, since both groups of private targets and subsidiaries exhibit better 
performance than public firms but significantly negative AARs (-0.72% and -0.80% 
respectively). Once again our model seems reliable, as all three factors, Rm-Rf, SMB and 
HML, for private and subsidiary targets are significant at the 5% level. 
Proceeding with the examination of the two-year long-run performance with regards to the 
method of payment (Panel B of Table 11), we find that the stock form of financing 
remains the worst concerning to the returns that bidders experience on average in the long 
run. In numbers, we obtain - 1.5 1% AARs when stock is used as method of payment, while 
-0.79% and -1.07% AARs are estimated for cash and combination of cash and stock, 
respectively. Once again, interestingly, all three factors Rm-Rf, SMB and HML, are 
jointly significant at the 5% level. 
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Finally, we examine the three-year long run performance of bidding firms, which is 
(together with five) the most commonly used period for long-run analysis. The 
identification of the acquirer return patterns over such a long period of time provides a 
better and more spherical understanding of bidders' earnings when engaging in merger 
actions. In numbers, the results we obtain for one and two-year analyses are pronouncedly 
confirmed in the three-year analysis. Monthly AARs in excess of the Fama and French 
(FF) three-factor model for three-year calendar time portfolios formed on the basis of 
target public status are displayed in Panel A of Table 2.13. Jensen's alpha is negative (- 
0.94%) and statistically significant for the first portfolio comprising of all 2,607 takeovers 
from 1983-1998. All three factors (Rm-Rf, SMB, HML) are statistically significant, while 
the coefficient of determination R2equals to the standard (according to one and two years' 
results) value of 81.53%. Following the usual procedure, we split our overall portfolio into 
the 'Public', 'Private' and 'Subsidiary' groups and we obtain significantly negative AARs 
(-1.35%) for public targets as well as private firms and subsidiaries (-0.84% and -0-88% 
respectively). Approving the reliability of our model, all 3 factors (Rm-Rf, SMB and 
HML) for subsidiary targets are significant at the 1% level. 
In addition, we control for the effect of the method of payment in the long-run 
performance of bidding firms (Panel B of Table 2.11). We find that, consistent with the 
vast majority of the literature, acquirers buying by stock exhibit significantly negative 
monthly AARs (-1.49%), while cash or combination of cash and stock exchanges 
experience insignificantly negative AARs. All these results, specifically for the three-year 
period after the event, obtain more weight, as our initial purpose was to fulfil our 
performance analysis by examining the most commonly applied long-run interval. 
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We subsequently conduct a robustness test to further evaluate the above evidence. 
Multiple acquirers were initially defined as bidders that acquire three or more public 
and/or private targets and/or subsidiaries within a three-year period. Therefore, one could 
argue that, for example, inter-effects sourcing from the same bidder acquiring both public 
and private or subsidiary targets may determine a 36-month return series. In other words, 
the results we obtain for private targets or subsidiaries may be driven by the existence of 
bidder returns from public acquisitions. In order to control from the effect of public 
targets, we isolate a sample of acquirers who bought 'Only Private' or 'Only Subsidiary' 
targets and examine their long-run performance. Table 2.14 reports the one to three-year 
post-acquisition monthly average abnormal returns for only private and only subsidiary 
subgroups. For only private, one to three-year monthly abnormal returns are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level though for stock payments are in general 
insignificant. For only subsidiaries, one to three-year monthly abnormal returns are 
negative but statistically insignificant except when stock is used as the payment method. 
However, given the small sample size for only subsidiaries, we are not able to establish 
valuable inferences from this evidence. As a whole, it is indicated that even for the only 
private and subsidiary groups, abnormal returns are negative and mostly significant. This 
evidence further confirms the findings reported in Tables 2.11,2.12 and 2.13. 
Z4.9. Z Price Reversals 
Finally, we examine whether our results are just a manifestation of long-term reversals as 
suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In particular, our finding that acquirers buying 
private targets and/or subsidiaries earn positive abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement date but lose in the long-run can be attributed to short-run persistence 
followed by long-term reversals. If the firms involved in private or subsidiary acquisitions 
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experienced positive returns in the few months prior to the acquisition announcement, then 
the stock prices of these acquirers may be subject to a brief persistence followed by long- 
term reversals. 
Firstly, the pre-event (pre-announcement) performance of each bidder acquiring private 
targets and/or subsidiaries is measured. Specifically, for each acquirer, we calculate 
average returns for the six months preceding the announcement of the acquisition. 
Acquisitions of private and subsidiary firms are ranked according to their pre-event returns 
and placed into quintiles. Subsequently we focus on acquisitions of private/subsidiary 
targets that lie in the top and bottom quintiles of pre-event monthly average returns. As a 
result we sort our sample into four categories: i) privately-held acquisitions that 
experienced the highest pre-event returns; ii) privately-held acquisitions that exhibited the 
lowest pre-event returns; iii) acquisitions of subsidiary targets that generated the highest 
pre-event returns; and iv) acquisitions of subsidiary targets that exhibited the lowest pre- 
event returns. 
The results for this analysis are displayed in Table 2.15. We observe that acquirers of 
private targets who gained high pre-event returns (5.24% on average) have significant one- 
year post-announcement monthly average abnormal returns of -0-47%. Similar results are 
obtained for two- and three-year analysis respectively. This finding is consistent with 
long-term reversal and it is not possible to deten-nine whether the long-term abnormal 
performance is solely due to reversals or whether the quality of the acquisition is a 
contributing factor. Noticeably, however, acquirers of private targets who experienced 
negative pre-event returns (-1.83%) also do poorly in the long run (4.06%). The negative 
average abnormal returns cannot be attributed to long-term reversals of stock returns since 
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the acquirers had negative returns prior to the merger announcement. Moreover, bidders of 
subsidiary targets who earned negative pre-event returns have one-year average abnormal 
returns of -1.13%. This finding also cannot be attributed to price reversals. As a 
consequence, we suggest that our results are not simply a manifestation of momentum and 
therefore they are not just capturing long-run stock price reversals. 
2.5. Summary and Conclusions 
In spite of over 30 years of active research on mergers and acquisitions, much remains 
unknown about the acquisition effect on the performance of acquiring firms. This is likely 
to be due to the high variation appearing during an acquisition announcement as a result of 
a large amount of information arising about numerous issues of the event. We therefore 
apply a special research design, recommended by Fuller et al. (2002), to isolate bidder 
characteristics, and therefore to provide a better insight about the real effect of acquisitions 
in the bidder's returns. This special approach consists of a sample of bidders that 
successfully acquired three or more public, private and subsidiary targets using cash and 
stock within a threc-year period between 1985-2004. 
Our study is virtually the first that applies this approach to the UK with the most updated 
data in order to examine how shareholders' returns vary by these characteristics. The 
number of firms that satisfies the restrictions we set consists of 4173 takeovers, a rather 
comprehensive sample for the UK. In addition, although most recent studies (Fuller et al. 
(2002) among them) have focused on the effect of the acquisition around the event date, 
we it consider more prudent to proceed our research a bit further and examine the 
performance of acquirers in a long-term horizon as well. Given the fact that short-run 
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event study results can be driven by market mispricing, we investigate whether five-day 
conclusions can stand up both in the long-run and, of course, to a UK sample of 
acquisitions. 
We calculate Cumulative Average Residuals (CARs) for the five-day period surrounding 
the acquisition announcement and estimate the abnormal returns by using a modified 
market adjusted model (Ri-Rm). In brief, we find negative abnormal returns for bidders 
purchasing public targets and positive CARs for those buying private firms or subsidiaries. 
Concerning the method of payment used, we report negative abnormal returns for public 
acquisitions both for cash and stock form of financing, but positive performance when 
acquiring private firms or subsidiaries with cash and/or combination of cash and stock. 
Furthermore, when we differentiate bidders' returns according to the relative size of the 
target to the bidder we find that for public targets, the larger the targets relative to the 
bidder, the more negative the acquirer's CAR. In contrast to the literature, the negative 
return is not driven by stock offers to public targets, as we identify negative abnormal 
returns for cash offers as well. However, for both private targets and subsidiaries the return 
becomes more positive as the target size increases. 
Subsequently, due to the leading position of the UK within the international takeover 
market, we seek to distinguish the multiple bidders' returns with regards to the origin of 
the target firm (Domestic vs Foreign), as there could be suspicion of result contamination 
due to inclusion of foreign firms into the sample. We report higher returns for an 
acquisition involving a foreign target than a domestic firm, while surprisingly the stock 
form of exchange offers substantial positive abnormal returns to multiple acquirers. In 
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general, our results mirror the main conclusions drawn for the short-run performance of 
multiple acquirers. The further division of bidders with respect to their growth 
opportunities (Glamour vs Value Acquirers) is used to verify that our research design 
controls for (much of) the information of bidders' characteristics contained around the 
takeover event. The overall conclusion we draw is that, indeed, announcement market 
returns are not affected by bidders' characteristics and also return patterns stand when the 
book-to-market ratio is taken into account. 
The next step is to examine the long-run performance of multiple acquirers within a 
maximum 36-month post-acquisition period (we investigate bidder performance over one, 
two and three-year horizon). We divide takeover bids in portfolios according to the target 
public status (public, private, subsidiary) and the method of payment (cash, stock, 
combination of cash and stock), and we examine the one, two and three-year post- 
acquisition share price performance of each subgroup by applying the well-known 
Calendar Time Analysis (CTA). We obtain significantly negative monthly average 
abnormal returns for bidders acquiring public targets both for stock and cash form of 
financing and less negative returns on average for private targets and subsidiaries. 
In conclusion, our long-run results unambiguously indicate that all frequent acquirers 
experience wealth losses during the post-event period, irrespective of the type of target 
acquired. This finding contrasts sharply to the short-run evidence that acquirers gain when 
buying private and subsidiary targets implying a possible market overreaction at the 
acquisition announcement. We therefore believe it is premature to accept Fuller et al. 's 
(2002) conclusion based solely on the short-run findings. In this respect, given the 
inconsistency between the short- and long-run evidence, we consider that no firm 
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conclusion can so far be drawn on whether acquiring private and/or subsidiary targets 
creates real economic gains to shareholders or indeed whether the short-run gains are 
merely an illusion of market mispricing. 
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TabIe 2.1. Mean and Median Size of Acquirers and Targets 
This table presents a sample of bidders and targets where the bidders successfully acquired three or more targets 
within a three-year period from January 1,1985 to May 6,2004 (20 years). Targets are comprised of public, 
private, and subsidiary firms. For each of the following panels, a particular bidder is represented only once per 
year but may be represented multiple times over the 20-year period. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets include both foreign and domestic firms. The total row for the 
number of bidding firms represents the number of unique acquirers throughout the sample period. Panel A 
contains 618 unique bidders acquiring 4173 targets. Targets in Panel A are public, private and subsidiary firms. 
Panels B, C, and D represent public, private and subsidiary deals respectively. Panel B represents 148 unique 
bidders acquiring 195 public targets. Panel C contains 577 unique bidders acquiring 2459 private targets. Panel 
D includes 512 unique bidders acquiring 1519 subsidiary targets. Numbers are reported in million sterlings. 
Bidder Target 
Year Mean Median N Mean Median N 
Panel A: All 
1985 269.35 327.23 5 67.73 25.46 5 
1986 492.16 200.05 28 41.06 7.5 35 
1987 504.47 91.14 85 45.49 8.15 126 
1988 411.13 95.72 150 34.53 4.79 278 
1989 539.64 110.03 141 30.41 6.75 261 
1990 580.75 99.91 117 18.19 5.45 186 
1991 670.52 80.45 91 22.45 4.8 135 
1992 455.45 99.59 93 15.84 3.35 143 
1993 445.77 104.61 104 29.44 4.71 158 
1994 419.3 134.36 125 29.96 5.88 192 
1995 602.67 118.26 135 30.5 4.68 210 
1996 696.44 151.89 154 36.66 6.04 240 
1997 658.14 136.77 197 33.4 4.5 352 
1998 803.28 150.33 235 35.02 5.7 412 
1999 1109.31 202.45 219 54.92 9.18 406 
2000 1287.05 227.76 219 41.02 9.45 398 
2001 1080.93 217.18 165 36.82 7.6 273 
2002 1189.66 287.09 115 88.42 8.1 183 
2003 731.86 192.04 74 28.59 9.39 133 
2004 689.23 218.2 39 13.077 5 47 
Total 488.19 77.34 618 37.213 6.16 41 i3 
Panel B: Public 
1985 405.64 405.64 2 140.3 140.3 2 
1986 - - - - 
1987 994.13 337 12 122.4 89.78 13 
1988 777.48 416.46 17 253.6 49.78 18 
1989 510.24 141.65 20 71.85 19.1 24 
1990 485.27 280.63 7 46.66 8.26 7 
1991 2257.73 42.35 8 52.43 13.1 8 
1992 371.57 481.8 3 7.59 5.79 3 
1993 3803.38 1842.68 4 603.5 126.32 4 
1994 921.11 182.99 8 345.19 47.31 8 
1995 1058.83 307.07 13 86.61 56.09 13 
1996 1558.31 1342.67 4 403.72 144.88 4 
1997 442.21 112.48 9 67.85 28.2 9 
1998 1551.1 254.68 16 179.83 38.8 16 
1999 1385.95 215.63 27 124.76 38.52 28 
2000 2222.77 292.9 18 184.67 76.43 18 
2001 3232.45 818.91 15 215.4 187.12 15 
2002 821.85 535.77 3 90.75 12.4 3 
2003 1488.7 1488.7 2 180.83 180.83 2 
2004 
- - 
- - 
Total 1256.75 238.28 148 159.058 42.33 195 
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Table 2.1-Continued 
Bidder Target 
Year Mean Median N Mean Median N 
Panel C: Private 
1985 1.55 1.55 1 0.9 0.9 1 
1986 292.95 200.05 22 26.55 6.8 25 
1987 223.01 132.96 56 15.9 6 73 
1988 324.98 64.4 105 8.57 3.55 178 
1989 380 114.23 94 13.45 4.5 139 
1990 417.82 95.6 72 8.22 4.19 98 
1991 210.66 61.98 47 6.98 3.95 60 
1992 423.85 93.76 50 14.05 2.87 69 
1993 319.11 94.93 60 11.09 4.41 74 
1994 357.47 134.68 82 11.89 5 112 
1995 373.71 104.78 87 19.57 3.5 123 
1996 426.04 136.96 104 20.75 4.32 148 
1997 606.38 99.73 143 11.41 3.55 234 
1998 675.73 134.68 154 11.02 4.13 248 
1999 939.95 197.85 153 24.7 7.11 234 
2000 1182.51 239.05 155 26.42 7.15 247 
2001 884.06 211.18 111 16.03 6.22 168 
2002 769.79 216.09 79 16.82 6.86 118 
2003 428.93 138.23 51 13.92 6.17 77 
2004 413.26 191.85 29 9.76 4.91 33 
Total 511.1 82.48 577 15.81 4.75 2459 
Panel D: Subsidiary 
1985 266.97 266.97 2 28.59 28.59 2 
1986 936.1 234.99 9 77.33 12.49 10 
1987 776.88 262.76 35 74.48 11.96 40 
1988 611.92 208.67 67 42.8 7.9 82 
1989 747.16 189.36 76 44.31 7.54 98 
1990 651.81 118.08 61 27.79 6.19 81 
1991 360.48 140.54 58 32.72 5.04 67 
1992 651.81 117.93 55 17.92 4.64 71 
1993 360.48 112.97 65 17.71 5.1 80 
1994 456.98 129.87 58 23.05 7.65 72 
1995 829.59 158.55 65 38.82 7.02 74 
1996 1062.52 266-53 72 46.76 9 88 
1997 1049.26 204.15 88 77.76 8.27 109 
1998 1052.5 227.9 122 59.59 9.47 148 
1999 1504.84 300.41 112 90.45 12.9 144 
2000 1859.87 251.78 108 48.71 12.6 133 
2001 1319.78 268.82 73 45.87 13.19 90 
2002 1761.97 460.61 52 224.58 11.46 62 
2003 1458.38 450.59 39 43.87 11.74 54 
2004 1263.09 554.94 13 20.91 5.1 14 
Total 616.21 112.81 512 56.23 8.7 1519 
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Table 2.2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Multiple Acquirers 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired three or more public, 
private and/or subsidiary targets within a three-year period between January 1,1985 and May 6,2004. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, +2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a 
takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R, j - R., 
where R,, is the Return on firni i and Rm, is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). The 
usual estimation period is eliminated due to the high probability of confounding events for bidders acquiring 
three or more targets during a three-year period. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panel A are comprised of bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets. 
Panel B and C are subsamples of Panel A; they contain first bids and fifth and higher bids, respectively. The 
results for each panel are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing includes transactions made 
solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. 
Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods 
classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Bids 
All Acquirers 0.7 4 O/o' 0.64 0/6" 0.03% 0.98 %a 
4173 2492 158 1523 
Public Targets -1.950/oa - 1.160/6' 4.05 W -1.570/o' 
195 93 45 57 
Private Targets 0.730/6' 0.4 6 O/o' 0.95% 1.02 %' 
2459 1261 85 1113 
Subsidiary Targets 1.09%11 0.98%a 3.78% 1.260/6' 
1 1519 1138 28 353 
Panel B: V Bids-Within 3-Year Constraint 
All Acquirers 1.090/oa 0.81 O/oa 2.1 OW 1.45%' 
1676 1019 65 592 
Public Targets -2.29%' -2.39% -2.17 W -2.19% 
82 42 18 22 
Private Targets 1.120/o" 3.06 %b 2.75% c 1.65 W 
948 485 36 427 
Subsidiary Targets 1.46%" 1.35%" 6.98% r 1.400/o' 
646 492 it 143 
Notation: a Denotes significance at 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at 5% level; 
c Denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2.2-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: 3 rd and Higher Bids 
All Acquirers 0.580/o" 0.47 V -0.94% 0.9 1 G/ 
a 0 
2942 1756 102 1084 
Public Targets -1.95%' -1.24% -5.13 %b -0.67% 
139 69 31 39 
Private Targets 0.62%' 0.36 %' 0.31% 0.93 %a 
1737 885 54 798 
Subsidiary Targets 0.86%a 0.740/6" 2.75% 1.12%" 
1 1066 802 17 247 
Notation: ' Denotes significance at 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at 5% level; 
f Denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2.3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Multiple Acquirers of Clustered 
Private Bids 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired two or more private 
firms on the same day between January 1,1985 and May 6,2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated 
for the five days [-2, +2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated 
using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R,, - R., 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). Cash 
financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions 
made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or 
convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. 
I All Cash Stock Combo 
Clustered Private Targets 1 1.43W 
238 
0.92% 
140 
0.51% 
14 
2.45 V 
84 
Notation: 4 Denotes significance at 1% level. 
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Table 2.4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Multiple Acquirers of Subsidiaries 
This table displays the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of a bidder acquiring a subsidiary from a parent that is 
diversified, represented on the left side of the table, or non-diversified, represented on the right side of the table. 
A diversified parent is defined as a parent whose three-digit SIC code is different from that of the subsidiary 
company. CARs are calculated for the five days [-2, +21 around the announcement (day 0) of a takeover. 
Abnormal Returns arc estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARIt ý Rj - Rm( 
where Rit is the Return on firm i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). The 
usual estimation period is eliminated due to the high probability of confounding events for bidders acquiring 
three or more targets during a three-year period. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). The results for each panel are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The median is in brackets and the number of bids is reported below 
the median. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Diversifled Parent 
All Acquirers 1.01%a 0.95%" 1.39% 1.17%' 
1016 768 20 228 
Ist Bids 1.40%" 1.3 7% 3.17% 1.36%b 
443 339 7 97 
3rd and Higher Bids 0.87%* 0.79%' 0.83% 1.14%' 
1 713 539 13 161 
Panel B: Non-Diversified Parent 
All Acquirers 1.27% a 1.04%' 9.75%' 1.44% b 
503 370 8 125 
Ist Bids 1.60%' 1.32%a 13.63%' 1.49% 
203 153 4 46 
3rd and Higher Bids 0.82%a 0.62% b 8.98% 1.07%' 
353 263 4 86 
Notation: " Denotes significance at 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at 5% level; 
' Denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2.5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Multiple Acquirers by Status of 
Targets 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns calculated for the five days [-2, +2] around the announcement (day 0) of a 
takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARj, = R,, - R., 
where R,, is the Return on f inn i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). The 
usual estimation period is eliminated due to the high probability of confounding events for bidders acquiring 
three or more targets during a three-year period. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panel A are all bids from bidders that acquired both public and private targets. 
Panel B and C contain bidders acquiring only private firms and bidders acquiring only subsidiary firms, 
respectively. The results for each panel are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing includes 
transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in 
common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Firms Ac quiring Both Public and Private Targets 
All Acquirers 0.69 W 0.62 % -0.18% 0.92 W 
3690 2248 144 1298 
Public Targets -1.950/oa - 1.1 60/or 4.05 '/o' -1.570/o' 
195 93 45 57 
Private Targets 0.68 W 0.42%' 0.71% 1.00 %a 
2081 1103 71 907 
Subsidiary Targets 1.07 % 0.98% 3.78% 1.15 W 
1414 1052 28 334 
Panel B: Firms Acquiring Only Private Targets 
Bids for Private 0.99W, 0.75% 2.15% 1.11 % 
_Largets 
378 158 14 206 
Panel C: Firms Acquiring Only Subsidiary Targets 
Bids for Subsidiary 1.35 W 0.96%` 3.07 % 
Targets 
_ 
107 87 20 
Notation: " Denotes significance at 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at 5% level; 
r Denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2.6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Frequent Acquirers by the Relative 
Size of the Target 
The table presents 5-day [-2, +2] Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the announcement date of a takeover 
calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR, = Rlt - Rm, 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and Rmj is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The relative size of the target is 
defined as the target market value (when the firm is public) or the deal value (when the target is private firm or 
subsidiary) divided by bidder market value. The Acquirer Market Value (MV) is calculated as of the month 
before the announcement date and is the product of the monthly share price multiplied by the number of 
ordinary shares in issue on Datastream. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and 
debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises 
offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. Panel A 
represents all bids while Panels B to D represent public, private, and subsidiary, respectively. The number of 
bids is reported below the mean. 
F- All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Bids 
<5% 0.38%' 0.44W -0.82% 0.37% 
2397 1588 64 745 
5%-9.99% 1.1 00/oa 0.850/, a 2.64% 1.33%a 
666 366 19 281 
10%-19.99% 0.730/ob 0.7 0 0/6' -1.61% 
1.090/b 
509 271 28 210 
; ->20% 
1.75%' 1.46%' 1.09% 2.141/oa 
603 268 47 288 
Panel B: Public 
<5% . 1.980/b 0 -1.970/o' 0.60% -2.87% 
44 32 3 9 
5%-9.99% -1.64% -2.76% -1.04% 0.50% 25 15 3 7 
10%-19.99% -1.88% -0.05% -4.54 0/6' 1.30% 46 20 16 10 
ý: 20% -2.06 O/ob -0.08% 4.71 O/ob -1.75% 
80 26 23 31 
*Denotes significance at the I% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
"Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.6-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: Private 
<5% 0.43%' -1.01% 0.35% 
1500 864 50 586 
5%-9.99% 1.11 O/oa 0,20% 4.2 4 O/o' 1.65%' 
395 168 12 215 
10%-19.99% 0.61% 0.05% 5.09% 0.89% 
289 134 8 147 
2: 20% 2.36%* 1.76'Yob 2.64% 2.680/o" 
275 95 15 165 
Panel D: Subsidiary 
<5% 0.550/oa 0.55'Yo' -0.33% 0.61% 
852 692 11 149 
5%-9.99% 1.37W 1.74%' 0.59% 0.26% 
246 183 4 59 
10%-19.99% 1.630/oa 1.571/6" -3.30% 2.110/6" 
173 116 4 53 
; 
->20% 
2.3 1 O/oa 1.530/o" 13.351/ob 2.4 8 0/6' 
248 147 9 92 
' Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
'Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.7. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Frequent Acquirers by the Target 
Origin (Domestic Vs Foreign) 
The table presents 5-day [-2, +2] Cumulative Abnormal Returns of a bidder acquiring a domestic or foreign 
company around the announcement date of a takeover calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR, = Rit - Rm, 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and R, is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The domestic and foreign 
targets are defined as UK and non-UK firms respectively. The results for each panel are further divided by the 
method of payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are 
defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of 
both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. Panel A reports the results 
for domestic targets. Panel B reports the results for foreign targets. The number of bids is reported below the 
mean 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Domestic Targets 
All Acquirers 0.62%" 0.600/oa -1.00% 0.8 5 O/oa 
2680 1492 130 1058 
Public Targets -2.240/oa -1.13% 4.270/o" -1.840/oc 
157 63 44 50 
Private Targets 0.80%2 0.520/ob 0.25% 1.09%a 
1534 696 64 774 
Subsidiary Targets 0.8 0 O/oa 0.82%" 1.89% 0.6 3 O/o' 
989 733 22 234 
Panel B: Foreign Targets 
All Acquirers 0.950/oa 0.690/o" 4.80%` 1.26%' 
1495 1001 28 466 
Public Targets -0.75% -1.22% 5.69% 0.35% 
38 30 1 7 
Private Targets 0.62%' 0.39% 3.08% 0.840/ob 
925 565 21 339 
Subsidiary Targets 1.640/6" 1.250/o* 10.68% 2.500/oa 
532 406 6 120 
' Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
'Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.8. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Frequent Acquirers by 
Diversifying/Non-Diversifying Acquisitions 
This table displays the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of a diversified bidder acquiring a public, private or 
subsidiary firm, represented in Panel A, or non-diversified, represented in Panel B. A diversified bidder is 
defined as a firm whose three-digit SIC code is different from that of the target company. CARs are calculated 
for the five days [-2, +2] around the announcement (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using 
a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R, - R,,,, 
where R, t is the Return on firm i and Rmt is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The results for each panel are 
further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and 
debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises 
offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The 
number of bids is reported below the mean. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Diversifying Ac quisitions 
All Acquirers 0.77%' 0.68%' 0.18% 0.99%a 
2708 1639 97 972 
Public Targets -1.320/o' -1.05%, -2.070/o' -1.20% 
134 60 29 45 
Private Targets 0.8 00/oa 0.55%a 1.04% LOW 
1558 811 48 699 
Subsidiary Targets 1.010/08 0.95%a 1.39% 1.170/o" 
1016 768 20 228 
Panel B- Non-Diversifying Acquisitions 
All Acquirers T 0.6 7 O/o' 0.55%, -0.22% 0.95%" 1465 853 61 551 
Public Targets -3.3 1V -1.36% -7.630/ob -2.94% 
61 33 16 12 
Private Targets 0.600/ob 0.29% 0.83% 0.920/ob 
901 450 37 414 
Subsidiary Targets 1.270/oa 1.040/o' 9.75% 1.440/ob 
503 370 8 125 
' Denotes significance at the I% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
'Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.9. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Frequent Acquirers by their Book- 
to-Market (B/M) Ratio 
The table presents 5-day [-2, +2] Cumulative Abnormal Returns of glamour and value acquirers around the 
announcement date of a takeover calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R,, - R., 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and R,, is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are UK public firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The glamour acquirers are defined as 
those with low book-to-market ratio, while the value acquirers are defined as those with high book-to-market 
ratio. The acquirer book-to-market ratio is calculated one month before the acquisition announcement date and is 
the product of the net book value divided by the Market Value. Cash financing includes transactions made solely 
in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination 
payment comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as 
"other" by SDC. Panel A reports the results for Glamour Acquirers. Panel B represents the results for Value 
Acquirers. The number of bids is reported below the mean. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Low B/M (Glamour Acquirers) 
All Acquirers 0.87%' 0.80%' 0.40% 1.01W 
1913 1049 71 793 
Public Targets -2.75%* -1.39% -7.5 1 O/oa -1.34% 
80 42 18 20 
Private Targets 0.9 1 O/oa 0.921/6" 0.82% 0.900/oa 
1211 561 41 609 
Subsidiary Targets 1.26%' 0.850/oa 10.850/ob 1.690/oa 
All 446 12 164 
Panel B: I-ligh B/M (Value Acq uirers) 
All Acquirers 0.75%" 0.64%a 0.06% 1.041/6' 
1913 1227 65 621 
Public Targets - 1.440/ob -1.01% -2.29 O/or -1.29% 
97 38 25 34 
Private Targets 0.68V 0.18% 1.77% 1.28%' 
1028 572 30 426 
Subsidiary Targets 1.1 O%a 1.160/6' 0.81% 0.900/ b 0 
788 617 10 161 
' Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
'Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.10. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analyses of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Frequent Bidders 
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of the bidder's five-day cumulative abnormal 
return on the following variables. The first two dummy variables display whether the target is acquired with 
stock and whether the target is acquired with a combination of cash and stock. Cash financing includes 
transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in 
common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The next dummy variables include whether the bid is the first bid, 
whether the bid is the third or higher bid, whether the target is foreign, whether the bidder and target are in the 
same industry, and whether the subsidiary is from diversified parent. A diversified parent is defined as a firm 
whose three-digit SIC code is different from that of the subsidiary company. The remainders of the variables 
include the log of the relative size of the target to bidder and the log of target's size. The relative size of the 
target is defined as the natural log of the target market value (when the firm is public) or the deal value (when 
the target is private firm or subsidiary) divided by bidder market value as of the month before the announcement 
date. The Acquirer Market Value (MV) is calculated as of the month before the announcement date and is the 
product of the monthly share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue on Datastream. Finally, 
interaction variables of the relative size with cash, stock or combination are included. P-values are reported in 
brackets next to the parameter estimates. 
Dependent Variables Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -0.014 0.005 0.000 
[0.528] [0.2631 [0.000] 
Dummy =I If Target is Acquired with Stock -0.025 0.0008 -0.007 
[0.144] [0.9211 [0.557] 
Dummy ýI If Target is Acquired with -0.007 0.004 0.001 
Combination of Cash and Stock [0.586] [0.2301 [0.7731 
Dummy ml If First Bid 0.007 -0.001 0.005 
[0.735] [0.807] [0.289] 
Dummy =1 If Third or Higher Bid 0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
[0.7361 [0.401] [0.332] 
Dummy =I If Target is Foreign 0.008 -0.0009 0.012 
[0.5811 [0.764] [0.000] 
Dummy =I if Target and Bidder are in Same -0.019 -0.002 0.006 
Industry [0.089] [0.426] [0.1751 
Dummy =I If Subsidiary is from a Diversified 0.004 
Firm [0.348] 
Log of Relative Size 0.001 0.002 0.004 
[0.8341 [0.067] [0.000] 
Log of Target Size -0.0003 0.001 -0.0008 
[0.9471 [0.287] [0.438] 
Interaction Variable = Relative Size * Cash 1.1 9e-005 -6.92e-005 -3.047e-005 
[0.896] [0.5641 [0.279] 
Interaction Variable = Relative Size * Stock -6.63e-005 0.0002 0.0009 
[0.762] [0.4351 [0.000] 
Interaction Variable = Relative Size * Combo 2.88e-005 -3.047e-005 -6.019e-005 
[0.658] [0.531] [0.459] 
F-statistic 0.837 1.395 6.579 
[0.603] [0.1681 [0.000] 
N 195 2459 1521 
1 RI 4.80% 0.62% 5% 
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Table 2.11.1-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French Mactor model. The sample of the overall portfolio consists of 3383 successful takeover bids that took 
place over the period 1985-2000 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Global Financing 
database. In Panel A, calendar time regressions are performed on the basis of target public status (Public, 
Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar time abnormal returns are formed according to the method of payment 
(Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or 
cash and debt. Stock offers are defiried as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing 
comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by 
SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful takeover and remain for 12 months. 
Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the 
calendar-time return under the Fama-French model with the following regression: 
Rpt - Rft = a, + ß, (R - R, 0) + s, SMB, + h, HML, ei( 
Where RP, is the simple average monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio, R. is the monthly return on 
three-month Treasury bills, R., is the return on a value weighted market index, SMB, is the zero-cost 
portfolio capturing the difference in the returns of a value weighted portfolio of small stocks and large stocks, 
and HMLt is the difference in the returns to a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to market stocks and low 
book-to-market stocks. In addition, A, S, and h, are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and C,, is 
the error term. The reported intercept is the average of the individual, firm-specific intercepts. The t-statistics are 
displayed in brackets and are calculated on the basis of Andrews' (199 1) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors. 
Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
All 
- 
Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept 0% a - 0. 
ý 
-1.500101, -0.5501or -0.700/6' 
Rm-Rf 1.21577 1.26074 1.30805 1.15053 
[32.21 [15.4] [27.8] [27.6] 
SMB 0.676757 0.568478 0.846750 0.563948 
[13.2] [5.24] [13.5] [9.94] 
HML -0.0233365 0.523710 -0.0330353 0.145944 [-0.341] [3.58] [-0.391] [1.93] 
RI 84.11% 55.20% 82.07% 78.66% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.74%* -1.730/o' -0.49%b 
Rm-Rf 1.21727 1.43000 1.27974 
[32.1] [14.3] [30.4] 
SMB 0.628010 0.975076 0.812553 
[12.5] [7.43] [14.21 
HNIL 0.232269 -0.575192 -0.169572 
[3.42] [-3.261 [-2.231 
RI 84.59% 61.27% 83.45% 
Notation: ' Denotes significance at 1% level; b Denotes significance at 5% level; 
' Denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2.12.2-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French Mactor model. The sample of the overall portfolio consists of 2995 successftil takeover bids that took 
place over the period 1985-1999 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Global Financing 
database. In Panel A, calendar time regressions are performed on the basis of target public status (Public, 
Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar time abnormal returns are formed according to the method of payment 
(Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or 
cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing 
comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other by 
SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful takeover and remain for 24 months. 
Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the 
calendar-time return under the Fama-French model as described in Table 2.11. The t-statistics are displayed in 
brackets and are calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors. 
Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -0.86%" -1.60 OW -0.72%" -0.800/oa 
Rm-Rf 1.19867 1.26109 1.26848 1.15422 
[30.8] [23.01 [28.31 [26.01 
SMB 0.662988 0.640420 0.799547 0.584375 
[12.5] [8.77] [13.4] [9.67] 
HML 0.158360 0.612256 0.192479 0.214544 
[2.24] [6.22] [2.39] [2.66] 
82.36% 73.39% 81.77% 76.47% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.790/oa - 1.5 1 %b -1.07%" 
Rm-Rf 1.18111 1.54848 1.28000 
[33.0] [9.51] [26.21 
SMB 0.596511 1.26246 0.804588 
[12.6] [5.94] [12.1] 
HNIL 0.334338 0.164153 -0.0342090 
[5.21] [0.572] [-0.3871 
R2 85.11% 38.37% 78.34% 
Notation: a Denotes significance at 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at 5% level; 
' Denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2.13.3-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French 3-factor model. The sample of the overall portfolio consists of 2607 successful takeover bids that took 
place over the period 1985-1998 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Global Financing 
database. In Panel A, calendar time regressions are performed on the basis of target public status (Public, 
Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar time abnormal returns are formed according to the method of payment 
(Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or 
cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing 
comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by 
SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful takeover and remain for 36 months. 
Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the 
calendar-time return under the Fama-French model as described in Table 2.11. The t-statistics are displayed in 
brackets and are calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors. 
Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -0.94%* . 1.35 0/6' -0.84%" -0.88%" 
Rm-Rf 1.16160 1.22612 1.23237 1.11206 
[30.2] [23.7] [28.2] [25.9] 
SMB 0.618120 0.668703 0.759650 0.521384 
[11.8] [9.691 [13.1] [8.92] 
HNIL 0.261810 0.686589 0.344535 0.272851 
[3.76] [7.42] [4.39] [3.51] 
81.53% 75% 81.27% 76.09% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.95%8 -1.49%a - 1.0 IYoa 
Rm-Rf 1.18150 1.21126 1.20723 
[31.41 [19.5] [28.0] 
SNIB 0.606309 0.849556 0.714582 
[12.21 [10.4] [12.21 
HML 0.368501 0.475471 0.169674 
[5.46] [4.351 [2.17] 
R2 83.79% 69.96% 79.59% 
Notation: * Denotes significance at 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at 5% level; 
c Denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2.14. Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression of Long-Run Stock Returns using 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model for 'Only Private'-'Only Subsidiary' Targets 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French 3-factor model. Calendar time regressions are performed on the basis of calendar time regressions are 
performed on the basis of bidders that acquired 'Only Private' targets or 'Only Subsidiaries'. Results are then 
further divided by the method of payment (Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful 
takeover and remain for 12,24 and 36 months respectively. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include 
firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the calendar-time return under the Fama-French 3-factor 
model with the following regression: 
Rpt - Rft = a, +A (R., - Rft) + s, SMB, + h, HML, ci, 
The t-statistics are calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors. The numbers in percentage represent the reported FF ct, which is the average of the individual, 
firm-specific intercepts. The number of firms is reported below the monthly average abnormal returns. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: I Year 
Only Private -1.530/oa -0.860/o' -1.03% -1.32%b 
313 135 12 166 
Only Subsidiary -0.70% -0.51% -2.090/ob -0.42% 
87 44 24 19 
Panel B: 2 Years 
only Proilvate -1.43%' -0.69% -1.80% -1.52%" 
268 125 12 131 
only Subsidiary -0.51% -0.40% - 1.240/oc -0.55% 75 35 23 17 
Panel C: 3 Years 
Only Private -1.480/o' -1.30%' -1.680/o' -1.44%a 
234 109 12 113 
Only Subsidiary -0.26% -0.07% -0.02% -1.12% 
68 31 21 16 
" Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
'Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.15. Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression of Long-Run Stock Returns using 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model of Acquirers Buying Private Targets and Subsidiaries 
with the Best and Worst Pre-event Performance 
This table presents pre-announcement monthly average returns as well as 1,2 and 3-year monthly average 
calendar time abnormal returns of four categories of acquirers. Firstly, acquirers are divided into two groups: 
acquirers of private and subsidiary targets respectively. These two groups created are further subdivided into 
four categories: i) Acquirers of private targets who had the highest six-month pre-announcement average returns, 
ii) Acquirers of private targets who had the lowest six-month pre-announcement average returns, iii) Acquirers 
of subsidiary targets who had the highest six-month pre-announcement average returns, iv) Acquirers of 
subsidiary targets who had the lowest six-month pre-announcement average returns. We estimate the calendar- 
time post-event returns under the Fama-French Mactor model with the following regression: 
Rp, - Rfi = a, +, 8, (R,,,, - Rft) + s, SMB, + h, HML, + v, 
The t-statistics are calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors. The numbers in percentage represent the reported FF (x, which is the average of the individual, 
f irm-specif ic intercepts. The number of firms is reported in parenthesis. 
Private Targets Subsidiar y Targets 
Top quintile in Bottom quintile in Top quintile in Bottom quintile in 
terms of pre-event terms of pre-event terms of pre-event terms of pre-event 
returns returns returns returns 
6-Month 5.24% -1.83% 4.37% -1.72% 
Pre-Event (959) (959) (616) (616) 
I-Year -0.471/ob -1.060/6' -0.41% -1.13%* 
Post-Event 
6-Month 4.78% -1.71% 4.20% -1.57% 
Pre-Event (844) (844) (552) (552) 
2-Year -0.860/6' -1.04%" 0 -0.590/(b . 1.120/6' 
Post-Event 
6-Month 4.55% -1.71% 4.08% -1.56% 
Pre-Event (731) (731) (486) (486) 
3-Year -1.06%* -0.960/o' -0.580/oc -1.17%* 
Post-Event 
' Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
c Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Chapter 3: Do Stock Prices Drive Performance of Bidding Firms? 
3.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we documented evidence that bidders enjoy significant announcement profits 
(i. e. positive abnormal returns) when they acquire subsidiaries and private firms with cash; 
they exhibit insignificantly positive returns when they acquire private targets with stock; 
and they generate negative abnormal returns when they buy public firms irrespective of the 
payment method used (worse on average performance for share exchanges). In addition, 
when we examined shareholders' wealth effects in the long-run, we found that returns are 
reversed for any method of payment used and any target acquired. We also showed that 
acquisitions of listed firms have a worse performance on average than unlisted firms in the 
long-run. Therefore, our results suggested that bidders (shareholders) should cash out after 
the announcement to enjoy positive returns, providing also an insight to managers about 
which specific acquisitions lead on average to a less worse performance for their firm. 
Finally, taking the above results into consideration, we addressed the question of whether 
acquiring private and subsidiary firms creates superior value; this remains open for debate 
and future research. 
The purpose of this chapter is, thus, to identify whether other factors, namely market 
conditions (market valuations or merger waves) affect the performance of bidders and are 
likely to be significant factors for the results obtained in Chapter 2. Numerous studies 
provide evidence that mergers occur when the overall stock market is hot. The main 
hypothesis lying behind the process of an acquisition is the exploitation of synergies that 
102 
Chapter 3 Do Stock Prices Drive Performance of Bidding Firms? 
occur in order to achieve some efficiency that lowers costs. ' The incentive to cut costs 
should be strongest during recessions when most firms have excess capacity and there is 
considerable downward pressure on prices. Yet, the advent of a recession always brings a 
sharp decline in merger activity. Why are increases in efficiency so attractive when stock 
prices are rising and so unattractive when they fall? 
In general, the literature suggests positive abnormal returns for target shareholders at the 
acquisition announcement while bidder shareholders' returns depend on various factors 
shown in Chapter 2, such as method of payment and target ownership status. Recent 
studies associate M&A activity with stock market performance. Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2001) correlate high merger activity with high market valuations, while Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) suggest that the impact of market valuation depends on method of payment, 
the performance of acquirers, and the occurrence of merger waves. Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2003) develop a model in which firm-specific and market-wide 
misvaluations can cause merger waves. Finally, Rosen (2005) suggests a merger 
momentum in prices, providing evidence that acquirer stock prices are more likely to 
increase when the merger is announced in high valuation markets as compared to low 
valuation markets (hot versus cold markets). Hence, some other interesting questions arise: 
Does the overall level of the stock market affect the performance of acquiring firms? Or is 
merger activity indeed the major deterministic factor? Putting both together, is it the 
overall level of the stock market that drives acquisitions or can mergers themselves predict 
ups and downs of the market? 
1 When the market-wide overvaluation is high, the estimation error associated with the synergy is high too, so 
the offer is more likely to be accepted. Thus, when the market is overvalued the target is more likely to 
overestimate the synergies because it underestimates the component of misvaluation that it shares with the 
bidders. 
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We use a sample of 3,512 domestic acquisitions announced between January 1,1984 and 
May 6,2004, and examine the performance of acquirers both in the short and long run. We 
classify the market into high, neutral or low valuation periods based on the P/E ratio of the 
TOTMKUK index. Since we are interested in examining overall market valuations, we use 
the TOTMKUK P/E ratio as a proxy for market valuation just like investors use a firm's 
P/E ratio as a measure of firm valuation. Each month is classified as high- (low-) valuation 
when it lies in the top (bottom) half of the month with P/E ratios above (below) the past 
five-year average P/E. All other months are classified as neutral. For robustness reasons 
we also employ the TOTMUK index itself classifying each month into high, low or neutral 
valuation period following the procedure used for P/E classification. In addition, we 
examine the performance of acquirers dependent on the level of merger activity, 
classifying each month as a hot or cold merger month, after ranking each month according 
to the number of mergers, and identifying whether this month lies in the top or bottom 
30% quintile with the largest or smallest number of mergers respectively. 
We find that, overall, acquirers exhibit positive abnormal returns for the five-day interval 
surrounding the acquisition announcements. Consistent with the literature, we find positive 
and significant CARs for cash acquisitions, while negative abnormal returns are obtained 
when stock is used in the transaction. When we differentiate our sample on the basis of 
target type, we find that acquirers gain when buying private firms or subsidiaries, but lose 
when public targets are purchased. In general, the return pattern is qualitatively the same 
with the one obtained in Chapter 2 for frequent acquirers. When we partition the sample by 
the market's valuation at the acquisition announcement, we obtain positive and significant 
abnormal returns in high-valuation periods, while insignificantly positive CARs are 
obtained during low-valuations periods. Results are robust when we use either P/E 
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TOTMKUK index or TOTMKUK index itself to classify market valuation and also when a 
larger than five-day window is employed (i. e. -20, +20). This suggests that while the 
market rewards acquisition attempts when stock prices are high, it appears to be indifferent 
to acquisitions initiated in low-valuation periods. Further, when we examine the 
performance of bidders taking into account the merger activity, we find that bidder 
shareholders increase, on average, their wealth more in cold rather than hot merger 
markets. This implies that in cold merger markets acquirers are more careful in the 
evaluation of synergies or they negotiate more efficiently. Finally, when we investigate the 
interrelationships between overall level of stock market valuations and merger activity, we 
identify that during high valuation periods more positive abnormal returns are enjoyed 
regardless of the number of mergers taking place, while the inverse relationship does not 
exist. As a result, we argue that overall level of the stock market drives acquisitions and 
not merger activity. 
Further, we turn our attention to acquirers' long-run performance (12-, 24- and 36- month 
analysis respectively). We find, consistent with the results we obtained in Chapter 2, that 
acquirers experience negative and significant abnormal returns. However, we report worse 
performance on average for acquisitions initiated during high-valuation periods than low- 
valuation periods. In general, even when we account for the payment method used or target 
public status, low-valuation acquisitions outperform high-valuation acquisitions on 
average. This pattern of better performance of low-valuation acquisitions in the long run 
stands after controlling for the acquirer's market valuation (B/M). These findings indicate 
that low-valuation acquirers destroy significantly less long-term shareholder wealth on 
average than high-valuation acquirers. The initial generally positive reaction of the market 
to high-valuation acquirers reflects that the market learns only gradually that many of the 
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mergers undertaken during boom periods were imprudent and with less care. In contrast, 
when stock prices are low, acquisitions earn insignificantly positive announcement returns 
but, in the long run, these acquisitions exhibit better performance. This suggests that the 
market learns over time that, despite its initial scepticism, these acquisitions can have 
better potential. All in all, for both high and low-valuation acquisitions the market reaction 
at the announcement stands in sharp contrast to the market's long-run view of the firm's 
perfonnance. 
In order to confirm that our results are not just capturing long-run stock price reversals we 
calculate the pre-event performance of each acquirer in the high and low-valuation period 
for the six-month period preceding the acquisition announcement. High and low-valuation 
acquirers are ranked in order of their pre-event monthly average returns and placed into 
quintiles. We document that high-valuation acquirers who gained high pre-event returns 
have negative abnormal returns consistent with long-term reversal. However, high- 
valuation acquirers who experienced negative pre-event returns also do poorly in the long 
run, suggesting that the negative average abnormal returns cannot be attributed to long- 
term reversals of stock returns since the acquirers had negative returns prior to the merger 
announcement. Moreover, low-valuation acquirers who earned positive pre-event returns 
have positive one-year average abnormal returns. This outperformance also cannot be 
attributed to price reversals. We therefore suggest that high-valuation acquirers are 
underperforming relative to low-valuation acquirers in the long run because managers are 
making poorer acquisition decisions during high-valuation periods. 
We further analyze our sample by raising the question why do high-valuation acquirers 
underperform relative to low-valuation acquirers in the long run? A potential explanation 
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we provide is that managers might engage into herding behaviour. By this we mean that 
managers may decide to follow the herd during a merger for personal prestige reasons and 
because they do not want to be considered out of the "merger game". We report empirical 
evidence consistent with herding. In particular, early movers, defined as the earliest 10% 
of all acquisitions announced during a high-valuation wave, have significantly worse 
performance than late movers (the remaining 90% of high-valuation merger waves), as 
suggested by the significant difference reported when employing zero investment 
portfolios. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 reviews the related literature; 
section 3.3 describes the data; section 3.4 discusses the methodologies; section 3.5 presents 
and analyzes our results. Finally, section 3.6 summarizes the findings and concludes. 
3.2. Literature Review 
3. Zl. Shareholders' Wealth Effects 
A large body in the literature has examined the share price performance of bidding firms at 
the announcement or in the post-acquisition period. In this section we review various 
empirical studies with findings on shareholders' wealth effects (value creation or 
destruction). 
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3. Zl. 1. Short-Run Announcement Returns 
In Chapter 2 (section 2.2) we analytically review the literature concerning the short-run 
performance of acquiring firms. One crucial issue regarding performance studies worth 
mentioning is that bidder returns are hard to measure for three main reasons: Firstly, 
targets may be small relative to bidders, so even good acquisitions could have little impact 
on the bidder's stock price. Secondly, the stock price's reaction to an acquisition can only 
represent the surprise component of the acquisition. If a bidder is known to be engaging in 
an acquisition strategy the stock price's reaction to any acquisition announcement will only 
represent how the market understands that acquisition differs from anticipated acquisitions. 
Finally, if the target resists the takeover, the takeover process could take a long time. 
Hence, the uncertain outcome of the event makes it difficult to isolate the market's 
perception of the bid. 
3. ZI. Z Post-Acquisition Performance 
A number of alternative explanations have been proposed for the post-merger performance 
puzzle. One such explanation that warrants further attention is the hot market theory. This 
theory was first proposed in the context of Initial Public Offering (IPO) market by Ritter 
(1984) and has recently been formalised by Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2001). Their 
model of the IPO process attributes the three main empirical anomalies - underpricing, hot 
issues markets and long run underperformance - to the presence of a class of irrationally 
exuberant investors. With constraints on short sales, the presence of exuberant investors 
can result in long-run underperformance of IPOs. However, issuers, timing their IPOs to 
take advantage of a hot issue market, are less than aggressive about pricing their 1POs. 
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Their model shows how underpricing can emerge when underwriters attempt to maximise 
issue proceeds by extracting surplus from exuberant investors. 
Various researchers have documented evidence regarding the long-run performance of 
bidding firms in Mergers and Acquisitions. Due to the widely documented contradictory 
evidence of these researchers, the long-run performance of bidding firms is inconclusive. 
This sub-section reviews the literature on the long-run performance of acquirers. It 
comprises a review of the general trend in post-merger performance of acquirers, while it 
links long-run studies to method of payment, mode of acquisition, size and book-to-market 
factors. 
3.2.1.2.1. General Trend 
In the US, Malatesta (1983), Asquith (1983) and Magenheirn and Muller (1988), among 
others, reported significant negative abnormal returns in the year following the outcome 
announcement. However, Malatesta (1983) found insignificant negative abnormal returns 
in the year following the merger announcement for his entire sample, but found significant 
negative abnormal returns for bidders in mergers occurring after 1970 and for bidders with 
smaller equity value. By providing a thorough examination of acquirers' post-merger 
performance, Agrawal et al. (1992) used a nearly exhaustive sample of acquisitions and 
observe that they suffer a statistically significant loss of about 10% over the five-year post- 
merger period. They further used an estimation approach that adjusts for shifts in beta over 
time, which indicate that their results are not due to the mean-reversion. Hence they argued 
that the negative post-merger returns are not caused by a slow adjustment of the market to 
the merger event. Andre et al. (2004) studied the long-term performance of 267 Canadian 
mergers and acquisitions that take place between 1980 and 2000, using different calendar- 
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time approaches with and without overlapping cases and find that Canadian acquirers 
significantly underperform over the three-year post-event period. 2 
Despite the widely documented negative post-acquisition performance the evidence is not 
one-sided. Contrary to the above findings, other researchers including Langetieg (1978) 
and Franks et al. (1991) did not find significant negative performance over three years 
after the acquisition. Since they used multi-factor benchmarks, they concluded that 
previous findings of poor performance after takeover are likely due to benchmark portfolio 
errors rather than mispricing at the time of the takeover. This seems to imply that the 
negative post-acquisition performance documented is more a statistical artifact rather than 
a result of market inefficiency. However, Agrawal et al. (1992) showed that their results 
are period specific and, hence, cannot be generalised. Consistent with Franks et al. (199 1), 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) reported that the five-year abnormal return for their entire 
sample is insignificantly different from zero. Loderer and Martin (1992) also reported that 
the five-year post acquisition performance is positive but insignificantly different from 
zero. 
In the UK, the first major study was undertaken by Firth (1980) when he examined 
acquisitions over the period 1969-1975. He reported that bidding firms are associated with 
negative abnormal returns. Consistent with this result, Bames (1984) examined all mergers 
undertaken by companies in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1974-1976 and 
reported substantial and significant price decreases of acquirers in the long term. 
Furthermore, Franks and Harris (1989) used a comprehensive sample for over a thirty-year 
period (1955-1985) and found that bidders earn negative post-merger abnormal returns of 
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-13% two years after the merger. They also observed that when CAPM is used instead of 
the similar market model used by Firth (1980) a significantly positive abnormal return 
(about 4%) is gained due to the average bidder's alpha. Limmack (1991) reported that on 
average over the 24 months after the announcement, the acquirer's shareholders experience 
significantly negative returns over the whole period. Consistent with all the above UK 
studies, Gregory (1997) examined domestic takeovers for the period 1984-1992 and found 
that, irrespective of the benchmark used, the two-year post-acquisition returns is, on 
average, significantly negative. Hence, he expressed (p. 998) that 'the contribution of this 
paper has been to show that the post-takeover performance of UK companies is 
unambiguously negative in the longer term'. However, Limmack (1997, p. 1006) remarked 
that 'his conclusion is perhaps a little premature' since there remain at least three possible 
explanations for the results obtained in this and other studies, which are '(i) the market is 
inefficient and takeovers are not, on average, in bidding shareholders' interest (ii) results 
are time and sample specific and (iii) the models or methods selected for control may not 
be appropriate for the purpose and that there are other as yet unspecified but more 
appropriate control models or methods'. 
Contrary to these studies documenting significantly negative abnormal returns but 
consistent with Franks et al. (1977), Dodds and Quek (1985) studied acquirers over a 
rather short period, 1974-1976, and found that they earn positive abnormal returns. 
However, they observed that the positive abnormal returns earned only lasted until the 25 th 
month with negative abnormal returns being earned thereafter. 
2 Results are consistent with the extrapolation and the method of payment hypotheses, that is, glamour acquirers 
and equity-financed deals underperform. 
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A very recent UK study by Antoniou, Arbour and Zhao (2005) examined takeovers in the 
1990s using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) methodologies. They found that over a three-year period acquirers earn a positive 
but insignificantly different from zero abnormal returns. However, they reported 
significantly negative one-year CAR and one and two-year BHAR abnormal returns. They 
repeated the three-year performance examination after eliminating the overlapping 
acquiring firms but found the results to be of the same pattern even though overlapping 
stock return inflates the conventional West statistic. Hence they conclude that there is no 
statistically significant three-year post-takeover abnormal return. 
3. ZLZ2. Method of Payment 
The method of payment is an imperative characteristic of any M&A activity since in 
structuring an acquisition the form of payment must be determined. Bidding firms pay the 
target firm's shareholders using an array of means with the most common being cash, 
stock, and a combination of both (mixed). According to Fishman ((1989), p 41): 'A key 
difference between a cash offer and a (risky) securities' offer is that a security's value 
depends on the profitability of the acquisition, while the value of cash does not'. In a 
perfect market world of Modigliani and Miller (1958) with certainty, no transaction costs 
and no-taxes, one would not expect the method of payment to have an effect on 
shareholder wealth. However, in reality this is not the case. 3 It is widely accepted that the 
mode of payment provides an important signal about the perceived value of synergy which 
can hence explain the long-run post-acquisition performance of bidders. 4 
3 See DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Fishman (1989) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 4 See chapter 2 (section 2.2.4) for further implications concerning payment method and bidders' performance. 
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Martin (1996) and Loughran and Vijh (1997) argue that the form of payment is partly 
endogenous to the mode of acquisition (mergers/tender offers), which may be the real 
driving force behind the results (see also Faccio and Masulis (2005)). Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) find, in contrast to cash exchanges, negative abnormal returns for stock offers. 
Martin (1996) further reports that while acquiring firm size is not related to the method of 
payment, both the acquirer's and the target's investment opportunities are determinants of 
the form of financing. Consistent with the signalling hypothesis, Franks and Harris (1989) 
observed that in the UK and US larger bid premia are associated with cash than equity and 
that acquirers making cash offers have better post-merger performance than those using 
equity. However, they find that unlike the US, UK bidders using all equity do not suffer 
significant abnormal losses at the time of the bid announcement. Antoniou, Arbour and 
Zhao (2005), who studied four means of exchange, found that mixed financing offers are 
the best performing while stock offers are the worst ones even though they did not find any 
statistically significant post-takeover abnormal returns for all four in three years after the 
takeover. 
Very few studies have examined the long-run performance of privately held firms or 
subsidiaries. Moeller Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) reported insignificantly positive post- 
acquisition (significantly positive for large firms, insignificantly negative for small firms) 
abnormal returns for three years after the announcement, and zero abnormal returns for 
subsidiary targets. Li (2004) documented that acquirers of private targets significantly 
underperform three years after their acquisitions, despite a large positive market reaction 
around the announcement period. The underperformance is only prevalent for stock- 
financed transactions, most severe for low book-to-market acquirers, and unrelated with 
the relative size of the transactions. 
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For mergers of private companies, using stock as medium of payment has further 
implications due to the particular ownership structure of private companieS. 5 The 
concentrated ownership in private companies makes the creation of large shareholders 
possible through mergers. If the acquisition is paid with the acquirers' shares, and it creates 
a large shareholder who can effectively monitor the management's decisions, the 
acquirers' stock value should not go down afterwards. Similarly, according to the 
information hypothesis, if the favourable private information of acquiring firms' stocks can 
be conveyed to the market by the private targets' managers' acceptance of blocks of 
shares, we will not observe the long-run underperformance of the acquirers. If the short- 
run positive bidder abnormal returns are driven by any factors related with long-run 
fundamental value, we would observe the continuous upward drift in acquirer's stock 
value if the market underreacts. Over the long run, the blockholder and information stories 
predict no downward drift in acquiring firms' stock value unless the market overreacts 
around announcement dates. 
3. Z]. Z3. Mode ofAcquisition, Size and BIM Benchmarks 
Some researchers separate corporate takeovers by the form of acquisition due to their 
differing effect on the post-acquisition performance of acquirers and have reached a 
consensus that acquirers under-perform after mergers but not after tender offers. Even 
though Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that on average bidders do not lose, they 
commented that post-acquisition returns depend on the mode of acquisition. They observed 
that on average, mergers generate significantly negative post-acquisition returns (-15.9%) 
but marginally significantly positive abnormal returns (43%) for tender offers. This implies 
that even though mergers are usually friendly to the target managers, on average they are 
5 For further analysis see chapter 2 (section 2.2.2). 
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not in shareholders' best interest while tender offers, which are typically hostile to the 
target managers, seem to benefit shareholders. The evidence suggests that the disciplining 
of target managers in tender offers may affect the shareholder wealth gains from 
acquisition. Martin and McConnell (1991) observed that the turnover rate for the top 
manager of target firms in tender offer acquisitions significantly increases following 
completion of the takeover. 
Consistent with Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998) used a size-based 
and book-to-market based benchmark proposed by Farna and French (1992) and found that 
bidders in mergers underperform. while acquirers in tender offers overperform (small but 
statistically significantly positive) in the three-year post-acquisition period. On the other 
hand, in line with Jensen and Ruback (1983), Agrawal et al. (1992) observed no evidence 
of unusual performance for tender offers (small and insignificantly different from zero) but 
found that acquiring firms in mergers earn significantly negative abnormal returns of - 
13.85% in the three-year post-event interval. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argued that the long-term under-performance of acquirers is 
not uniform across firms and that this is primarily caused by the poor post-acquisition 
performance of low book-to-market 'glamour' acquirers (significantly negative -17%). 
Although Sudarsanam. and Mahate (2003) reported the same phenomenon for the UK, they 
found, in contrast to the US study, stronger support for the method of payment hypothesis 
than for the extrapolation hypothesis. They further argued that, in spite of 'glamour' 
acquirers enjoying significantly higher announcement returns than 'value' acquirers, they 
have a much lower three-year post-acquisition return irrespective of the method of 
payment. In addition, Sudarsanam. and Mahate (2003) observed that either when market- 
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to-book-value ratio or price-earning ratio is used as a proxy for glamour/value status, they 
both lead to similar results. 
3.2.2. Market Conditions 
3. ZZL Stock MarketActivity 
Nelson (1959) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) associate aggregate stock prices and 
mergers. Nelson (1959) points out that i) mergers are highly concentrated in time, ii) 
merger waves starting in the late 1800s are associated with stock market booms, and iii) 
the means of payment is generally stock. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) show that this 
correlation persists through 2000.6 They are the only ones who have applied the q-theory 
to mergers and claimed to be able to explain merger waves with this theory. They liken 
mergers to the purchase of used plant and equipment, and show for the period 1971-2000 
that their q-equation for mergers outperforms a similar equation for purchases of used- 
capital. When a firm chooses to expand, however, it has three options: purchase new plant 
and equipment, purchase used plant and equipment, or purchase another company. 
Therefore they suggest that merger waves occur during stock market booms, because 
buying other companies becomes relatively more attractive than purchasing assets in the 
new or used capital markets. 
Both studies suggest that many of the merger waves were caused by changes in the 
business environment that both increased overall stock prices and led to more profitable 
merger opportunities. Since mergers represent asset reallocation, merger waves should 
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occur when there is major technological change. When a major new technology arrives, 
many firms will not be able to easily adapt it, perhaps because their managers and 
employees have the wrong skills. Such firms become takeover targets for those firms that 
can take advantage of the new technology. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) suggest that 
mergers are clustered around economic and regulatory shocks, and they provide evidence 
that merger activity varies significantly across industries. Given that most mergers occur 
following shocks and there is evidence of a positive stock market reaction to mergers 
(Andrade et al. (2001)), it is likely that common synergies are created due to the shocks, 
supporting the neoclassical explanation of merger waves: merger waves occur in response 
to specific industry shocks that require large scale reallocation of assets. Harford (2005), 
however, argues that these shocks are not enough on their own and there must be sufficient 
capital liquidity to accommodate the asset reallocation. 
However, according to Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2003), the industry-shocks 
hypothesis ignores the association that mergers come in waves and that these waves are 
correlated with stock market booms. They suggest two ways to bring these two patterns 
together: First, a single exogenous event causes both a series of merger waves in several 
industries and the stock market boom. Second, the stock market boom itself causes a series 
of industry merger waves. However, neither Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) nor Harford 
(2005) mention the association between aggregate merger waves and share prices; without 
an explanation that links this association to industry shocks their account of merger waves 
is incomplete. 
6 They find that merger activity is highly correlated with the size of the stock market, with a correlation 
coefficient p of 0.574. 
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Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesize that the reason merger waves always 
occur in booms is because increases in cash flows simultaneously increase fundamental 
values and relax financial constraints, bringing prices closer to fundamental values. 
Empirical evidence by Harford (1999) supports this argument by showing that firms that 
have built up large cash reserves are more active in the acquisition market. 
If the market reaction to merger announcement is not based on fundamentals (meaning that 
behavioural. elements drive acquisition decisions), it might also affect merger decisions. 
Mergers are more frequent when bidders appear to be overvalued (Dong et al., (2005)). 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that if valuations are driven by beliefs, it is possible 
that managers may make more acquisitions, especially those financed using stock, during 
periods of optimism because these offer good opportunities to issue large amounts of stock 
at an overvalued price. 7 Knowing that their shares are overvalued, the managers of these 
companies exchange them for real assets through mergers, thereby protecting their 
shareholders from the wealth loss that will accompany the market's eventual correction of 
its error in evaluation. The target's managers are assumed to have short time horizons, so 
they also gain (a private gain) by "cashing in" their stakes in their firms at favourable 
terms. In this case, a rational stock market would react to a merger announcement as 
evidence that a firm may think its stock is overvalued, leading to a negative announcement 
reaction with no long run drifl. 8 Nevertheless, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a theory 
on an irrational stock market and self-interested target managers who cash out quickly. 
Although mergers are not assumed to generate any wealth-creating synergies, when they 
7 An old and widely used idea in corporate finance is that firms use stock as an acquisition currency in mergers 
when they think their stock is overvalued. This idea is rooted in asymmetric information arguments such as 
Myers and Majluf (1984), and it is the basis for numerous studies examining long-run, post-acquisition under- 
performance. 
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occur as a result of some firms having overvalued shares under the S&V (2003) theory 
they appear to be win-win events. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005) develop a model of rational managerial behaviour 
and uncertainty about sources of misvaluation that would also lead to a correlation 
between market performance and merger waves. In their model, rational targets without 
perfect information will accept more bids from overvalued bidders during market valuation 
peaks because they overestimate synergies during these periods. Thus, when the market is 
overvalued, the target is more likely to overestimate the synergies even though it can 
realize that its own price is affected by the same overvaluation because it still 
underestimates the shared component of the misvaluation. The greater transaction flow 
produces a merger wave. However, their model differs from that of Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) in that target managers rationally accept overvalued equity because of imperfect 
information about the degree of synergies. 
In a more recent empirical piece, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) 
present that aggregate merger waves occur when market valuations, measured as market- 
to-book-ratios, are high relative to various estimates of true valuations based on accounting 
models or industry multiples. However, they note that their results are consistent with both 
the behavioural mispricing stories and with the interpretation that merger activity spikes 
when growth opportunities are high or when firm-specific discount rates are low. This 
latter interpretation is similar to a neoclassical hypothesis with a capital liquidity 
component. 
Martin (1996) shows that firms that use stocks in acquisitions have lower book-to-market ratios than those that 
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3. ZZI. I. OverextrapolationIlIubris Hypothesis 
Firm-level valuations seem to have a great impact on the long-run performance of 
acquiring shareholders. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) provide empirical evidence that the 
market overextrapolates past managerial performance of bidding firms when assessing the 
acquisition value. Managers of companies with low B/M ratios tend to overestimate their 
abilities and to proceed to an acquisition without examining the value and the 
consequences of a merger with caution (i. e. they are more likely to be infected by hubris). 
In addition, large shareholders or the board of directors of such companies are more likely 
to give the management 'more freedom' in approving its acquisitions plans. In this case, 
hubris-driven acquisitions will more likely lead to share price underperformance. 
9 On the 
other hand, firms' managers with high B/M ratios will be more careful in acquisitions 
evaluations, because a potential fault will lead to significant losses for the company. Such 
acquisitions should create shareholder value rather than destroying it, as hubris-driven 
acquisitions do. 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2003) suggest that the overextrapolation is extensive during 
high market valuation periods. Managers during stock market booms are influenced by the 
overall state of the market and not just by the valuations of their own firms. Therefore, it is 
more likely to suffer from hubris motivations, which lack sufficient synergies. As a 
consequence, such hubris-driven acquisitions undertaken during booming periods lead to a 
great extent to value destruction, while positive abnormal returns are obtained in the short- 
use cash. Stock deals were especially common in the high-flying high-technology sector where most takeovers 
involved securities. 
9 The winners' curse hypothesis arises in a common value auction (the asset has the same value to all bidders), 
because the highest bidder has the highest positive valuation error and therefore wins the auction but does not 
like the "prize" (Bazerman and Samuelson (1983)). However, it bids more than the actual gain, and its 
shareholders suffer a loss. Of course, rational individuals should not enter into contests in which they lose even 
when they "win". Thus we need to posit managerial hubris (Roll (1986)). Managers know about the winners' 
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run. On the contrary, during downward stock market periods, investors seem to be more 
cautious about acquisition attempts; hence, they conduct only acquisitions that deliver 
sufficient synergies. 
3. ZZI. Z Investor Sentiment (as afactor-component ofStock Market) 
Delong et al. (1990) and Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) argue that when the market is in 
an upward trend, managers may feel encouraged to make acquisitions because they believe 
that the market expects firms to undertake growth-enhancing initiatives like acquisitions. 
Alternatively, managers may use hot markets as a cover to exploit shareholders. If 
managers are rewarded for increasing stock prices, then they have an incentive to make 
bad acquisitions in hot markets, since even a bad acquisition may temporarily boost the 
acquirer's stock price. In addition, acquisitions when market sentiment is bullish are easier 
than when it is bearish because target resistance is lower when stock prices and the general 
'environment' of the market are high and confident respectively due to the fact that targets 
receive premia that are over and above their already high valuations. On the other hand, 
when the market sentiment is bearish, the market does not expect acquisitions, and 
therefore managers respond by avoiding undertaking acquisitions unless the amount of 
synergies is considered large enough to justify going against market sentiment and 
expectations. 
curse and know that other acquirers have on average lost money, but have the hubris to believe that they are 
better than other managers in spotting attractive merger opportunities. 
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3. ZZI. 3. Herding behaviour 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Neeman and Orosel (1999) posit that in case that 
managers expect more acquisitions to take place when stock prices are rising, each 
manager may be more interested in acquiring another firm rather than carefully evaluating 
the potential synergies occurring. In this case fund managers may mimic the investment 
decisions of other managers, ignoring substantive private information. This is subject to 
the fact that they believe that the reputation damage made as a part of a herd may be 
smaller than if the manager had made a more isolated decision and also because managers 
would not like to be 'left out of the game' during a merger wave. 
3. ZZZ Merger ActivioVWaves 
One of the most striking characteristics of mergers is that they tend to come in bunches. 
Various studies providing a definition of merger waves have been reported. For instance, 
Reid (1968) calls waves the periods of times characterized by relatively large numbers of 
mergers reported simultaneously in many industries. Alternatively, Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005) define a merger wave as a sequence of time periods (two or more) in which the 
probability of a merger occurring is above the unconditional expected probability of a 
merger. 10 
Rosen (2005) tests the application of hot stock markets to merger markets. More 
specifically, the study examines whether market factors influence the reaction to a merger 
announcement. He shows that there is a form of momentum in mergers, which means that 
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the market reaction to the merger is positively correlated with the response to other 
mergers in the past. Thus, a hot merger market is one where the reaction to recent market 
conditions has been favourable. Hot markets are related, although not necessarily the same, 
as merger waves. Waves are traditionally measured by the number of mergers rather than 
by the market's reaction to merger announcements. The market reaction depends on the 
new information contained in a merger announcement (for example, whether synergies are 
created due to a merger) as well as how the market reacts to that information. 
Below three competing explanations are provided for mergers and are evaluated on to what 
extent they are consistent with the evidence of merger momentum he finds: 
3. Z2. Zl. The Neoclassical Theory 
The neoclassical theory of mergers assumes that managers act to maximize shareholder 
value. If mergers are concentrated around common shocks that positively affect the 
potential synergies from all mergers, then mergers following shocks should be better than 
other mergers. Under this theory, merger momentum may result from shocks that increase 
synergies for a group of mergers. Mergers announced following these shocks should be 
better on average than other mergers, leading to correlated announcement returns. Thus, 
while the number of mergers and the market reaction to merger announcements do not 
need to be related, if the neoclassical theory holds and if merger waves are responses to 
common shocks, then merger waves and merger momentum should be highly correlated. 
10 Therefore, they suggest that when looking at historical data we will never know if a time period with a large 
number of mergers was a merger wave or just a high number of positive realizations. However, the more 
mergers we see, the more likely the time period is a wave. 
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3. ZZZZ The Managerial Discretion HypothesislManagerial Objectives 
The managerial discretion hypothesis assumes that managers get utility from seeing their 
firms grow rapidly. This utility might arise because managers' incomes are tied to the 
growth of the firm, or because they get 'psychic income' from managing a larger firm. 
Marris (1964,1998) was the first to posit growth objectives for managers. He hypothesized 
further that managers were constrained in their pursuit of growth by the threat of a 
takeover, which he assumed to be inversely related to the market-to-book ratio. Some 
managers are empire builders. Under the managerial discretion hypothesis mergers are the 
fastest way for a firm to grow, and thus empire-building managers undertake mergers even 
when they lower the wealth of their shareholders (Mueller, (1969)). 
Managerial motivations, possibly in reaction to shocks, can also lead to increases in 
merger activity. If managerial objectives drive merger decisions, then acquisitions during 
waves may be worse than other mergers (Gorton et al. (2002)). This is due to the fact that 
when acquisition reduces the profitability that a firm is subsequently acquired, managers 
can use mergers to preserve private benefits. Under such a circumstance the phenomenon 
'eat or be eaten' comes up, since managers make acquisitions to deter other bidders from 
acquiring their firms creating merger waves (Morck et al. (1990)). These are defensive in 
nature acquisitions and are more likely to destroy rather than create value. 
Under either theory, rational shareholders are assumed to react immediately to the new 
information (positively under the neoclassical theory, negatively under managerial 
motivation hypothesis) contained in a merger announcement. Therefore, there should be no 
long run reversal after the announcement or at least there is no reason that the post- 
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acquisition bidders' performance should depend on when the merger announcement 
occurs. 
3. ZZZ3. Investor Sentiment (as afactor-component ofMerger Activity) 
There is evidence that investors may be overly optimistic in so-called hot markets. First of 
all, in markets other than merger markets, Loughran and Ritter (1995) attribute high 
returns on Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) to optimistic beliefs on the part of investors. 
Ljungqvist et al. (2002) argue that, in hot markets, regular institutional investors are 
allocated Initial Public Offering (IPO) stock at a discount for gradual resale to exuberant 
investors in the after market. Underpricing serves to compensate the 'regulars' for the risk 
they take by restricting the supply of available shares and maintaining prices, despite the 
possibility that the hot market may end prematurely. Similarly, the prospect theory of 
underpricing and hot markets proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2002) suggests that large 
mispricing (underpricing) occurs in hot IPO markets. 
The same phenomenon could exist in hot merger markets. More specifically, investor 
sentiment theory suggests that shareholder reaction to a corporate announcement can be 
affected by overly optimistic beliefs on the part of investors and possibly managers; this is 
a reaction to factors other than the value created by the merger. If over-optimism affects 
the market reaction to merger announcements, then we should see autocorrelation in the 
returns to bidding firms from merger announcements. In other words, during hot merger 
markets, when optimism is a dominant ingredient of the market, the market reaction to all 
announcements should be more positive than at other times. Therefore merger momentum 
could result from investors as a group becoming optimistic about mergers announced 
during a particular period of time. 
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Rosen (2005) finds evidence that acquirer stock prices are more likely to increase when the 
merger is announced in high-valuation markets as compared to low-valuation markets (hot 
versus cold markets) or if the overall stock market is doing better than a long-term average. 
However, this effect disappears in the long run, as share prices are reversed. Long- run 
bidder stock returns are lower for mergers announced when either the merger market or the 
stock market is hot at the time of the acquisition announcement than for mergers 
announced at other times as optimism is replaced by results. 
3.3. Data 
3.3.1. Description ofData 
We identify a sample of successful acquisitions by UK public companies that acquired 
domestic targets, announced between January 1,1984 and May 6,2004.11 The sample 
acquisitions are drawn from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Database and the period selected is driven by the total 
availability of the SDC Database. The following criteria are used in selecting our final 
sample: 
- Acquiring firms are UK firms publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
have five days of return data around the acquisition announcement and 36-month return 
data listed on the DataStrearn Database. 
The bidder acquires at least 50% of the target's voting shares as a result of the acquisition. 
" SDC is a commercial database that includes information on UK takeover bids since 1980. However, the first 
domestic acquisition after our restrictions set appears in 1984. 
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- The target is a public, private, or a subsidiary firm. 
- The deal value is one million dollars or more. 12 
- We delete financial and utility firms (following Fama, and French (1992)) for both bidders 
and targets. 
We do not include foreign acquisitions as this would contaminate our analysis. Since we 
examine the performance of bidding firms as a matter of market valuations, it is obvious 
that the inclusion of deals made in foreign (non-UK) markets with different 
marketibusiness cycles, corporate governance, regulations and, generally, market 
conditions would lead to doubtful conclusions. Eventually, our sample that satisfies all the 
above restrictions consists of 3,512 acquisitions. 
Similar to Ang and Kohers (2001), we group the method of payment into three categories: 
(1) cash financing which includes transactions made solely in cash or cash and debt; (2) 
stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock; (3) combination 
financing which comprises of offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as 'other' by SDC. As we use Dimson et al. (2003) UK three- 
factors to account for UK book-to-market peculiarities, we include in our long-run analysis 
bids carried out between 1984-1998 for three-year analysis (2,332 firms), bids up to 1999 
for two-year analysis (2,615 firms), and takeovers from 1984-2000 (2,918 firms) for one- 
year analysis respectively. 
12 We employ a one million dollars cut-off point to avoid results being generated by very small deals. Similarly, 
studies like Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stutz (2004) in the US use a 
cut-off point of one million dollars. 
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3.3.2. Classification of High Valuation-Low Valuation Markets and Hot-Cold Merger 
Markets 
We classify each month into a high-, neutral- or low-valuation period. Firstly, we use 
monthly TOTMKUK P/E data from 1984 to 2004 to capture price levels that existed in 
each month from January 1984 till May 2004. We collect P/E data from Datastream. Since 
DataStream provides data for P/E ratio of FTSE All Share from 1993 onwards, we use the 
TOTMKUK (Total Market UK), which is the closest index to FTSE All Share (the 
correlation between these two indices is 99.92%). Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) find that 
merger waves coincide with periods of high price-earnings ratios on the stock markets, 
which is used as a proxy of market valuation. Bowman, Fuller and Nain (2004) also 
employ the same proxy. In order to classify each month into a valuation group we first 
detrend the market (TOTMKUK) P/E by removing the best straight line fit (OLS) from the 
P/E of the month in question and the five preceding years. 
13 Each month is classified into 
an above (below) average group if the detrended P/E of that month was above (below) the 
past five-year average. In other words, when the PIE residuals of that month is above or 
below the past five-year average P/E residuals. Then the months are ranked in order of 
detrended P/E. The top half of the above-average months are classified as high-valuation 
months and the bottom half of the below-average months are classified as low-valuation 
months. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation months. 
Secondly, for robustness reasons, we employ an alternative classification of high, neutral 
and low-valuation acquisitions by using the TOTMKUK itself rather than the P/E ratio of 
" It is necessary to remove the trend from the market P/E ratio because P/E ratios have trended upwards. Hence, 
if we do not remove the trend, then this would result in a systematic classification of more recent acquisitions as 
high-valuation acquisitions and older acquisitions as low-valuation acquisitions. Our results are robust to 
reasonable changes in the length of the historical data used in the detrending. 
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the TOTMKUK index. 14 The index level in each month is classified as above or below the 
past five-year average TOTMKUK index level. ' 5 The top half of TOTMKUK levels in the 
above average groups are classified as high-valuation months, while the bottom half of 
TOTMKUK levels in the below-average group are classified as low-valuation months. All 
other months are classified as neutral-valuation months. 
Finally, we classify each month into a hot or cold merger period. We use the monthly 
number of acquisitions undertaken from 1984 to May 2004 to capture merger waves and 
merger momentum from January 1984 till May 2004. These months are ranked from top to 
bottom according to the number of mergers. Each month is classified as a hot (cold) 
takeover month if the number of acquisitions of that month lies above (below) the top 
(bottom) 30% of the months with the largest (smallest) number of acquisitions. 
3.3.3. Description of Event Study Samples 
Table 3.1 presents some descriptive statistics of our sample. We find during the period 
January 1984-May 2004 52 high-valuation periods, 68 low-valuation periods and 122 
neutral-valuation periods. Therefore, we report that our sample contains 1,014 high- 
valuation acquisitions, 1,796 neutral-valuation acquisitions and 702 acquisitions initiated 
in low-valuation periods. With respect to the method of payment used in the transaction we 
observe the dominance of cash and combination financing (1,963 and 1,360 respectively), 
while very few deals were done with stock (only 189). In addition, as expected according 
to the literature, our sample reflects that acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets are 
14 Since we used the P/E ratio of the TOTMKUK index, for reasons of consistency we employ this index instead 
of the FTSE ALL Share index. " We remove the best straight-line fit (OLS) trend from the TOTMKUK index level before classifying each 
month as above or below the past average. The detrending procedure is the same as the one described for the P/E 
ratio. 
129 
Chapter 3 Do Stock Prices Drive Performance of Bidding Firms? 
major components of the takeover activity (approximately 93% of our sample). In terms of 
the total deal value, 33.97% of all acquisition pounds are spent in high-valuation periods 
and only 15.25% in low-valuation periods. In addition, it is shown that high-valuation 
periods are accompanied with greater merger activity than low-valuation periods (28.87% 
vs 19.99%). Looking at the size, a noticeable point is that the mean market value of 
bidding firms is larger in high-valuation periods when they use cash or when they purchase 
public targets. All these are issues that characterize managers of companies that are 
infected by hubris, since usually this kind of managers is likely to be overconfident to: i) 
initiate acquisitions during high valuation periods when the overall state of share prices is 
in very high levels; ii) use cash to try to reflect to the market their budget capacity, 
although they reduce their liquidity; or iii) buy large companies (public firms are far larger 
than private firms or subsidiaries), taking the risk that such a transaction can entail. In 
addition, about 35% of all stock acquisitions are made in high-valuation periods while only 
16% are made in low-valuation periods, suggesting that acquirers prefer to use stock when 
they believe that it is overvalued, instead of paying with possibly undervalued stock during 
low-valuation markets. 
3.4. Methodologies 
3.4.1. Short Run 16 
We calculate Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) for the five-day period [-2, +2] around 
the announcement date supplied by SDC. 17 More specifically, we estimate the abnormal 
returns by using a modified market-adjusted model: 
16 See Chapter 2 (section 2.3.3.1) for a more thorough analysis of the importance of short-run event studies and 
the model we use. 
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ARj, --, ý Rit - R. t 
(1) 
where R,, is the return on firm i and Rmt is the value-weighed market index return (i. e. the 
FT-All Share). The t-statistics are estimated using the cross-sectional variation of abnormal 
returns. 18 
3.4. Z Long Run 
The selection of a proper benchmark is always problematic when examining long-term 
returns. Early evidence from over a decade ago strongly suggested that the models used to 
measure short-run impacts were not suitable for long-run analyses (e. g. Conn-Connell 
(1990)). Commonly used models such as Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Market 
Model, Market-Adjusted Model, all using daily and monthly data, showed significant signs 
of parameter instability and hence loss of reliability as generators of benchmark expected 
returns (e. g. Coutts, Mills, Roberts (1997)). While the models were suitable for short-run 
analysis due to the magnitude of valuation effects, the cumulative influence of model 
instabilities made long-run analysis less reliable. For example, Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
(1999) report 'the analysis of long-run returns is treacherous' while Fama (1998) argues 
that bad model problems are 'unavoidable.... and more serious in tests of long-run 
returns'. 
17 We choose the five-day period because Fuller et al. (2002) find that a five-day window around the merger 
announcement given by SDC is wide enough to capture the first mention of a merger every time for a sample of 
about 500 announcements. 
" We do not estimate market parameters based on a time period before each bid, since our sample contains 
acquirers making many acquisitions within a very small period of time and therefore, there is a high probability 
that previous takeover attempts would be included in the estimation period, hence making beta estimations less 
meaningful. Additionally, it has been shown that for short window event studies, weighting the market return by 
the firm's beta does not significantly improve estimation (Brown and Warner (1980)). 
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Ritter (199 1) posits that the use of whether the CARs or BHARs (Buy-and-Hold abnormal 
returns) depends on the research question we would like to address. Barber and Lyon 
(1997) favour the use of BHARs because i) CARs are not able to reflect the investor's 
experience that holds a security for a long post-event period, and ii) CAR is a biased 
predictor of BHAR. Biases in the estimation of mean abnormal long-term returns from 
daily data are largely eliminated by using buy-and-hold returns and matching event firms 
to a reference portfolio of control firms, leaving only the bad model problem. 19 However, 
it seems that both CARs and BHARs have their own advantages and can be considered as 
complementary rather than competing approaches. 
In sum, all methodologies exhibit several problems and biases and therefore any inference 
and results could be misleading. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) summarize the biases: i) 
The new listing bias arising due to the sample firms usually have a long pre-event return 
record, whereas the benchmark portfolio includes firms that have only recently begun 
trading and are known to have abnormally low returns. Loughran and Ritter (1995) record 
negative CARs for newly listed firms in the US over the 1970s and 1980s. As Kothari and 
Warner (1997) note, any selection criteria that have the consequence of systematically 
excluding newly listed firms will impact a positive bias to the average CAR to the selected 
firms. ii) The rebalancing bias because of the compounded return on the benchmark 
portfolio implicitly assumes periodic rebalancing of the portfolio weights, whereas the 
sample firm returns are compounded without rebalancing. iii) The skewness bias referring 
to an asymmetric t-distribution with a mean smaller than the zero null due to a skewed- 
right distribution of abnormal returns. Brown and Warner (1980) show that the use of 
19 Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) show how carefully constructed portfolios, in conjunction with the bootstrap 
approach of Ikenberry et al. (1995), can eliminate a number of these biases. 
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monthly data significantly increases the severity of skewness. iv) Bad model problems, due 
to ill-specified models of expected returns, since they provide a firm-specific benchmark 
expected return without implying any particular restrictions on the cross-section of 
expected returns. v) Cross-sectional correlations, as Brav (1997) postulates, due to 
industry effects or other contemporaneous cross-firm connections, which cause fewer 
independent observations than there seem to be. 
For the purpose of our study we use the Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPR) to 
allow inferences that are not biased by cross-sectional dependence. 20 Since a very large 
proportion of our sample appears to include multiple bidders, which indicates overlapping 
observations in the estimation of returns, CTPR is considered as the most appropriate 
methodology we can apply. In each calendar month, a portfolio is formed by including all 
stocks with an acquisition event during the past 12,24, or 36 months. The portfolio is 
rebalanced every month by including new event firms which executed a transaction in the 
previous month and dropping the ones whose latest acquisition event falls out of the one to 
three-year holding period. The average monthly abnormal return during the one to three- 
year post-event period is the intercept from the time-series regression of the calendar 
portfolio return on the Fama and French three-factor model. The FF three-factor model is 
estimated by using the UK Mactor of Dimson et al's (2003) to account for the UK B/M 
ratio peculiarities: 21 
Rpt -R. =aj +A(R, l -R ML, + ej, (2) . fi) 
+ s, SMB, + h, H 
20 Cross-sectional dependence caused by overlapping observations leads to downwards-biased standard errors 
and therefore causes t-statistics to be biased upwards. In addition, according to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), due 
to the number of firms being different for each month, heteroskedastic residuals are likely to be present when 
regressing calendar time average portfolio returns in excess of the risk free rate against the factors of an asset- 
pricing model. Hence, we use Andrews (1991) beteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
so as to realistically assess the validity of our results. 
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where Rpt is the average monthly return of the calendar portfolio, R. is the monthly risk 
free return, R,,, is the monthly return of the value-weighted market index, SMBt the 
value-weighted return on small firms minus the value-weghted returns on large firms, and 
HML, the value-weighted return on high book-to-market firms minus the value-weighted 
return on low book-to-market firms. In addition, A, si and h, are the regression 
parameters and E,, is the error term. The a (intercept) is interpreted as the average of the 
individual, firm-specific intercepts. 
3.5. Empirical Evidence 
3.5.1. Short-Run Abnormal Returns by Market Valuation 
3.5.1.1. Bidder Performance by PIE classification 
Table 3.2, Panel A, presents the five-day CAR [-2, +2] for all acquisitions. We find that, 
for the overall portfolio, bidders experience positive (0.79%) and significant abnormal 
returns at the 1% level. Consistent with the mounting body of the literature, we find 
positive and significant abnormal returns (0.73%) for cash payments and statistically 
significant negative abnormal returns (-1.16%) when stock is used as a medium of 
exchange. This is consistent with Myers and Majluf s (1984) theory which suggests that 
the greater information asymmetry associated with stock payments leads to more negative 
performance. In addition, acquisitions made with mixed payments appear to generate 
positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.16%. When we differentiate on the basis of 
21 Dimson, Nagel, and Quigley (2003) use different breakpoints to those of Fama-French (1993) to construct 
Size and Book-to-Market portfolios mainly due to size and B/M ratio being negatively correlated in the UK and 
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target ownership status we obtain significant negative abnormal returns for public targets (- 
1.59%) and significant positive CARs for private targets and subsidiaries (0.96% and 
0.99% respectively). For public targets, we report negative CARs of -3.32% for stock 
payments while CARs for cash or mixed form of financing are negative but insignificant (- 
0.62% and -1.34% respectively). For private targets and subsidiaries CARs are positive 
(0.96% and 0.99% respectively) and mostly significant irrespective of the means of 
exchange (insignificant only when stock is used as a method of payment). 
Panel B presents the performance of bidders in a high-valuation period according to the 
P/E classification. In numbers, we observe that bidders exhibit large positive and 
significant abnormal returns of 1.58%. Panels C and D display the performance of 
acquirers during neutral and low valuation period respectively. In neutral valuation 
mergers acquirers exhibit positive and significant abnormal returns (0.56%), while 
insignificantly positive abnormal returns are obtained during low-valuation acquisitions 
(0.25%). Differences-in-mean tests (Panel E) indicate that the announcement returns are 
significantly higher for high-valuation acquisitions than for low-valuation acquisitions 
(1.33%). This suggests that the market welcomes acquisitions during high-valuation 
periods and rewards them, in the short run, more than acquisitions initiated during low- 
valuation periods. In other words, the market is less welcoming of acquisitions during 
bearish periods than during booming periods. The pattern of negative CARs for public 
targets and positive CARs for private targets and subsidiaries holds irrespective of the 
valuation period examined. 
large firms (small firms) being concentrated in the low (high) BE/ME quartile. 
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Comparing the Panels B and D of Table 3.2, we clearly observe more pronounced positive 
abnormal (or less negative in the case of public targets) returns during bullish markets than 
bearish markets regardless of the target public status or the method of payment used in the 
transaction. In particular, bidders enjoy significant profits when buying private targets and 
subsidiary (an impressive 2.18% for private and 1.27% for subsidiaries) targets. In 
addition, they exhibit negative abnormal returns when they buy public targets; however, 
these are equal to -0.86% and most importantly they are insignificant. Nevertheless, 
looking at Panel D of a low-valuation period, bidders experience negative and statistically 
significant abnormal returns when they buy public targets. When we partition the sample 
by the method of payment and market valuation, results indicate significant and positive 
performance for cash acquisitions that took place during high (1.22%) and neutral 
valuation periods (0.69%) but insignificantly positive CARs for cash acquisitions during 
low-valuation periods. This is confirmed by Panel E, which shows that the five-day 
announcement CAR for high-valuation cash acquisitions is 1.06% higher than the CAR for 
low-valuation cash acquisitions. These results suggest that the market during high- 
valuation periods entails more liquidity, offering the opportunity of higher debt capacity 
for bidding firms to initiate acquisitions. This is consistent to Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2001) who find that in overvalued markets cash offers lead to a much larger 
positive announcement affect on the target and a better performance (a less negative effect) 
on the acquirer. A further indication of market reward (or at least not punishment) for 
bullish market acquisitions is the positive (even insignificant) bidder performance for stock 
acquisitions (0.97%), while acquirers experience, on average, losses during both low 
(-1.43%) and neutral (-2.63%) valuation periods when share exchanges take place. Along 
these lines, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005) suggest that management is more 
likely to overestimate the value of stock bids in overvalued markets. On the whole, our 
136 
Chapter 3 Do Stock Prices Drive Performance of Bidding Firms? 
results suggest that the state of the market at the time of the merger announcement 
significantly affects the abnon-nal returns experienced by the acquirers around the 
announcement day. In other words, the market offers more wealth gains during high- 
valuation acquisitions than low-valuation acquisitions. 
The same procedure is used by exploring the performance of bidding firms in the short-run 
through the investigation of an alternative event window [-20, +20] for robustness reasons. 
We intend to confirm that the market's thumbs-up announcement-effect reaction to high- 
valuation acquisitions and thumbs-down announcement effect reaction to low-valuation 
acquisitions stands when we extend the period surrounding the announcement. For bids of 
UK public targets, Draper and Paudyal (1999) argue that an event window of up to 20 days 
preceding and following the announcement should be used. The UK takeover legislation 
permits a situation where bidders of UK public firms may start building up their stake well 
before the bid announcement. Once the bid is formally announced, it must remain open for 
at least 14 days after the announcement date. In addition, the employment of an alternative 
window is made because there is always the possibility that the market starts reacting to 
bids for unlisted targets well before the publicized announcement date. One could argue 
that since our vast majority of deals includes private or subsidiary acquisitions, in which 
announcement dates in most cases converge effective dates, we fail to capture the 
information, rumours, and negotiations that take place before the event and the total market 
reaction and resolution after the acquisition. To the extent that bids for unlisted targets may 
well be made sometimes before they are formally announced or recorded in SDC, the 
market may start reacting to news and rumours surrounding the bid well before the 
recorded announcement date. In other words, a merger is the result of negotiations between 
an acquirer and a target. Therefore, because of the negotiation process between the merger 
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partners that is inherent in a merger, news leakage is very likely for mergers. This is 
consistent with Schwert's (1996) finding which shows significant run-ups in targets' prices 
as far back as one month (21 trading days) before a merger announcement. Hence, in a 
merger, the stock price adjustment is likely to start weeks before the merger announcement 
during the rumour phase of the merger. As a consequence from the above is that further 
extension of the event window is considered essential. However, we should note at this 
point that lengthening our event window may lead to inaccuracy in capturing new 
information induced by the actual event. In other words, a longer window may be less 
accurate or powerful than a relatively short window surrounding the bid announcement. To 
the extent that the market reacts efficiently to new information, the actual abnormal return 
will be better detected within a shorter window, as the longer the window used, the greater 
the noise in abnormal return estimation (Dong et al., (2005)). 
Table 3.3, Panel A, presents 41-day CARs [-20, +201 for the full sample classified by 
target public status and method of payment. In general, results are consistent with the 
patterns we obtained in Table 3.2 for five-day CARs. For all bids, the CAR is positive 
(0.76%) and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. When focusing on public 
targets we obtain negative but insignificant CARs of -1.95%. When we further 
differentiate on the basis of method of payment, CARs are, surprisingly, all insignificantly 
negative irrespective of the mode of payment used, with stock payment generating the 
largest negative and highly significant CARs of -1.65%. 
For private targets, CARs are positive (0.86%) and significant. This is in line with Chang 
(1998) and Ang and Kohers (2001) who document substantial gains for acquisitions of 
privately held firms. For subsidiaries the performance is still positive, as bidders enjoy 
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profits of 0.90%, with cash exchanges driving the result (1.35%). This is in line with 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) who posit that, when a subsidiary acquisition takes place, cash 
is preferred since corporations selling subsidiaries are often motivated by financial distress 
concerns or a desire to restructure towards their core competency. Consequently, there is a 
strong preference for cash consideration in order to realize these financial or asset 
restructuring goals and also due to the fact that bidders are frequently motivated to divest 
subsidiaries to finance new acquisitions or reduce their tax burden. Such preference for 
cash payments is likely to lead to significant positive returns. 22 
The patterns obtained from the five-day window are reflected even more impressively by 
examining the [-20, +20] CAR. More specifically, all acquirers in high-valuation periods 
(Panel B) earn significant profits of 3.07%, while CARs for low-valuation acquisitions 
(Panel D) reflect a punishment of the market to bidders leading to negative (though 
insignificant) abnormal returns (-0.04%). This significant difference of 3.10% is displayed 
in Panel E. Noteworthy findings are obtained when we split our sample according to the 
method of payment and the target public status. Acquisitions are positive and significant 
regardless of the mode of exchange or the type of target acquired apart from public targets. 
In numbers, cash acquisitions lead to CARs of 3.34%, while stock acquisitions drive the 
performance of bidders even higher (5.58%). Bidders buying private (subsidiary) targets 
during booming markets experience, on average, gain of 4.06% (1.82%), while CARs 
remain positive (1.94%) for public acquisitions though they are insignificant. On the other 
hand, during low-valuation periods cash payments lead to negative CARs (-0.58%), having 
a significant mean-difference when comparing with the cash payments in high-valuation 
22 However, Fuller et al. (2002) document higher returns for subsidiary targets when stock is used as a method of 
payment. 
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periods (3.91%). Stock payments exhibit positive but insignificant CARs (1.00%). When 
we divide the sample on the basis of target status we obtain significantly negative 
abnormal returns (-4.93%), which are driven by the significant negative cash acquisitions 
(-5.64%). Interestingly, even private acquisitions, which, as shown above, lead to positive 
abnormal returns, generate losses during low-valuation periods, while subsidiary 
acquisitions exhibit positive CARs of 1.37%. In sum, results indicate that the market 
overreacts and treats favourably acquisitions made during high-valuation periods, 
rewarding the bidders with significantly larger profits than acquisitions during low- 
valuation periods and showing that is indifferent whether acquisitions in high-valuation 
periods are indeed value enhancing and reflect potential synergies. In a nutshell, market 
valuations seem to drive acquisitions over and above the method of payment or the target 
ownership status. 
3.5.1.2. Abnormal Returns by Index (1tse1j) Classification 
For further confirmation of our short-run evidence we demonstrate our robustness test 
using the TOTMKUK index itself in order to classify each month as a high-, low- or 
neutral-valuation month. Table 3.4 (Panel A) is exactly the same as Table 3.2 (Panel A), 
since it contains the results we obtain for the [-2, +2] overall portfolio. Looking at Panels B 
and D, we identify similar patterns to the ones we found using the P/E classification. All 
acquirers in bullish markets experience significant gains of 1.03%, while less profit is 
obtained during low-valuation periods (0.36%). This difference (0.67%) is confirmed 
when we proceed to mean-difference tests (Panel E). Once again, the patterns remain 
similar, as for high-valuation periods we find positive and significant abnormal returns for 
private targets and subsidiaries (1.44% and 0.88% respectively), while acquirers buying 
Public targets experience negative and significant CARs (-1.42%). Comparing with low- 
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valuation periods (Panel D), we document positive but insignificant CARs for private 
targets (0.38%), significantly positive abnormal returns for subsidiaries (0.81%) and larger 
losses for public targets (-3.04%). In addition, when we look across the methods of 
payment, cash and mixed exchanges lead to positive and significant CARs (0.82% and 
1.44% respectively) during bullish markets, while negative CARs (-0.24%) are obtained 
for share exchanges. In contrast, acquisitions undertaken during low-valuation periods 
exhibit insignificant CARs for both cash and stock (positive for cash (0.3 1 %), negative for 
stock (4.83%)). Such findings reflect that bidders experience better performance during 
high-valuation periods, as the market reacts favourably to investors for the risk they take to 
invest during these periods when market valuations are high. 
Table 3.5 examines the 41 -day [-20, +20] window CARs of bidders using our alternative 
classification of market valuation (TOTMKUK index itself). In general, return patterns are 
similar with those of Table 3.2 (Panel A). We find that for the overall portfolio bidders 
generate positive (0.76%) and significant abnormal returns at the 1% level. When we 
divide our sample by the medium of exchange, we find positive and significant abnormal 
returns (0.98%) for cash payments and negative but insignificant abnormal returns (- 
0.49%) when stock is used as a means of financing. Accordingly, bidders purchasing 
public targets experience insignificant losses of -0.73% while they earn significant gains 
when they buy private and subsidiary targets (0.86% and 0.90% respectively). Acquisitions 
undertaken during high-valuation markets lead to positive abnormal returns (0.60%), 
though insignificant, while bidders gain, on average, 0.48% during low-valuation periods. 
We find negative but insignificant CARs for acquisitions of public targets (-0.16%) and, 
surprisingly, subsidiary targets (-0.68%) and positive and significant abnormal returns for 
private targets during booming market. Public acquisitions undertaken during low- 
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valuation period lead to significant and negative CARs of -3.79%, while positive and 
significant CARs are experienced for subsidiary targets (2.09%) and insignificantly 
negative for private targets. In sum, the results we obtain using the TOTMKUK index 
classification itself reinforce the empirical evidence we obtained using the P/E 
classification. 
3.5.1.3. Abnormal Returns by Merger Activity 
Table 3.6 (Panel A) demonstrates five-day CAR for all acquisitions undertaken in hot 
merger markets. We observe that, overall, acquirers exhibit similar performance to the one 
obtained when examining abnormal returns of acquirers as a consequence of market 
valuations in Panels A of Tables 3.2,3.3,3.4 and 3.5, as they exhibit a positive and 
significant CAR of 0.77%, indicating the existence of a merger momentum under the 
neoclassical theory. When we differentiate on the basis of target ownership status we find 
that bidders gain when buying private targets and subsidiaries (1.00% and 0.80% 
respectively), but lose when acquiring public targets (-1.30%). With respect to the method 
of payment, cash and mixed payments lead to positive and significant CARs (0.62% and 
1.16% respectively), while insignificantly negative returns are obtained when stock is used 
as the form of financing. Patterns (apart from acquisitions of subsidiaries that lead to 
negative performance) when we extend the event window to 41 days (Panel B) 
surrounding the announcement [-20, +20] are similar to the five-day ones; however, all 
CARs we obtain are statistically insignificant. 
In Table 3.7, Panel A (Panel B) we document five-day (41 -day) CARs of bidders making 
acquisitions during a cold merger market. We observe that bidders experience positive and 
significant CARs of 1.14% (1.59%), which are higher than those during hot merger 
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markets discussed above. This result is in contrast to the rational expectation of larger 
abnormal returns in hot merger markets which, according to empirical research, are 
positively correlated with high-valuation markets. A plausible explanation for this finding 
is that the market understands that mergers that are not 'pushed' by the general takeover 
environment are mergers undertaken with more care and therefore it treats them more 
favourably. Since in cold acquisition periods few acquirers take the initiative to initiate a 
merger, the market realizes that potential synergies lie behind such acquisitions and 
rewards them. Alternatively, if we view it from the other way round, the managerial 
discretion hypothesis is likely to be a dominant factor since managers make poorer 
acquisitions when they expect more acquisitions to be undertaken. When merger activity is 
high, each manager may be more inclined to acquire another firm and be less careful in 
assessing synergies while he/she may be fearful not to become the 'victim' of a merger 
procedure ('eat or be eaten'). In addition, the reputation damage from a bad acquisition 
made as a part of a herd may be smaller than if the manager had made a more isolated 
decision. Finally, another interpretation is that during hot merger markets the bidding 
firm's stock is affected by hubris (Roll (1986)). The managers of bidding firms that had a 
recent success in a general noisy environment may believe that they can create value in 
situations that the market judges to be of a negative net present value. The managers thus 
want to make acquisitions even when they anticipate the announcement will generate a 
decline in stock prices or will not lead to large instant profits. They expect that they will be 
proved correct in the future. Because shareholders have imperfect control, they do not 
prevent managers from making such acquisitions. Therefore, when managers make bad 
acquisitions because of hubris, rational shareholders should discount the stock price. 
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Subsequently, we intend to find the various interrelationships between periods of different 
market valuation and merger activity. 23 In this way we explore to identify whether stock 
market or merger activity drive our results. In Table 3.8, Panel A (D) displays bidder gains 
for five days (41 days) surrounding the announcement during parallel high-valuation 
markets and hot merger activity. We find that bidders experience positive and significant 
CARs of 1.55% (1.71%) during simultaneous high-valuation market and cold merger 
activity (in Panels G and J bidders enjoy profits of 0.85% and 4.48%). As we can observe 
from Panel N, only for the 41-day CAR is there a significant difference in the means, 
partially showing that the general noisy environment of the stock market and market 
reaction to mergers is taken with great caution (i. e. high-valuation period-cold takeover 
activity), leading to better performance. Most importantly, both in hot and cold takeover 
markets bidders experience, in general, better performance during high-valuation periods 
than low-valuation periods. This indicates that in any classification of merger market (hot- 
cold), prices are driven by the overall level of the stock market. The opposite -Le. that in 
any classification of stock market (high-low valuation period) prices are driven by the 
existence or not of merger waves- does not exist. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005) 
argue that with each new merger the market increases its expectation of the probability that 
the synergies of all firms are high and therefore subsequent mergers lead to smaller price 
revisions. As a result, a merger wave that occurs when markets become overvalued may 
not end until the market realizes the true value of the synergies of the early mergers. 
Hence, waves of financial activity will occur in overvalued markets and end with a market 
crash when participants learn information about synergies that lead them to question the 
gains from the entire sequence of mergers. As they conclude 'it is not the case that mergers 
predict market crashes, but it is rather that market crashes are preceded by mergers'. 
23 For market valuation the PIE classification is employed. 
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3.5.2. Long Run Performance 
3.5. Z]. Abnormal Returns by PIE Classification 
Table 3.9, Panel A contains the one-year post-acquisition monthly average abnormal 
returns. From the table we observe that acquirers experience significant and negative 
monthly abnormal returns for the entire sample (-1.00%) of 2,918 acquisitions and the six 
sub-groups of public, private and subsidiary targets and cash stock and mixed payment 
method. This finding suggests that acquirers lose, on average, over one year after the 
acquisition irrespective of target ownership status or whether cash or stock is used as a 
form of financing. With regards to the method of payment, cash leads to less wealth loss 
(0.91%) as it can be shown by the significant (at the 5% level) zero investment portfolio 
used to calculate the differential. 24 In addition, when we differentiate on the basis of target 
public status we find that acquisitions of private or subsidiary targets destroy less 
shareholder wealth value than public acquisitions. Similar results are obtained for two and 
three year-analysis respectively (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). 
When we partition our sample based on the market valuation (Panels B, C and D), we find 
that high-valuation acquirers outperform significantly (less wealth loss) low-valuation 
acquirers by 4.28%. In addition, acquisitions of private targets and subsidiaries undertaken 
during booming periods are less value destroying than the same acquisitions during bearish 
markets (differences in mean are 3.39% and 8.80% respectively). This could be linked to 
the divergence of opinion concept. Private firms and subsidiaries are more likely to entail 
less available information to investors increasing the uncertainty and the differences in 
24 The zero investment portfolio is applied by taking the mean return difference each month between the ohigho 
Portfolio and the olow)> portfolio (in general the two portfolios for comparison each time) and then regress this 
new time series on the Fama-French three factors. 
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opinion. During hot markets investors are mostly optimist, hence reducing the belief 
asymmetries and therefore the returns. However, during cold markets investors take their 
initial positions (optimists/pessimists) and the divergence of opinion increases, leading to 
larger abnormal returns. 25 Neutral valuation acquisitions also significantly underperform in 
the post-event period. For two and three-year post acquisition analysis, the results we 
obtain are mostly similar (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). 
In general, it is evident from these results that high-valuation acquisitions, on average, 
destroy significantly more value for shareholders in the long run than low-valuation 
acquisitions. This can be attributed to investor sentiment (over-optimism) during boom 
markets. If market participants are optimistic about the prospects for a merger, then they 
will bid up the stock of the merging firms. However, as the performance of the -merged 
firm is revealed over time, market participants may revise their views of the quality of the 
merger downward, losing their optimism. Moreover, the possibility of the neoclassical 
hypothesis that does not predict a long-run downward drift in prices is disqualified since 
we find negative performance in the long run. 
In addition, managers are likely to be infected by hubris that their managerial skills are 
high enough to lead the company to great success. Therefore, the general pressure existing 
during boom markets increases their hubris and drives them to acquisitions with less care 
about the actual synergies that will occur after the merger. However, the market realizes by 
the time the real value of the company after the merger and disregards it, leading it to a bad 
performance. Finally, as better stock performance reflects smarter business strategies, we 
find that acquirers who make cash or stock acquisitions in low-valuation periods make 
25 Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2004) suggest that the greater the uncertainty, the larger the abnormal returns. 
146 
Chapter 3 Do Stock Prices Drive Performance of Bidding Firms? 
better decisions than acquirers who make cash or stock acquisitions in high-valuation 
periods. 
Another point worth mentioning is that cash acquisitions are also negative and significant 
in the long run. This finding appears to be inconsistent with previous empirical evidence 
(i. e. Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998)), presenting a pervasive 
positive abnormal performance of cash acquisitions. One potential explanation is provided 
by a recent article in the Financial Times (08 Dec. 2004), which suggests that bidders in 
the UK used to borrow cash from debt markets with high interest rates and for terms that 
generally do not act in the interests of shareholders: 
'Most of the businesses were bought with financing packages on punchy multiples, where 
debt was six or seven times as great as the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization ... If everyone is using leverage to bid up prices that does not make investment 
sense. It encourages private equityfirms to outbid each other and I can't see it not ending 
in tearsfor some'. 
Banks are also looking to invest in all levels of the capital structure, and are viewing 
returns on a blended basis, however the risk remains that banks may suffer a greater level 
of write-offs in the future. On the whole, cash use for UK acquisitions appears to be 
"expensive" and in general overvalued. 
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3.5. ZZ Abnormal Returns by TOTMKUK Index Classification 
When we use the Total Market UK (TOTMKUK) index itself we find similar results. 
Table 3.12, Panel A is exactly the same as the Panel A of Table 3.9 reporting the patterns 
of the overall portfolio. When we examine bidder performance during high-valuation 
periods (Panel B) we obtain significantly negative abnormal returns (-1.87%) for the one- 
year post-event period. The monthly average abnormal return for bidders initiating 
acquisitions during low-valuation periods is -0.732% reflecting, on average, less wealth 
loss for low-valuation acquisitions. When we differentiate either on the basis of target 
ownership status or method of Payment, low-valuation acquisitions outperform on average 
high-valuation acquisitions confirming the return pattern reported using the P/E 
classification. Similar results are obtained when we examine two and three-year post- 
acquisition performance respectively (Tables 3.13 and 3.14). These findings suggest that 
low-valuation acquirers destroy significantly less long-term shareholder wealth than high- 
valuation acquirers. The initial, generally, positive reaction of the market to high-valuation 
acquirers suggests that the market learns only gradually that many of the mergers 
undertaken during high-valuation periods were imprudent. In contrast, when stock prices 
are low, acquisitions cam significantly lower positive announcement returns, but, in the 
long run, these acquisitions experience less negative abnormal returns. This suggests that 
the market learns over time that, despite its initial scepticism, these acquisitions were more 
worthwhile. For both high and low-valuation acquisitions the market reaction at the 
announcement stands in sharp contrast to the market's long run view of the firm's 
performance. 
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3.5. Z3. Controlfor Firm-Specific Misvaluation 
In order to distinguish whether our findings are the result of the overall market's 
misvaluation or the misvaluation of the firm, we split the sample into high, medium and 
low book-to-market acquirers, and then divide each category into acquisitions that were 
undertaken in high, neutral and low-valuation periods. We investigate the performance of 
acquirers buying during high and low-valuation periods for each of the three book-to- 
market categories based on the book-to-market ratio one month prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Table 3.15 represents these results. We find that high, medium and low 
book-to-market acquirers all underperform when they buy during high-valuation periods 
for one-year post-acquisition period (-1.00%, -2.23%, -1.42%) respectively. Similar results 
are obtained for two and three years accordingly. Moreover, we report that high, medium 
and low book-to-market acquirers in high-valuation periods have, on average, lower long- 
run returns than the high, medium and low book-to-market ones acquiring in low valuation 
periods. Hence, such a finding indicates the importance of stock market valuations as key 
determinants of acquirer performance over and above a firm's misvaluation. 
3.5. Z4. Price Reversals 
A very important issue for examination is that the results we obtain are not just a 
manifestation of long-term reversals as suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In 
particular, our finding that high valuation acquirers earn more positive abnormal returns 
surrounding the announcement date but lose more in the long run than low-valuation 
acquirers can be attributed to short-run persistence followed by long-term reversals. If the 
firms involved in acquisitions during high (low)-valuation periods experienced positive 
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(negative) or, in general, better performance (less negative) returns in the few months 
before the announcement of the acquisition, then the stock prices of these acquirers may be 
subject to a brief persistence followed by long-term negative (positive) returns. 
Hence, in order to confirm that our results are not just capturing long-run stock price 
reversals we proceed with the following analysis. Firstly, the pre-event (pre- 
announcement) performance of each acquirer in the high and low valuation acquirer 
groups is calculated. In particular, for each acquirer, we determine the monthly average 
returns for the six months preceding the announcement of the acquisition. Secondly, high- 
valuation acquirers are ranked in order of their pre-event monthly average returns and 
placed into quintiles. The same procedure is followed for low-valuation acquirers. 
Subsequently we focus on acquirers that lie in the top and bottom quintiles of pre-event 
monthly average returns. As a result, we come up with the following four categories of 
acquirers: i) high-valuation acquirers who experienced the highest pre-event returns; ii) 
high-valuation acquirers who exhibited the lowest pre-event returns; iii) low-valuation 
acquirers who experienced the highest pre-event returns; and iv) low-valuation acquirers 
who experienced the lowest pre-event returns. The reason we focus on these extreme 
quintiles is that if our results are simply a manifestation of momentum and reversals and 
have nothing to do with the quality of acquisition decisions as we have claimed, then any 
support or contradiction of our interpretation will be the most obvious for acquirers who 
have experienced extremely high or low pre-event returns. 
The results for this analysis are displayed in Table 3.16. We observe that high-valuation 
acquirers who gained high pre-event returns (5.58% on average) have one-year post- 
announcement average monthly abnormal returns of -1.51%. Similar results are obtained 
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for the two and three year-analyses respectively. This finding is consistent with long-term 
reversal while it is not possible to determine whether the long-term abnormal performance 
is solely due to reversals or whether the quality of the acquisition is a contributing factor. 
Noticeably, however, high-valuation acquirers who experienced negative pre-event returns 
also do poorly in the long-run (-2.58%). The negative average abnormal returns cannot be 
attributed to long-term reversals of stock returns since the acquirers had negative returns 
prior to the merger announcement. Moreover, low-valuation acquirers who earned positive 
pre-event returns have one-year average abnormal returns of 0.66%. This outperformance 
also cannot be attributed to price reversals. We therefore suggest that high-valuation 
acquirers-are underperforming relative to low-valuation acquirers in the long-run because 
managers are making poorer acquisition decisions during high-valuation periods. 
3.5-2-5. Herding Behaviour during Merger Waves 
A Possible interpretation for the worse long-run performance of high-valuation 
acquisitions can be attributed to herding behaviour during merger waves. To test for 
herding behaviour, we divide our sample of acquirers who bought during high-valuation 
periods into those who acquired early in the merger wave and those who acquired later. If 
herding behaviour is the explanation for the underperformance of acquirers buying in high- 
valuation periods, then the underperformance should be caused by the late-movers, which 
are firms that acquire after taking notice of an increase in acquisition activity. Early 
movers are defined as the first 10% of acquirers in any high-valuation period. 26 All other 
acquirers are classified as late movers. Table 3.17 (Panel A) presents one-, two- and three- 
year monthly average abnormal returns for early and late acquirers in the high-valuation 
26 We obtain the same quantitatively results when we define the early mover as the first 20% or 30% of acquirers 
in any high-valuation period. 
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periods. We find that early movers exhibit significantly less negative abnormal returns 
than late movers, as displayed in Panel B, which shows the mean difference between the 
two portfolios. This finding is consistent with the notion that acquirers who buy later in an 
acquisition wave are less careful in the evaluation of synergies possibly because they are 
following the herd. 
3.6. Summary and Conclusions 
Bearing in mind our findings from Chapter 2 that acquirers experience positive abnormal 
returns in the short-run when buying private targets and subsidiaries, but lose when buying 
public targets irrespective of the method of payment used, while in the long run negative 
performance is exhibited for acquisitions of any type of targets, we examine some possible 
factors for such results. Recent studies provide evidence that M&As come in waves and 
there is a positive correlation between merger activity and stock prices. In general, the 
literature suggests that market conditions, either stock market valuation or merger activity, 
influence bidders' performance. However, the question whether stock market valuation is 
the most important factor that drives the performance of acquiring firms or whether the 
results obtained source from the merger activity (or possibly other factors) always arises. 
We examine a comprehensive sample of 3,512 UK domestic acquisitions from 1984 to 
May 6,2004. We calculate Cumulative Average Residuals (CARs) for the five-day and 
41-day period surrounding the takeover announcement and estimate the abnormal returns 
by using a modified market adjusted model (Ri-Rm). Our main finding is that the market 
valuation during the period of time that the acquisition takes place affects both the 
announcement returns and long-run performance of acquirers. In particular, we find that 
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announcement-day abnormal returns are significantly positive for acquisitions undertaken 
during high-valuation periods, while small and insignificantly positive abnormal returns 
are generated for acquisitions undertaken in low-valuation markets. This result still holds 
after controlling for the method of payment, the target public status, and the event window 
used or when employing a second classification for high, low and neutral-valuation 
markets. Thus, this finding suggests that the market appears indifferent to acquisitions 
undertaken during low-valuation periods. However, it welcomes and significantly rewards 
managers' initiatives to proceed to an acquisition in a period when the market is in a 
general misvaluation and there is not a very 'clear mind' from managers as they are likely 
to be infected by overconfidence and hubris. 
However, this pattern is reversed when we examine the long-run performance of acquirers 
within a maximum of a 36-month post-acquisition period (we investigate bidder 
performance over one-, two- and three-year horizons). We divide takeover bids according 
to the target public status (public, private, subsidiary) and the method of payment (cash, 
stock, combination of cash and stock), and we examine the one-, two- and three-year post- 
acquisition share price performance of each subgroup by applying the well-known 
Calendar Time Analysis (CTA). Acquirers buying during high-valuation periods have 
worse share price performance that those making acquisitions during low-valuation 
periods. Hence, the overall market's valuation at the time of the merger announcement 
seems to impact the firm's post-merger performance. Results are independent of the 
method of payment and target ownership status. In addition, we examine the pre-event 
performance of acquirers six months preceding the acquisition event and provide evidence 
that the reversal of patterns for the acquirers is not simply a manifestation of short-term 
persistence and long-term reversals but mirrors the consequences of acquisitions during 
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specific periods of market valuation. Moreover, we research whether our findings are a 
result of market-wide or firm-specific misvaluation. We show, by doing a B/M test, the 
importance of stock market valuations as key determinants of acquirer performance over 
and above the firm's misvaluation. 
Further, we investigate whether shareholders' wealth effects are driven by the merger 
activity or merger waves, indeed, follow market valuations. We find that bidders in cold- 
merger markets exhibit better performance than in hot-merger markets, inconsistent with 
the literature that finds correlation of high-valuation markets with intensive merger activity 
and larger abnormal returns. When we divide our sample in mutually exclusive portfolios 
of high, low and neutral valuation periods, we observe the usual picture of larger positive 
abnormal returns for acquisitions initiated during high-valuation periods irrespective of the 
fact that at the same time this period is classified as cold- or hot-merger period. Therefore, 
the results suggest that stock prices do matter leading us to reach a conclusion of stock- 
price driven acquisitions. 
Finally, we test the potential explanation of manager herding behaviour for the bidder 
performance obtained. We provide evidence that acquisitions initiated later in an 
acquisition wave destroy more shareholders' wealth, probably due to less care taken in the 
evaluation of synergies because managers decide to follow the herd and are not left out of 
the 'merger game'. All in all, this chapter provides evidence that the overall market 
valuations impact shareholders' wealth and offers a more thorough inspection about the 
return pattern obtained in Chapter 2. 
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Table 3.1. Sample Statistics: Acquirer Market Equity and Transaction Value by Market 
Valuation, Form of Payment and Target Ownership Status 
The table presents the mean and median market value of acquirers and the mean and median transaction value of 
the acquisition. The last three columns represent the total deal value and the percentage of total value of 
transaction and number of acquisitions respectively. The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a 
sample of 3512 acquisitions from January 1,1984 to May 6,2004. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets are UK public, private and subsidiary firms. Using monthly data 
from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the 
detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past 
five-year average. The summary statistics are further divided by target ownership status and method of payment. 
Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as 
transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and 
stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. 
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Table 3.2. Short-Run 1-2, +21 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Acquirers (P/E 
Classification) 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public, private and/or 
subsidiary UK targets 1984 and May 6,2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R,, - R., 
where Ri, is the Return on firm i and Rmt is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panel A are 
comprised of bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets. Panels B, C and D are subsamples of Panel A; they 
contain bids undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation periods respectively. Using monthly data from 
1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the 
detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past 
five-year average. The results for each panel are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. Panel E represents 
the differences in mean short-run CARs. " Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at the 
5% level; c Denotes significance at the 10% level. T-stats are provided in parentheses. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Acq uisitions 
All Acquirers 0.790/6' 0.7 3 0/6' - 1.160/6' 1.1 6/o" 
3512 1963 189 1360 
Public Targets 
-1.59%a -0.62% -3.32%' -1.34% 
247 105 69 73 
Private Targets 0.9 6 0/6' 0.5 3 0/6' -0.43% 1.47%" 
1987 899 93 995 
Subsidiary Targets 0.99%8 1.05%1 1.86% 0.720/ob 
1 1278 959 27 292 
Table 3.2-Continued 
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Table 3.2-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel B: High-Valuation Ac quisitions 
All Acquirers 1.58%" 1.220/o" 0.97% 2.240/o' 
1014 570 67 377 
Public Targets 
-0.86% -0.01% -1.82% -0.94% 
90 34 28 28 
Private Targets 2.18%* 1.490/o" 2.130/o' 2.881/o" 
559 263 30 266 
Subsidiary Targets 1.270/6" 1.12W 5.79% 1.290/o' 
365 273 9 83 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: Neutral-Valuation Acquisitions 
All Acquirers 0.5 6 0/6' 0.690/6" -2.630/o" 0.79%" 
1796 969 91 736 
Public Targets 
-1.88%a -0.83% -3.740/ob -1.720/oe 
113 47 30 36 
Private Targets 0.58%' 0.33% -2.760/o' LOW 
1026 445 45 536 
Subsidiary Targets 0.94%' 1.17%' -0.18% 0.39% 
657 477 16 164 
Table 3.2-Continued 
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Table 3.2-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel D: Low-Valuation Ac quisitions 
All Acquirers 0.25% 0.16% -1.43% 0.62% 
702 424 31 247 
Public Targets 
-2.300/ob -1.07% - 5.970/ob -1.12% 
44 24 11 9 
Private Targets 0.22% -0.30% 1.13% 0.65% 
402 191 18 193 
Subsidiary Targets 0.731/ob 0.7 1 I/o' 0.50% 0.83% 
256 209 2 45 
Panel E: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 1.33%" 
(3.85) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 1.88%a 
(2.66) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash LOW 
(2.70) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 2.40% 
(1.32) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -2.550/o* 
(-5.08) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -2.58%" 
(-5.14) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 1.44% 
(1.09) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low Valuation Private 1.96%' 
(3.95) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 0.54% 
(1.10) 
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Table 3.3. Short-Run [-20, +201 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Acquirers 
(P/E Classification) 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public, private and/or 
subsidiary UK targets 1984 and May 6,2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the forty-one days 
[-20, +20] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a 
modified market-adjusted model: 
ARj, = R,, - R., 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and RI is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panel A are 
comprised of bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets. Panels B, C and D are subsamples of Panel A; they 
contain bids undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation periods respectively. Using monthly data from 
1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the 
detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P[Es above (below) the past 
five-year average. The results for each panel are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. Panel E represents 
the differences in mean short-run CARs. 8 Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at the 
5% level; 'Denotes significance at the 10% level. T-stats are provided in parentheses. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Acq uisitions 
All Acquirers 0.76%a 0.98%a -0.49% 0.63% 
3512 1963 189 1360 
Public Targets 
-0.73% -1.65% -0.04% -0.05% 
247 105 69 73 
Private Targets 0.861/ob 0.88%r 0.18% 0.90% 
1987 899 93 995 
Subsidiary Targets 0.90o/b 0 1.35%" -3.96% -0.11% 
1278 959 27 292 
Table 3.3-Continued 
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Table 3.3-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel B: High-Valuation Acquisitions 
All Acquirers 3.07%' 3.34%' 5.5 80/oc 2.2 1 %r 
1014 570 67 377 
Public Targets 1.94% 0.28% 2.90% 3.00% 
90 34 28 28 
Private Targets 4.06*/o" 4.19%* 5.01% 3.821/ob 
559 263 30 266 
Subsidiary Targets 1.82'Yob 2.890/o' 15.79% -3.2 1V 
365 273 9 83 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: Neutral-Valuation Acquisitions 
All Acquirers 
-0.22% 0.27% -5.471/o* -0.22% 
1796 969 91 736 
Public Targets 
-1.22% -1.01% -0.84% -1.81% 
113 47 30 36 
Private Targets 
-0.39% 0.07% -4.5 1 */o" -0.43% 
1026 445 45 536 
Subsidiary Targets 0.21% 0.57% -16.85%b 0.84% 
657 477 16 164 
Table 3.3-Continued 
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Table 3.3-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel D: Low-Valuation Ac quisitions 
All Acquirers 
-0.04% -0.58% 1.00% 0.76% 
702 424 31 247 
Public Targets 
-4.930/o* -5.640/oa -5.37% -2.49% 
44 24 11 9 
Private Targets 
-0.40% -1.79% 3.85% 0.59% 
402 191 18 193 
Subsidiary Targets 1.3 7 O/o' 1.11% 10.37% 2.17% 
256 209 2 45 
Panel E: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 3.1 OW 
(3.61) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 1.47% 
(0.90) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 3.9 1 O/o' 
(3.79) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 4.58% 
(1.09) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -1.590/or 
(4.68) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -1.63'Yo' 
(4.71) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 6.870/6' 
(2.76) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low Valuation Private 4.461/6' 
(3.42) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 0.46% 
(0.41) 
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Table 3.4. Short-Run [-2, +21 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Acquirers 
(TOTMKUK Classification) 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public, private and/or 
subsidiary UK targets 1984 and May 6,2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
ARI, R, j - R. t 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and R .., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panel A are 
comprised of bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets. Panels B, C and D are subsamples of Panel A; they 
contain bids undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation periods respectively. Using monthly data from 
1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the 
detrended TOTMKUK index level of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended TOTMKUK 
levels above (below) the past five-year average. The results for each panel are further divided by the method of 
payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as 
transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and 
stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the 
mean. Panel E represents the differences in mean short-run CARs. " Denotes significance at the 1% level; b 
Denotes significance at the 5% level; ' Denotes significance at the 10% level. T-stats are provided in 
parentheses. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Acq uisitions 
All Acquirers 0.79%a 0.730/o* - 1.16%r 1.16%" 
3512 1963 189 1360 
Public Targets 
-1.59%a -0.62% -3.32%" -1.34% 
247 105 69 73 
Private Targets 0.96V 0.53%a -0.43% 1.470/6" 
1987 899 93 995 
Subsidiary Targets 0.990/0, 1.05%a 1.86% 0.720/ob 
1278 959 27 292 
Table 3.4-Continued 
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Table 3.4-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel B: High-Valuation Acquisitions 
All Acquirers 1.03%" 0.8 2 I/o' -0.24% 1.440/6" 
1336 717 58 561 
Public Targets 
- 1.420/6' 0.17% -3.13% -2.140/ob 
101 43 27 31 
Private Targets 1.440/6" 0.820/6" 1.45% 1.950/o* 
784 343 26 415 
Subsidiary Targets 
0.880/oa 0.89%a 6.5 8 0/6' 0.58% 
451 331 5 115 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: Neutral-Valuation Acquisitions 
All Acquirers 0.8 1 O/o' 0.900/oa -1.50% 1.140/6' 
1380 762 105 513 
Public Targets 
-1.180/o* -1.400/ob -2.960/ob 1.29% 
105 41 35 29 
Private Targets 0.8 1 O/oa 0.770/6" -1.69% 1.2 1 O/o' 
750 333 52 365 
Subsidiary Targets 1.20W 1.260/o" -1.91% 0.900/or 
525 388 IS 119 
Table 3.4-Continued 
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Table 3.4-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel D: Low-Valuation Ac quisitions 
All Acquirers 
0.3 6 I/o' 0.31% -1.83% 0.6 4 0/6' 
796 484 26 286 
Public Targets 
-3.040/ob -0.71% -5.81% -5.32% 
41 21 7 13 
Private Targets 0.38% -0.26% 0.68% I. Opyb 0 
453 223 15 215 
Subsidiary Targets 0.81%' 0.9 4 O/o' 4.25% 0.61% 
302 240 4 
_58 
Panel E: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 0.67%b 
(2.27) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 1.880/o" 
(2.66) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 0.50% 
(1.45) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 1.59% 
(0.83) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -2.55%' 
(-5.08) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -2.58%* 
(-5.14) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 1.62% 
(1.12) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private 1.060/6' 
(2.58) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 0.07% 
(0.17) 
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Table 3.5. Short-Run [-20, +201 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Acquirers 
(TOTMKUK Classification) 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public, private and/or 
subsidiary UK targets 1984 and May 6,2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the forty-one days 
[-20, +20] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a 
modified market-adjusted model: 
AR, j = Ri, - R,,,, 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and Rmt is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panel A are 
comprised of bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets. Panels B, C and D are subsamples of Panel A; they 
contain bids undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation periods respectively. Using monthly data from 
1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the 
detrended TOTMKUK index level of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended TOTMKUK 
levels above (below) the past five-year average. The results for each panel are further divided by the method of 
payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as 
transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and 
stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the 
mean. Panel E represents the differences in mean short-run CARs. ' Denotes significance at the 1% level ;b 
Denotes significance at the 5% level; c Denotes significance at the 10% level. T-stats are provided in 
parentheses. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Ac quisitions 
All Acquirers 0.76%a 0.98%a -0.49% 0.63% 
3512 1963 189 1360 
Public Targets 
-0.73% -1.65% -0.04% -0.05% 
247 105 69 73 
Private Targets 0.860/ob 0.8 80/oc 0.18% 0.90% 
1987 899 93 995 
Subsidiary Targets 0.90o/b C 1.35%" -3.96% -0.11% 
1278 959 27 292 
Table 3.5-Continued 
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Table 3.5-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel B: High-Valuation Acquisitions 
All Acquirers 0.60% 0.57% 1.27% 0.57% 
1336 717 58 561 
Public Targets 
-0.16% -1.14% -1.21% 2.12% 
101 43 27 31 
Private Targets 1.440/oc, 1.31% 2.67% 1.47% 
784 343 26 415 
Subsidiary Targets 
-0.68% 0.02% 7.31% -3.06%b 
451 331 5 115 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: Neutral-Valuation Acquisitions 
All Acquirers 1.090/08 1.65%* -0.47% 0.57% 
1380 762 105 513 
Public Targets 
-0.09% -1.66% 0.89% 0.97% 
105 41 35 29 
Private Targets 0.900/OC 1.900/0, -0.47% 0.19% 
750 333 52 365 
Subsidiary Targets 1.580/oa 1.780/o* -3.13% 1.65% 
525 388 18 119 
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167 
Chapter 3 Do Stock Prices Drive Performance of Bidding Firms? 
Table 3.5-Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel D: Low-Valuation Ac quisitions 
All Acquirers 0.48% 0.52% 4.49% 0.86% 
796 484 26 286 
Public Targets 
-3.790/o' -2.67% -0.22% -7.500/, c 
41 21 7 13 
Private Targets 
-0.21% -1.29% -1.88% 1.02% 
453 223 15 215 
Subsidiary Targets 2.090/6" 2.48%" -21.77% 2.15% 
302 240 4 58 
Panel E: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 0.12% 
(0.16) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 1.47% 
(0.90) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 0.05% 
(0.05) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 5.76% 
(0.95) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets - 1.590/4' 
(4.68) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -1.63%' 
(4.71) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 3.63% 
(1.36) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private 1.65% 
(1.54) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary -2.78%' 
(-2.58) 
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Table 3.6. Short-Run 1-2, +21, [-20, +201 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of 
Acquirers in Hot Merger Markets 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public, private and/or 
subsidiary UK targets 1984 and May 6,2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+21 and forty-one [-20, +20] days around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are 
estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R,, - R., 
where Rit is the Return on finn i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panel A and B are 
comprised of bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets and represent the 5-day and 41-day CARs 
respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month is classified as a hot- (cold-) takeover 
month if the number of acquisitions of this month lies above (below) the top (bottom) 30% of the already ranked 
months with more (less) acquisitions. The results for each panel are further divided by the method of payment. 
Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as 
transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and 
stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the 
mean. Panels C and D represent the differences in mean short-run CARs. ' Denotes significance at the I% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; ' Denotes significance at the 10% level. T-stats are provided in 
parentheses. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Acq uisitions 1-2, +21 
All Acquirers 0.77%' 0.6 2 O/o' -0.82% 1.160/6" 
1673 938 77 658 
Public Targets 
-1.300/o' -0.09% -3.420/o' -1.34% 
121 57 32 32 
Private Targets LOW 0.540/ob 0.70% 1.46'Yo" 
999 470 37 492 
Subsidiary Targets 0.80%8 0.81%a 2.57% 0.66% 
553 411 8 134 
Table 3.6-Continued 
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All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel B: All Acquisitions 1: 20, +201 
All Acquirers 
0.02% 0.28% -2.54% -0.05% 
1673 938 77 658 
Public Targets 
-0.89% -2.12% -0.31% 0.72% 
121 57 32 32 
Private Targets 0.69% 1.01% -1.70% 0.58% 
999 470 37 492 
Subsidiary Targets 
-1.00% -0.22% -15.36% -2.540/ob 
553 411 8 134 
Panel C: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 1-2, +21 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 1.98%" 
(2.86) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 1.44% 
(1.15) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 2.200/ob 
(2.53) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock -2.59% 
(-0.55) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -2.30%" 
(0.46) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -2.090/o' 
(-2.81) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public -0.42% 
(-0.25) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private 2.96%" 
(2.97) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 0.75% 
(0.79) 
Panel D: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 1-20, +2 1 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 1.30% 
(1.01) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 2.82% 
(1.07) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 2.6 7 0/6' 
(1.77) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 0.47% 
(0.07) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -1.59% 
(-1.06) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets 0.11% 
(0.07) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 6.260/6" 
(1.78) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low Valuation Private 1.37% 
(0.78) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 0.18% 
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Table 3.7. Short-Run [-2, +21, [-20, +201 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of 
Acquirers in Cold Merger Markets 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public, private and/or 
subsidiary UK targets 1984 and May 6,2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] and forty-one [-20, +20] days around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnon-nal Returns are 
estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARj, = R,, - R,,,, 
where R, is the Return on firm i and Rmt is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panel A and B are 
comprised of bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets and represent the 5-day and 41-day CARs 
respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month is classified as a hot- (cold-) takeover 
month if the number of acquisitions of this month lies above (below) the top (bottom) 30% of the already ranked 
months with more (less) acquisitions. The results for each panel are further divided by the method of payment. 
Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as 
transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and 
stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the 
mean. Panels C and D represent the differences in mean short-run CARs. ' Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; P Denotes significance at the 10% level. T-stats are provided in 
parentheses. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Acq uisitions 1-2, +21 
All Acquirers 1.14W 1.05%" -1.30% 1.85%" 
519 311 38 170 
Public Targets 
-1.73% -0.30% -0.88% -3.91% 
41 13 14 14 
Private Targets 0.91%" 0.14% -3.32% 2.290/o' 
280 141 15 124 
Subsidiary Targets 2.0 7 I/o' 1.990/oa 1.40% 2.650/ob 
198 157 9 32 
Table 3.7 -Continued 
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All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel B: All Acquisitions 1 -20, +201 
All Acquirers 
1.59-/o' 0.96% 2.27% 2.59%" 
519 311 38 170 
Public Targets 
3.44% 3.95% 6.35% 0.06% 
41 13 14 14 
Private Targets 
1.22% 0.15% 2.11% 2.321/ob 
280 141 15 124 
Subsidiary Targets 1.73% 1.44% -3.80% 4.7 1 O/o' 
198 157 9 32 
Panel C: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs [-2, +21 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation -0.61% 
(-1.00) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 2.3 6 0/6' 
(2.00) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash -0.17% 
(-0.27) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 0.31% 
(0.17) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -2.64%b 
(-2.25) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -3.800/o' 
(-3.20) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 2.16% 
(0.70) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private -0.72% 
(-0.93) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary -0.81% 
(0.78) 
Panel D: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 1-20, +201 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 2.9 1 
(1.91) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions -1.31% 
(-0.32) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 5.32%" 
(2.65) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock -7.58% 
(4.21) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets 2.22% 
(0.94) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets 1.71% 
(0.68) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 4.19% 
(0.77) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private 2.16% 
(1.03) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 2.41% 
(1.07) 
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Table 3.8. Short-Run [-2, +21, [-20, +201 CARs Interrelationships of Acquirers in 
HighlLow Valuation and Hot/Cold Merger Markets 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for bidders that acquired public, private and/or 
subsidiary UK targets 1984 and May 6,2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] and forty-one [-20, +20] days around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are 
estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARj, = Rj, - R., 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Results in Panels A, B, and C 
are comprised of bids for public, private, and subsidiary targets for high, neutral and low-valuation market 
respectively and represent the f ive-day CARs. Correspondingly, results in Panels D, E, and F contain bids during 
high, neutral and low-valuation and hot merger market respectively and represent the forty-one-day CARs. 
Results in Panels G, H, and I include bids during high, neutral and low-valuation and cold merger market 
respectively and represent the five-day CARs. In correspondence, results in Panels J, K, and L contain bids 
during high, neutral and low-valuation market respectively and represent the forty-one-day CARs. Using 
monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is classified as a high- (low-) valuation 
month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above 
(below) the past five-year average. In correspondence, each month is classified as a hot- (cold-) takeover month 
if the number of acquisitions of this month lies above (below) the top (bottom) 30% of the already ranked 
months with more (less) acquisitions The results for each panel are further divided by the method of payment. 
Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as 
transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and 
stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the 
mean. Panels M and N represent the differences in mean short-run CARs. " Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; ' Denotes significance at the 10% level. T-stats are provided in 
parentheses. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: High Valuation-Hot Merger Market 1-2, +21 
All Acquirers 1.55%a 1.260/o" -0.28% 2.20V 
734 416 36 282 
Public Targets 
-1.94% 0.14% -4.33% -2.861/o" 
61 27 17 17 
Private Targets 2.370/6" 1.59%a 3.470/ob 3.0 1 I/o" 
419 195 18 206 
Subsidiary Targets 1.030/ob o/ b 1.08 0 1.12% 0.83% 
254 194 1 59 
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Table 3.8 -Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel B: Neutral Valuation-Hot Merger Market 1-2, +21 
All Acquirers 0.26% 0.33% -1.91% 0.39% 
806 433 35 338 
Public Targets 
-0.43% -0.21% -1.82% 0.38% 
48 21 12 15 
Private Targets 0.12% 0.18% -4.03% 0.32% 
496 225 16 255 
Subsidiary Targets 0.66%b 0.57% 2.78 0.67% 
262 187 7 68 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: Low Valuation-Hot Merger Market 1-2, +21 
All Acquirers 
-0.43% -0.94% 2.31% 0.33% 
133 89 6 38 
Public Targets 
-1.52% -0.47% -4.67%c - 
12 9 3 - 
Private Targets 
-0.59% -1.93% 9.30% 0.61% 
84 50 3 31 
Subsidiary Targets 0.27% 0.55% -0.90% 
37 30 7 
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Table 3.8 -Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel D: High Valuation-Hot Merger Market [-20, +201 
All Acquirers 1.7 1 'Yob 2.15 O/o' -0.74% 1.35% 
734 416 36 282 
Public Targets 0.11% -1.69% 1.09% 2.01% 
61 27 17 17 
Private Targets 2.970/ob 3.490/o' -1.95% 2.91% 
419 195 18 206 
Subsidiary Targets 0.0029% 1.35% -9.97%' 4.26'Yo' 
254 194 1 59 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel E: Neutral Valuation-Hot Merger Market 1-20, +201 
All Acquirers 
-1.580/, a -1.360/ob 4.63% -1.55'Y. 
b 
806 433 35 338 
Public Targets 
-0.86% -1.25% -0.32% -0.73% 
48 21 12 15 
Private Targets 
- 1.3 80/ob -0.77% -2.82% 1 .83 O/ob 
496 225 16 255 
Subsidiary Targets 
-2.090/ob -2.080/o' -16.13% -0.67% 
262 187 7 68 
Table 3.8 -Continued 
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Table 3.8 -Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel F: Low Valuation-Hot Merger Market 1-20, +201 
All Acquirers 0.41% -0.51% -1.21% 2.81% 
133 89 6 38 
Public Targets 
-6.140/ob -5.44% -8.24% - 
12 9 3 
Private Targets 1.59% -0.69% 5.82% 4.870/ob 
84 50 3 31 
Subsidiary Targets 
-0.17% 1.26% -6.300/ob 
37 30 7 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel G: Hig h Valuation-Cold Merger Market [-2, +21 
All Acquirers 
C 0 0.85o/b 0.6 9 0/6' 0.04% 1.720/oc 
112 64 19 29 
Public Targets 
-0.01% 1.46% -0.69% 0.50% 
15 2 8 5 
Private Targets 0.47% -0.15% -2.57% 2.720/ob 
51 29 6 16 
Subsidiary Targets 5(y b 1.5 0 1.3 80/ob 4.34% 0.46% 
46 33 5 8 
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Table 3.8 -Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel H: Neutral Valuation-Cold Merger Market 1-2, +21 
All Acquirers 0.99. /b 1.401/6' -3.74% 1.12% 
203 130 13 60 
Public Targets 
-2.97% -0.66% -1.79% -6.84% 
18 8 4 6 
Private Targets 0.78% 0.13% -5.37% 2.35%a 
103 52 6 45 
Subsidiary Targets 2.12%' 2.580/6" -3.10% 0.25% 
82 70 3 9 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel 1: Low Valuation-Cold Merger Market 1-20, +201 
All Acquirers 1.460/o' 0.8 7 O/o' -0.27% 2.44%' 
204 117 6 81 
Public Targets 
-2.17% -0.52% 0.17% -5.39% 
8 3 2 3 
Private Targets 1.19o/b 0 0.29% -0.73% 2.140/ob 
126 60 3 63 
Subsidiary Targets 2.350/6" 1.580/oc 0.20% 5.270/o* 
70 54 1 15 
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Table 3.8 -Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel J: High Valuation-Cold Merger Market 1-20, +201 
All Acquirers 4.48%" 4.480/o' 7.870/ob 2.25% 
112 64 19 29 
Public Targets 8.430/ob 14.36% 7.49% 7.55% 
15 2 8 5 
Private Targets 3.190/ob 3.800/or, 3.25% 2.08% 
51 29 6 16 
Subsidiary Targets 4.6 1V 4.48%' 14.00% -0.72% 
46 33 5 8 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel K: Neutral Valuation-Cold Merger Market 1-20, +201 
All Acquirers 0.02% 0.84% -11.98% 0.84% 
203 130 13 60 
Public Targets 
-1.06% 1.69% 0.61% -5.85% 
18 8 4 6 
Private Targets 0.46% -0.15% -2.75% 1.59% 
103 52 6 45 
Subsidiary Targets 
-0.29% 1.48% -47.22% 1.56% 
82 70 3 9 
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All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel L: Low Valuation-Cold Merger Market 1-20, +201 
All Acquirers 1.56% -0.84% 15.451/ob 4.000/ob 
204 117 6 81 
Public Targets 4.23% 3.04% 13.26% -0.59% 
8 3 2 3 
Private Targets 1.04% -1.35% 9.5 7 0/6' 2.91% 
126 60 3 63 
Subsidiary Targets 2.20% -0.48% 37.44% 9.5 1 I/. b 
70 54 1 15 
Panel M: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 1-2, +21 
Hot Merger Market minus Cold Merger Market -0.37% 
(4.20) 
Hot High-Valuation minus Cold High-Valuation 0.69% 
(1.36) 
Hot Low-Valuation minus Cold Low-Valuation 1.8go/)b 
(-2.46) 
Hot High-Valuation minus Cold Low-Valuation 0.09% 
(0.16) 
Hot High Cash minus Cold Low Cash 0.39% 
(0.65) 
Hot High Stock minus Cold Low Stock -0.01% 
(-0.00) 
Hot High Public minus Cold Low Public 0.23% 
(0.07) 
Hot High Private minus Cold Low Private 1.18% 
(1.60) 
Hot High Subsidiary minus Cold Low Subsidiary -1.32% 
(-1.56) 
Panel N: Differences in mean Short-Run CARs 1-20, +201 
Hot Merger Market minus Cold Merger Market -1.570/o' 
0.91) 
Hot High-Valuation minus Cold High-Valuation -2.770/ob 
(-2.16) 
Hot Low-Valuation minus Cold Low-Valuation -1.16% 
(-0.76) 
Hot High-Valuation minus Cold Low-Valuation 0.14% 
(0.10) 
Hot High Cash minus Cold Low Cash 2.99'Yoc 
(1.70) 
Hot High Stock minus Cold Low Stock -16.18'Yob 
(-2.33) 
Hot High Public minus Cold Low Public -4.12% 
(-0.86) 
Hot High Private minus Cold Low Private 1.93% 
(0.97) 
Hot High Subsidiary minus Cold Low Subsidiary -2.20% 
(4.21) 
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Table 3.9. I-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model (P/E Classification) 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French 3-factor model. Panel I represents the overall portfolio consisting of 2918 successful domestic takeover 
bids that took place over the period 1984-2000 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDQ 
Global Financing database. Panels 2-4 are comprised of the results we obtain during high-, neutral- and low- 
valuation market respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is 
classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top 
(bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. In Panel A, calendar time 
regressions are performed on the basis of target public status (Public, Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar 
time abnormal returns are formed according to the method of payment (Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and 
Stock). Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as 
transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and 
stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the 
effective day of the successful takeover and remain for 12 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to 
include firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the calendar-time return under the Fama-French 
model with the following regression: 
Rpt - Rft = a, +A (R,,,,, - Rft) + s, SMB, + h, HML, + c, 
Where RP, is the simple average monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio, R. is the monthly return on 
three-month Treasury bills, Rm, is the return on a value weighted market index, SMBt is the zero-cost 
portfolio capturing the difference in the returns of a value weighted portfolio of small stocks and large stocks, 
and HMLt is the difference in the returns to a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to market stocks and low 
book-to-market stocks. In addition, A, S, and h, are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and C,, is 
the error term. The t-statistics are displayed in brackets. The t-statistics are in (brackets) and calculated on the 
basis of Andrews' (1991) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The numbers in 
percentage represent the reported FF cc, which is the average of the individual, firm-specific intercepts. Panel 5 
contains the differences in mean one-year calendar time abnormal returns. ' Denotes significance at the 1% 
level; b Denotes significance at the 5% level; r Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Panel 1. All Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept - 
500% a 
-1.75%" -1.06%a -1.05%" 
Rm-Rf 1.185 1.212 1.210 1.192 
[38.9] [16.2] [33.7] [28.4] 
SMB 0.788 0.650 0.882 0.723 
[19.11 [6.5] [18.1] [13.1] 
HML 0.181 0.560 0.04758 0.344 
[3.2] [4.2] [0.7] [4.6] 
R2 89% 58% 87% 82% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.976% -1.79%a -0.906%a 
Rm-Rf 1.210 1.257 1.209 
[30.1] [15.3] [24.1] 
SNIB 0.685 0.944 0.847 
[12.71 [8.4] [12.8] 
HML 0.373 -0.404 0.0934 
[5.2] [2.71 [1.041 
R2 82% 60% 78% 
Table 3.9 -Continued 
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Table 3.9 -Continued 
Panel Z Hieh- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -1.31%a -1.76%" 4.21W -1.03%' 
Rm-Rf 1.201 1.304 1.223 1.171 
[25.9] [17.1] [23.04] [17.19] 
SNIB 0.746 0.581 0.800 0.734 
[11.6] [5.5] [10.9] [7.8] 
HML 0.225 0.566 0.07167 0.431 
[2.91 [4.6] [0.8] [3.81 
RI 1 88% 77% 86% 76% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.22%' -2.33%' -1.14%' 
Rm-Rf 1.170 1.262 1.267 
[30.1] [9.7] [19.31 
SNIB 0.694 0.798 0.748 
[12.7] [4.4] [8.3] 
HML 0.425 -0.265 0.01809 
[5.2] [-1.31 [0.17] 
RI 83% 58% 81% 
Panel 3. Neutral- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquivitions 
All Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept -0.855%" 
TO- _5% b 
-0.619%' -1.12%' 
Rm-Rf 1.151 1.246 1.163 1.185 
[33.3] [11.1] [26.4] [21.21 
SMB 0.892 0.691 1.045 0.803 
[17.51 [4.2] [16.2] [10.03] 
HML -0.0533 0.455 -0.248 0.04239 
[-0.7] [2.021 [-2.6] [0.366] 
R2 87% 43% 82% 74% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.988%" -1.60%' -0.482%' 
Rm-Rf 1.153 1.488 1.136 
[28.7] [8.61 [18.6] 
SMB 0.785 1.399 0.979 
[13.6] [5.3] [11.3] 
HNIL 0.227 -2.212 0.002137 
[2.5] [0.15] [0.01] 
R11 83% 42% 71% 
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Table 3.9 -Continued 
Panel 4. Low- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidia 
Intercept -G 0% -0.466% 1.66%' -0.726% 
Rm-Rf 1.345 1.162 1.223 1.306 
[13.05] [10.1] [9.8] [11.8] 
SNIB 0.762 0.869 0.810 0.753 
[5.4] [5.4] [4.8] [5.1] 
HML -0.253 -0.072 -0.528 0.301 
[-0.8511 [-0.189] [-1.473] [0.9 10] 
RI 63% 70% 51% 61% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.97 
I%b 
-1.17% -0.64 1% b 
Rm-Rf 1.505 1.142 0.963 
[11.7] [6.6] [14.11 
SMB 0.766 1.111 1.004 
[4.4] [4.6] [11.3] 
HML -0.0847 -0.0508 -0.0493 
[-0.229] [-0.097] [-0.2321 
R2 58% 41% 77% 
Panel 5. Differences in mean one-yeaE Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 4.280/e 
(2.49) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 0.9 1 -YO, 
(1.82) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 2.74% 
(1.04) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 0.15% 
(0.01) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets 5o/ 
b 
-0.5 0 
(4.68) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -0.79%' 
(-2.98) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private 
go/ b 3.3 (o 
(2.02) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 8.80'Yoa 
(2.54) 
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Table 3.10.2-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model (P/E Classification) 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French 3-factor model. Panel I represents the overall portfolio consisting of 2615 successful domestic takeover 
bids that took place over the period 1984-1999 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDQ 
Global Financing database. Panels 2-4 are comprised of the results we obtain during high-, neutral- and low- 
valuation market respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is 
classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top 
(bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. All other months are classified as 
neutral-valuation acquisitions. In Panel A, calendar time regressions are performed on the basis of target public 
status (Public, Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar time abnormal returns are formed according to the 
method of payment (Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing includes transactions made 
solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. 
Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods 
classified as "other" by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful takeover and 
remain for 24 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. 
The t-statistics are in (brackets) and calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The numbers in percentage represent the reported FF cc, which is the 
average of the individual, firm-specific intercepts. Panel 5 contains the differences in mean two-year calendar 
time abnormal returns. ' Denotes significance at the I% level; b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 0 Denotes 
significance at the 10% level. 
Panel 1. AH Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Acaukitions 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -1.16%a -1.62%" -1.26%" - 1.16% 
Rm-Rf 1.172 1.216 1.206 1.141 
[42.1] [29.1] [35.9] [31.61 
SMB 0.749 0.632 0.863 0.637 
[19.8] [11.4] [19.01] [13.4] 
HNIL 0.382 0.673 0.271 0.518 
[7.5] [9.03] [4.4] [8.06] 
R2 90% 82% 87% 85% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.14%3 -1.33%b -1.30%* 
Rm-Rf 1.200 1.428 1.191 
[30.4] [9.5] [25.61 
SNIB 0.630 1.264 0.828 
[12.0] [6.2] [13.4] 
HML 0.497 0.156 0.301 
[7.02] [0.5] [3.6] 
RI 82% 36% 79% 
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Table 3.10 -Continued 
Panel Z Hi-alt- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept -1.18%" - 1.47% -1.16%* -0.99%, 
Rm-Rf 1.172 1.248 1.217 1.127 
[29.8] [19.61 [26.011 [22.1] 
SMB 0.662 0.487 0.727 0.607 
[12.5] [5.7] [11.51 [8.8] 
HNIL 0.330 0.620 0.201 0.513 
[5.08] [6.02] [2.5] [6.09] 
R2 88% 77% 85% 80% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.18%8 -1.46%' -1.15%, 
Rm-Rf 1.112 1.645 1.210 
[23.2] [6.3] [22.1] 
SMB 0.609 1.235 0.632 
[9.41 [3.5] [8.61 
HML 0.474 0.152 0.126 
[6.00] [0.3] [1.4] 
R2 81% 30% 81% 
Panel 3. Neutral- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept W -1.82 -1.22%' -1.25%' 
Rm-Rf 1.145 1.293 1.172 1.132 
[36.6] [20.1] [32.31 [26.3] 
SMB 0.791 0.658 0.930 0.647 
[18.5] [7.6] [18.8] [11.2] 
HML 0.342 0.716 0.201 0.444 
[5.8] [6.1] [2.9] [5.6] 
RI 88% 69% 86% 80% 
Panel B: Method oi Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.22%* -1.26%', -1.09%, 
Rm-Rf 1.169 1.148 1.148 
[33.7] [17.7] [21.1] 
SMB 0.696 0.851 0.929 
[15.05] [9.6] [12.7] 
HML 0.495 0.647 0.281 
[7.8] [5.3] [2.8] 
RI 86% 64% 73% 
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Table 3.10 -Continued 
Panel 4. Low- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidian 
Intercept -1.67%a 
T -120/c b 
. 12 o -1.63%a -1.55%a 
Rm-Rf 1.262 1.379 1.231 1.235 
[16.02] [ 11.9] [13.4] [12.4] 
SMB 0.755 0.752 0.844 0.715 
[7.31 [4.9] [6.9] [5.5] 
HML -0.207 0.485 -0.0919 -0.0842 
[-1.008] [1.4] [-0.39] [-0.32] 
R2 66% 68% 59% 57% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.51%' -2.27%a -1.28%a 
Rm-Rf 1.310 1.140 1.089 
[14.8] [7.021 [14.31 
SMB 0.627 0.765 1.077 
[5.41 [3.5] [11.11 
HML -0.517 0.396 0.536 
[-2.21 [0.9] [2.51 
RI 63% 33% 73% 
Panel 5. Differences in mean two-Vear Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 0 
0.85o/b 
(1.66) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 0.30% 
(0.50) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 0.62% 
(0.93) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 0.21% 
(0.14) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -0.220/o' 
(4.36) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -0.52%" 
(-2.71) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public -0.82% 
(-0.96) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private 1.090/0, 
(1.44) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 1.830/6" 
(2.90) 
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Table 3.11.3-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model (P/E Classification) 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French 3-factor model. Panel I represents the overall portfolio consisting of 2332 successful domestic takeover 
bids that took place over the period 1984-1998 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDQ 
Global Financing database. Panels 2-4 are comprised of the results we obtain during high-, neutral- and low- 
valuation market respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is 
classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top 
(bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. All other months are classified as 
neutral-valuation acquisitions. In Panel A, calendar time regressions are performed on the basis of target public 
status (Public, Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar time abnormal returns are formed according to the 
method of payment (Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing includes transactions made 
solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. 
Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods 
classified as "other" by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful takeover and 
remain for 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. 
The t-statistics are in (brackets) and calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The numbers in percentage represent the reported FF cc, which is the 
average of the individual, firm-specific intercepts. Panel 5 contains the differences in mean three-year calendar 
time abnormal returns. " Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at the 5% level; c Denotes 
significance at the 10% level. 
Panel 1. All Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Acqukitions 
_ All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -1.29%' -1.62%" -1.33%" -1.33%' 
Rm-Rf 1.196 1.204 1.227 1.180 
[42.1] [28.9] [36.51 [31.4] 
SMB 0.777 0.705 0.885 0.674 
[20.1] [12.7] [19.5] [13.5] 
HNIL 0.421 0.743 0.349 0.512 
[8.1] [9.99] [5.6] [7.6] 
R11 90% 82% 88% 84% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.30%' -1.32%' -1.43%' 
Rm-Rf 1.244 1.164 1.227 
[31.2] [24.9] [26.8] 
SMB 0.693 0.822 0.877 
[13.04] [13.02] [14.4] 
HML 0.494 0.433 0.355 
[6.8] [5.081 [4.3] 
R2 83% 77% 80% 
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Table 3.11 -Continued 
Panel Z High-, Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acaulsitions 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -1.35%' -0.952%" -1.39%' -1.08%a 
Rm-Rf 1.199 1.242 1.235 1.146 
[29.6] [18.0] [25.9] [24.2] 
SMB 0.669 0.546 0.695 0.666 
[12.06] [5.9] [10.6] [10.3] 
HML 0.431 0.750 0.381 0.523 
[6.1] [6.5] [4.6] [6.51 
RI 86% 71% 82% 81% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.20%' -1.61%' -1.36%" 
Rm-Rf 1.180 1.267 1.216 
[26.3] [14.21 [22.06] 
SMB 0.667 0.618 0.647 
(10.81 [5.2] [8.51 
HML 0.505 0.423 0.248 
[6.5] [2.8] [2.6] 
RI 83% 60% 78% 
Panel 3. Neutral- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept -f 26% -1.87%" -1.24%' -1.41%" 
Rm-Rf 1.160 1.188 1.192 1.149 
J40.2] [23.1] [35.2] [28.3] 
SMB 0.790 0.666 0.933 0.631 
[20.21 [9.7] [20.3] [11.7] 
HML 0.383 0.598 0.308 0.468 
[7.21 [6.5] [4.9] [6.4] 
RI 89% 74% 87% 82% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.32%' -0.931%* -1.37%' 
Rm-Rf 1.178 1.064 1.193 
[36.2] [20.8] [25.4] 
SMB 0.718 0.834 0.888 
[16.6] [12.06] [14.3] 
HML 0.507 0.367 0.330 
[8.7] [3.9] 13.9] 
R2 87% 70% 79% 
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Table 3.11 -Continued 
Panel 4. Low- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquishlons 
All Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept -f 80% -1.15%" -2.03% a -1.31%* 
Rm-Rf 1.240 1.411 1.262 1.182 
[18.4] [13.8] [15.31 [15.4] 
SMB 0.725 0.922 0.766 0.699 
[7.8] [7.1] [6.7] [6.7] 
HML 0.311 0.654 0.312 0.331 
[2.3] [2.5] [1.9] [2.11 
RI 67% 69% 59% 61% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.51%a -2.20%' -1.41%* 
Rm-Rf 1.227 1.302 1.016 
[16.6] [10.7] [15.51 
SMB 0.563 0.928 1.040 
[5.51 [5.04] [13.71 
HML 0.366 0.05149 0.734 
[2.5] [0.151 [6.7] 
w 62% 45% 74% 
Panel 5. Differences in mean three-year Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 0.39% 
(1.18) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 0.12% 
(0.40) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 0.17% 
(0.44) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock -0.45% 
(-0.66) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -0.15% 
(-0.80) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -0.350/ob 
(4.78) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public -0.14% 
(-0.20) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private 0.38% 
(0.59) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 0.50% 
(1.12) 
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Table 3.12.1-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model (TOTMKUK Classification) 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French 3-factor model. Panel I represents the overall portfolio consisting of 2918 successful domestic takeover 
bids that took place over the period 1984-2000 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) 
Global Financing database. Panels 2-4 are comprised of the results we obtain during high-, neutral- and low- 
valuation market respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is 
classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended TOTMKUK index level of that month belongs to 
the top (bottom) half of all detrended TOTMKUK levels above (below) the past five-year average. All other 
months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. In Panel A, calendar time regressions are performed on 
the basis of target public status (Public, Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar time abnormal returns are 
formed according to the method of payment (Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "othee' by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful 
takeover and remain for 12 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just 
completed a takeover. The t-statistics are in (brackets) and calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The numbers in percentage represent the 
reported FF cc, which is the average of the individual, firm-specific intercepts. Panel 5 contains the differences in 
mean one-year calendar time abnormal returns. " Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at 
the 5% level; c Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Panel 1. Aff Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidi&rl 
Intercept 1.00% a -1.75%' -1.06%' -1.05%a 
Rm-Rf 1.185 1.212 1.210 1.192 
[38.9] [16.21 [33.7] [28.4] 
SMB 0.788 0.650 0.882 0.723 
[19.1] [6.5] [18.1] [13.1] 
HML 0.181 0.560 0.04758 0.344 
[3.2] [4.2] [0.7] [4.6] 
RI 89% . 
58% 87% 82% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.976%" -1.79%a -0.906%' 
Rm-Rf 1.210 1.257 1.209 
[30.11 [15.3] [24.11 
SNIB 0.685 0.944 0.847 
[12.7] [8.4] [12.81 
HML 0.373 -0.404 0.0934 
[5.2] [2.7] [1.04] 
R2 82% 60% 78% 
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Table 3.12 -Continued 
Panel Z High- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept -1.87%" -2.79% -1.65%' -1.80%a 
Rm-Rf 1.435 1.223 1.497 1.360 
[27.81 [7.9] [24.21 [16.71 
SNIB 0.919 0.614 1.027 0.858 
[13.8] [3.09] [12.9] [8.1] 
HNIL 0.418 0.627 0.287 0.607 
[5.2] [2.6] [3.001] [4.8] 
RI 93% 49% 92% 82% 
Panel B: Method of Fayment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.57%" -3.04%' -1.70%' 
Rm-Rf 1.412 1.546 1.346 
[23.6] [8.11 [18.81 
SNIB 0.810 0.856 0.970 
[10.51 [3.5] [10.51 
HNIL 0.646 -0.402 0.209 
[6.9] [-1.4] [1.8] 
RI 90% 60% 87% 
Panel 3. Neutral- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -0.708% -0.838%" -0.856%' -0.739% 
Rm-Rf 1.164 1.218 1.203 1.185 
[35.31 [19.1] [26.6] [27.7 
SNIB 0.842 0.654 0.955 0.755 
[16.21 [6.5] [13.4] [11.6] 
HML -0.0509 0.107 -0.0335 0.01131 
[-0.53] [0.59] [-0.25] [0.09] 
RI 89% 73% 83% 85% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.741%" -1.18%' -0.619%' 
Rm-Rf 1.215 1.129 1.193 
[25.29] [11.35] [18.8] 
SMB 0.809 1.231 0.778 
[10.931 [7.581 [8.071 
HML -0.0555 -0.267 0.128 
[-0.40] F0.911 [0.71] 
R2 81% 51% 72% 
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Table 3.12 -Continued 
Panel 4. Low- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private 
- 
Subsidia 1 q 
Intercept -0.732%' -2.02% . 805%& 
:0 
-0.5281 /o 
Rm-Rr 1.060 1.211 1.065 1.016 
[26.7] [6.6] [20.3] [21.1] 
SNIB 0.877 1.113 0.919 0.737 
[15.41 [4.2] [12.2] [10.7] 
HNIL -0.0402 -0.179 0.04952 -0.118 
[-0.40] [-0.39] [0.38] [-0.99] 
Rz 90% 38% 85% 85% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -0.855% a -1.80%0 -0.472% 
b 
Rm-Rf 1.050 1.251 1.051 
[24.21 [5.71 [18.9] 
SNIB 0.833 1.197 0.921 
[13.4] [4.051 [11.6] 
HML -0.0993 -0.311 0.02795 
[-0.921 [-0.57] [0.20] 
R2 88% 36% 83% 
Panel 5. Differences in mean one-year Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
High-ValuatiOn minus Low Valuation 0.75% 
(0.97) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 0.91o/b 
(1.82) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 0.28% 
(0.25) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock 
Public Targets minus Private Targets . 0.550/ob 
(-1.68) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -0.790/6" 
(-2.98) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public -1.63% 
(-0.43) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private 0.61% 
(0.30) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 5.27%' 
(1.09) 
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Table 3.13.2-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model (TOTMKUK Classification) 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Farna and 
French Mactor model. Panel I represents the overall portfolio consisting of 2615 successful domestic takeover 
bids that took place over the period 1984-1999 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDQ 
Global Financing database. Panels 2-4 are comprised of the results we obtain during high-, neutral- and low- 
valuation market respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is 
classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended TOTMKUK index level of that month belongs to 
the top (bottom) half of all detrended TOTMKUK levels above (below) the past five-year average. All other 
months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. In Panel A, calendar time regressions are performed on 
the basis of target public status (Public, Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar time abnormal returns are 
formed according to the method of payment (Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful 
takeover and remain for 24 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just 
completed a takeover. The t-statistics are in (brackets) and calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The numbers in percentage represent the 
reported FF a, which is the average of the individual, firm-specific intercepts. Panel 5 contains the differences in 
mean two-year calendar time abnormal returns. " Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at 
the 5% level; 'Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Panel 1. All Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiqrv ' 
Intercept -1.16%' -1.62%8 -1.26%' -1.16%a 
Rm-Rf 1.172 1.216 1.206 1.141 
[42.1] [29.1] [35.9] [31.6] 
SMB 0.749 0.632 0.863 0.637 
[19.81 [11.4] [19.01] [13.41 
HML 0.382 0.673 0.271 0.518 
[7.51 [9.03] [4.4] [8.06] 
RI 90% 82% 87% 85% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept - 1.14% -1.33%b -1.30%" 
Rm-Rf 1.200 1.428 1.191 
[30.4] [9.5] [25.6] 
SMB 0.630 1.264 0.828 
[12.01 [6.21 [13.4] 
HML 0.497 0.156 0.301 
[7.02] [0.5] [3.6] 
RZ 82% 36% 79% 
Table 3.13 -Continued 
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Table 3.13 -Continued 
Panel Z Me& Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acqukitions 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -1.55%2 -1.80%a -1.58%a -1.31%' 
Rm-Rf 1.400 1.287 1.488 1.271 
[29.09] [15.9] [25.3] [23.6] 
SMB 0.814 0.564 0.948 0.680 
[13.1] [5.3] [12.5] [9.7] 
HML 0.576 0.694 0.476 0.720 
[7.51 [5.3] [5.081 [8.31 
R2 92% 76% 90% 88% 
Panel B: Method of Fayment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept - 1.44% -0.699% -1.53%' 
Rm-Rf 1.365 1.991 1.278 
[24.6] [5.61 [19.9] 
SMB 0.692 1.558 0.866 
[9.7] [3.4] [10.5] 
HNIL 0.725 0.552 0.331 
[8.2] [0.9] [3.2] 
R2 88% 33% 85% 
Panel 3. Neutral- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
&Cýý 
__ All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept 1.16% -0.865%a -1.48%' -1.07%" 
Rm-Rf 1.207 1.163 1.238 1.253 
[37.1] [22.004] [25.9] [29.131 
SMB 0.860 0.559 1.013 0.792 
[17.11 [6.9] [13.7] [12.2] 
HML 0.145 0.223 0.329 0.002776 
[1.57] [1.47] [2.421 [0.023] 
R2 89% 76% 81% 85% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.08%2 -1.47%' -1.45%' 
Rm-Rr 1.267 1.129 1.242 
[28.4] [18.3] [21.151 
SMB 0.783 0.913 0.873 
[11.5] [9.5] [9.81 
HML 0.03183 0.04346 0.474 
[0.255] [0.242] [2.89] 
R11 83% 68% 75% 
Table 3.13 -Continued 
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Table 3.13 -Continued 
Panel 4. Low- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquivitions 
All Public Private SubsidiaEy 
Intercept -1.03%" -1.72%a -1.09%" -0.919%" 
Rm-Rf 1.098 1.290 1.088 1.058 
[33.9] [12.5] [27.9] [24.3] 
SNIB 0.830 0.912 0.862 0.740 
[18.4] [6.3] [15.9] [12.2] 
HNIL 0.0771 0.379 0.138 0.002794 
[0.943] [1.458] [1.407] [0.025] 
RI 92% 63% 89% 86% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept - 1.07%' -2.13% -0.873%' 
Rm-Rf 1.086 1.205 1.102 
[30.3] [7.4] [24.1] 
SNIB 0.776 0.808 0.939 
[15.6] [3.7] [14.71 
HML 0.04205 0.416 0.112 
[0.465] [0.988] [0.973] - 
R2 90% 40% 86% 
Panel 5. Differences in mean two-year Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 0.47% 
(0.95) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 0.30% 
(0.50) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 0.48% 
(1.26) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock -0.64% 
(-0.41) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -0.220/oc' 
(-1.36) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -0.520/o' 
(-2.71) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public -0.37% 
(-0.38) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low Valuation Private 0.40% 
(0.54) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 1.650/0 
(2.10) 
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Table 3.14.3-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns using Fama- 
French (1993) 3-Factor Model (TOTMKUK Classification) 
- 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios according to the Fama and 
French 3-factor model. Panel I represents the overall portfolio consisting of 2332 successful domestic takeover 
bids that took place over the period 1984-1998 as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) 
Global Financing database. Panels 2-4 are comprised of the results we obtain during high-, neutral- and low- 
valuation market respectively. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is 
classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended TOTMKUK index level of that month belongs to 
the top (bottom) half of all detrended TOTMKUK levels above (below) the past five-year average. All other 
months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. In Panel A, calendar time regressions are performed on 
the basis of target public status (Public, Private, Subsidiary). In Panel B calendar time abnormal returns are 
formed according to the method of payment (Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective day of the successful 
takeover and remain for 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just 
completed a takeover. The t-statistics are in (brackets) and calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The numbers in percentage represent the 
reported FF cc, which is the average of the individual, f irm-specific intercepts. Panel 5 contains the differences in 
mean three-year calendar time abnormal returns. a Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance 
at the 5% level; 'Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Panel 1. All Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept - 1.29% -1.62%a -1.33%" -1.33%" 
Rm-Rf 1.196 1.204 1.227 1.180 
[42.11 [28.9] [36.5] [31.4] 
SMB 0.777 0.705, 0.885 0.674 
[20.1] [12.7] [19.5] [13.5] 
HML 0.421 0.743 0.349 0.512 
[8.1] [9.99] [5.6] [7.6] 
RI 90% 82% 88% 84% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.30%' -1.32%b -1.43%' 
Rm-Rf 1.244 1.164 1.227 
[31.2] [24.9] [26.8] 
SMB 0.693 0.822 0.877 
[13.04] [13.02] [14.4] 
HML 0.494 0.433 0.355 
[6.8] [5.08] [4.31 
R2 83% 77% 80% 
Table 3.14 -Continued 
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Table 3.14 -Continued 
Panel Z 111, eh Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
A equkitions 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
Intercept -1.73%' -1.33%* -1.80%a -1.36%' 
Rm-Rf 1.439 1.283 1.540 1.297 
[30.6] [16.3] [26.07] [22.061 
SMB 0.878 0.598 1.032 0.733 
[14.1] [5.8] [13.1] [9.41 
HML 0.632 0.694 0.611 0.708 
[7.9] [5.2] [6.07] [7.2] 
R2 92% 75% 89% 84% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.72%* -1.16%" -1.37%" 
Rm-Rf 1.444 1.432 1.322 
[26.1] [14.8] [23.3] 
SMB 0.827 0.821 0.927 
[11.3] [6.4] [12.31 
HNIL 0.754 0.558 0.398 
[8.04] [3.4] [4.1] 
R2 88% 72% 87% 
Panel 3. Neutral- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acquisitions 
All Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept -1.26%" -1.35%' -1.23%' . -1.39%' 
Rm-Rf 1.202 1.191 1.210 1.241 
[40.8] [21.71 [32.3] [31.61 
SMB 0.840 0.791 0.983 0.721 
[18.8] [9.7] [17.31 [12.4] 
HML 0.251 0.435 0.006307 0.420 
[3.421 [2.91] [0.068] [4.37] 
RI 91% 75% 86% 86% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.33%& -1.39%' -1.41%' 
Rm-Rf 1.249 1.152 1.238 
[28.91 [19.3] [23.07] 
SMB 0.720 0.945 0.904 
[11.21 [10.4] [11.3] 
HML 0.405 0.135 0.291 
[3.84] [0.81] [2.22] 
RI 83% 69% 77% 
Table 3.14 -Continued 
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Table 3.14 -Continued 
Panel 4. Low- Panel A: All-Target Public Status 
Valuation 
Acqukillons 
All Public Private Subsidiarv 
Intercept -1.12%' -1.87%' -1.22%' -0.952%' 
Rm-Rf 1.123 1.324 1.133 1.042 
[36.5] [13.8] [28.9] [26.81 
SNIB 0.863 0.997 0.897 0.767 
[20.8] [7.7] [16.9] [14.6] 
HML 0.103 0.573 0.182 -0.0194 
[1.3] [2.3] [1.8] [-0.19] 
RI 92% 65% 89% 86% 
Panel B: Method of Payment 
Cash Stock Combo 
Intercept -1.15%8 -1.35%" -1.03%* 
Rm-Rr 1.108 1.336 1.127 
[34.5] [11.1] [24.4] 
SNIB 0.822 0.972 0.934 
[19.02] [6.2] [15.02] 
HML 0.07376 0.156 0.122 
[0.90] [0.491 [1.04] 
R' 91% 56% 85% 
Panel 5. Dirferences In mean three-year Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
High-Valuation minus Low Valuation 0.18% 
(0.51) 
Cash Acquisitions minus Stock Acquisitions 0.12% 
(0.40) 
High-Valuation Cash minus Low-Valuation Cash 0.460/ob 
(1.91) 
High-Valuation Stock minus Low-Valuation Stock - 1.3 00/ob 
(4.81) 
Public Targets minus Private Targets -0.15% 
(-0.80) 
Public Targets minus Subsidiary Targets -0.350/ob 
(-1.78) 
High-Valuation Public minus Low-Valuation Public 1.400/6' 
(1.32) 
High-Valuation Private minus Low-Valuation Private -0.04% 
(-0.08) 
High-Valuation Subsidiary minus Low-Valuation Subsidiary 1.120/ob 
(2.26) 
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Table 3.15. Effect of Market-Wide Valuations: Controlling for Acquirer Book-to- 
Market 
In this table the impact of the market state is examined by controlling for acquirer book-to-market ratio. We 
divide the sample into high, medium and low book-to-market acquirers, and examine the 1,2 and 3-year 
performance of acquirers making acquisitions during high- and low-valuation periods for each book-to-market 
category. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month through this period is classified as a high- 
(low-) valuation month if the detrended TOTMKUK index level of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half 
of all detrended TOTMKUK levels above (below) the past five-year average. All other months are classified as 
neutral-valuation acquisitions. Acquirers are divided into equal subsamples, of high, medium and low book-to- 
market firms based on their book-to-market ratio one month prior to the acquisition announcement. ' Denotes 
significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 'Denotes significance at the 10% level. T- 
stats are provided in parentheses. 
Panel A: I year High-Valuation Acquisitions Low-Valuation Acquisitions 
Number Intercept Number Intercept 
High B/M 399 -1.000/0, 172 -1.040/o* 
(Value Acquirers) (-3.02) (-3.07) 
Medium B/M 405 -2.230/o' 191 -0.650/o' 
(4.73) (-1.86) 
Low B/M 400 -1.42%* 142 -0.660/ob 
(Glamour (-2.33) (-2.10) 
Acquirers)- 
Panel B: 2 years High-Valuation Acquisitions Low-Valuation Acquisitions 
Number Intercept Number Intercept 
High B/M 296 - 1.34%' 172 . 0.99%a 
(Value Acquirers) (4.84) (-3.07) 
Medium B/M 315 -1.540W 191 -1.01a 
(-5.70) (-3.85) 
Low B/M 290 . 1.900/04 142 -1.02W 
(Glamour (4.37) (-3.60) 
Acquirers)_ 
Panel C. 3 years High-Valuation Acquisitions Low-Valuation Acquisitions 
Number Intercept Number Intercept 
High B/M 201 -1.270/6" 172 . 1.13%' 
(Value Acquirers) (-5.21) (-5.23) 
Medium B/M 232 - 1.2 10/6" 191 -1.200/6" 
(-3.79) (4.80) 
Low B/M 200 -1.33%" 142 -0.960/ob 
(Glamour (4.37) (-3.85) 
Acquirers) I I I 
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Table 3.16.1,2 and 3-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns of 
Acquirers with the Best and Worst Pre-event Performance using Fama-French (1993) 3- 
Factor Model 
This table presents pre-announccment monthly average returns as well as 1,2 and 3-year monthly average 
calendar time abnormal returns of four categories of acquirers. Firstly, acquirers are divided into two groups, 
high and low-valuation acquirers respectively. High- (low)-valuation acquirers are the one who purchased firms 
during periods of high- (low-) stock market valuations. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each 
month through this period is classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended TOTMKUK index 
level of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended TOTMKUK levels above (below) the past 
five-year average. The two groups created above are further subdivided into four categories: i) High-valuation 
acquirers who had the highest six-month pre-announcement monthly average returns, ii) High-valuation 
acquirers who had the lowest six-month pre-announcement monthly average returns, iii) Low-valuation 
acquirers who had the highest six-month monthly average returns, iv) Low-valuation acquirers who had the 
lowest six-month pre-announcement monthly average returns. ' Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes 
significance at the 5% level; 'Denotes significance at the 10% level. T-stats are provided in parentheses. 
Iligh-Valuation Acquirers Low-Valuation Acquirers 
Top quintile in Bottom quintile in Top quintile in Bottom quintile in 
terms of pre- terms of pre-event terms of pre-event terms of pre-event 
event returns returns returns returns 
Average 6- 5.58% -2.22% 3.01% -2.07% 
month pre- 
event CTA 
Returns 
Average I-year -1.5lYo' -2.58%' 0.660/6" -0.68% 
CTAR 
(-5.36) (4.53) (1.78) (-1.54) 
Average 6- 5.16% -1.89% 3.03% -2.07% 
month pre- 
event CTA 
Returns 
Average 2-yea r -1.470/6" -1.810/0, -0.008% -0.89. /. 
" 
CTAR 
(-5.66) (-3.08) (-0.02) (-2.20) 
Average 6- 5.03% -2.06% 3.05% -2.05% 
month pre- 
event CTA 
Returns 
Average 3-year -1.64%* -1.970/6' -0.13% . 0.8lo/b 0 
CTAR 
(4.88) (-3.92) (-0.36) (-2.19) 
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Table 3.17.1,2 and 3-Year Calendar-Time Analysis of Long-Run Excess Returns of 
Early and Late Acquirers during High Valuation Periods using Fama-French (1993) 3- 
Factor Model 
This table (Panel A) presents 1,2 and 3-year monthly average calendar time abnormal returns for all early and 
late acquisitions made during high-valuation periods. Using monthly data from 1984 till May 2004, each month 
through this period is classified as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended TOTMKUK index level of 
that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended TOTMKUK levels above (below) the past five-year 
average. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation acquisitions. Early movers are assumed to be the 
first 10% of acquirers in each high-valuation period. All remaining acquirers are classified as late movers. Panel 
B contains the differences in mean one, two and three-year calendar time abnormal returns " Denotes 
significance at the 1% level ;b Denotes significance at the 5% level; cDenotes significance at the 10% level. T- 
stats are provided in parentheses. 
Panel A 
Early Movers Late Movers 
Number Intercept Number Intercept 
I year 124 -0.53% 1111 -1.94%' 
(-1.05) (-7.62) 
2 years 94 -0.780/o' 841 -1.530/6" 
(-1.80) (-7.28) 
3 years 66 . 1.510/68 593- -1.75%" 
(4.15) (-9.30) 
Panel B 
Early Movers minus Lat e Movers 
I year 1.360/6" 
2 years 
(2.36) 
0.740/ob 
(1.81) 
3 years 0.40% 
(0.93) 
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Chapter 4: Do Overconfident Acquirers Gain Less from Acquisitions? 
4.1. Introduction 
In chapter 2 we employed a sample of multiple acquirers to control for (much of) the 
information contained in a merger announcement. We found that private firms and 
subsidiaries experience significantly positive abnormal returns in the short-run while 
acquisitions of public targets lead to significant losses. However, when we examined 
bidders' performance in the long run we reported negative returns irrespective of the target 
ownership status. As we claimed, it is likely that the stock market overreacts around the 
acquisition announcement and its prices are gradually corrected in the long run. In Chapter 
3 we tried to identify why bidders exhibit such performance. We used a sample of 
domestic UK acquisitions and implied that the stock market drives performance of bidding 
firms. In general, we found that bidders enjoy significantly larger profits when they 
acquire firms during upward markets rather than low-valuation periods; however, 
acquisitions undertaken during booming periods lead to a worse performance in the long- 
run. This result was robust when we controlled for method of payment and target 
ownership status. In addition, when we examined the interrelation between merger waves 
and stock market valuations, we concluded that overall stock prices are the most important 
factor for bidders' profits and losses. In other words, stock market valuations and not 
merger activity drive performance of bidding firms. 
In this chapter, we argue that overconfidence traits appear as a deterministic factor of a 
manager's corporate decision to get involved in M&As. The main objective is to examine 
how overconfident/aggressive investment strategies (growth via M&As) are received by 
the market. In general, overconfident managers overestimate their abilities, precision of 
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their knowledge, and future prospects leading them to decisions that other managers, more 
rational, would never initiate. Consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2004) and in contrast 
to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), our overconfidence hypothesis suggests that merger 
decisions are made in a rational world by irrational decision-makers within the firm. 
Most of the overconfidence models predict high trading volume in the stock market (asset 
pricing literature) in the presence of overconfident traders. Moreover, at the individual 
level, overconfident investors will trade more aggressively. Hence, first, the higher the 
degree of overconfidence of an investor, the higher the trading volume. ' Second, periods 
with higher trading volumes (due to overconfidence) go in hand with lower profits (Barber 
and Odean (2001)). As a simple trader takes the decision to make an investment by 
purchasing shares (asset investment decision), by the same token a CEO is likely to take a 
corporate decision to accomplish a merger (corporate investment decision). The idea of 
overconfidence in corporate takeovers (corporate finance literature) stems from Roll 
(1986), with his well-known hubris hypothesis. 2 In a few words, Roll (1986) specifies that 
the motivation for many acquisitions followed by undesirable bidder returns is hubris 
resulting in overpayment for the target. Overconfident CEOs are likely to overrate the 
profits they can generate from an acquisition or the synergistic gains between their 
company and a potential target, overvaluing their contribution to their company and 
underestimating how disruptive a merger can be. As a result, overconfidence simply 
1 Odean (1998) calls this finding "the most robust effect of overconfidence" suggesting that changes in trading 
volume is the primary testable implication of overconfidence theory. He also finds that overconfident traders 
exhibit lower expected utility than rational traders and hold underdiversified portfolios. 
2 Heaton (2002) postulates that irrationality is more pronounced in corporate finance than asset pricing literature. 
As he puts it: "The 'arbitrage' objection (rational agents will exploit irrational agents) is weaker because there 
are larger arbitrage bounds protecting managerial irrationality than protecting security market irrationality. The 
most obvious 'arbitrage' of managerial irrationality -the corporate takeover- incurs high transaction costs, and 
the specialized investors who pursue takeovers bear much idiosyncratic risk. Arbitrage strategies short of a 
corporate takeover are difficult to implement, because managerial decisions usually concern assets (including 
human assets) that trade in markets without short sale mechanisms or other derivative assets that make arbitrage 
possible" (Russell and Thaler (1985)). 
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implies that managers view their company as undervalued by outside investors who, in 
reality, are less optimistic about the prospects of the firm. Hence, three main propositions 
occur: i) the announcement effect is more likely to be lower for overconfident than for 
rational managers, bearing in mind that overconfidence is more likely to lead to value- 
destroying deals; ii) overconfident managers are more likely to conduct "bad" or "worse" 
mergers (i. e. mergers that destroy or have less wealth value for - the acquiring firm's 
shareholders respectively) compared to rational mergers; and iii) managers are more likely 
to initiate mergers when they have access to sufficient sources of internal finance. In this 
case, they avoid the perceived loss in value from issuing undervalued equity to finance the 
merger. 3 
We therefore conduct, in this chapter, empirical tests of the above predictions. We argue 
that frequent acquirersý are overconfident and this prompts them to enter the merger 
market. Following Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), we define frequent acquirers as 
firms that successfully acquired five or more targets using alternative methods of payment 
during a very short period of time (three years) between 1980 and 2004 and examine their 
short-run stock returns. Thus, we classify managers as overconfident when they are 
frequent acquirers and explore their differences to casual managers in the observed merger 
activity. 5 As a result, two straight predictions are realized: i) the higher the degree of 
overconfidence, the larger the number of acquisitions conducted by the manager of a 
bidding firm and, ii) overconfidence, captured through multiple bidding, destroys 
shareholders' wealth value. Thus, overconfidence appears to be an explanation of merger 
3 For example, the market says a stock is worth $100 a share, but the CEO is sure it is worth at least $130. By 
this way of thinking issuing stock to do a deal means "giving away" $30 a share. 
4 Note that the terms bidder and acquirer are used interchangeably for the purpose of this study, because all the 
bids in our analysis lead to a completed acquisition. 
5 As Malmendier and Tate (2004) put it: 'Overall, the higher acquisitiveness of overconfident CEOs even "on 
average" suggests that overconfidence is an important determinant of merger activities'. 
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activity that generalizes across merger waves. In addition, destruction of value would also 
indicate that overconfident managers do not learn from their previous experience 
exploiting existing market positions and capabilities (Levinthal and March (1993)), which 
would correspondingly enhance their shareholders' wealth. 
Using merger data from SDC and Datastrearn and employing standard event study 
methodology, we find that overconfident CEOs still perform worse in spite of controlling 
for several firm fixed effects (method of payment, target origin, core industry, M/B value, 
relative size). Our finding is also enhanced when we investigate the difference in returns 
within a multiple-acquirer sample and, more specifically, between the first and fifth-and- 
higher deals. Since the market reacts to first deals of multiple acquirers as it would do to 
casual acquisitions, our result shows that first-in-order deals behave like casuals and 
outperform significantly subsequent acquisition attempts providing a robust interpretation 
for the existence of overconfidence as reflected by our proxy (i. e. frequent acquisitions). 
One important point to remember is that the direct link between overconfidence and high 
merger activity has never been shown or analyzed empirically. Our sample consists of 
5334 UK M&As taking place over a 25-year period. Such a comprehensive (near 
exhaustive) sample has not been studied before for the UK and it provides an updated 
insight of the merger activity, which also covers the takeover booming wave of the 1990s. 
Finally, another aspect worth mentioning is that a significant proportion of UK firms 
appear to engage in multiple acquisitions over this period (around 30% of the entire 
population) while most importantly private targets are major components of the UK 
takeover market (approximately 90%), a fact that very few studies have taken into account. 
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Of course, one could argue that the dynamic acquisitiveness of frequent acquiring firms 
may be due to a number of reasons other than overconfidence (e. g. growth opportunities 
via a merger deal). Therefore, to reply to such claim, we proceed to a number of robustness 
checks showing that several components characterizing the concept of overconfidence 
appear to frequent acquirers enhancing our overconfidence hypothesis. More specifically, 
consistent to the literature, overconfident managers have proportionally higher debt 
capacity and strongly prefer cash or debt-financed mergers to stock deals, unless their firm 
appears to be overvalued by the market. In addition, the bulk of the empirical evidence 
suggests that overconfident managers initiate diversifying acquisitions, a fact that is also 
strongly approved by our results. A voluminous strand in this literature suggests that 
diversified firms trade at a discount, 6 supporting our theory that overconfident managers 
are particularly likely to undertake 'bad' acquisitions. In all the above cases, casual bidders 
significantly outperform frequent acquirers. 
Finally, acquiring firms that make many acquisitions within a short-time interval are likely 
to be governed by less efficient managers than those of casual bidders. Our finding 
supports the hypothesis that frequent acquirers exhibit weaker corporate governance than 
casual bidders, providing one more plausible explanation for the return patterns obtained. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 describes the data and 
the methodology. In section 4.3 we review the related literature and discuss our approach. 
, Section 4.4 reports and interprets the empirical findings. Section 4.5 provides a summary 
and concludes our analysis. 
6 Milgrom (1988) and Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) provide influence costs as drawbacks of 
diversification, while Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that increased layers of agency costs outweigh the 
potential benefits of a larger internal capital market (Stein (1997)). 
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4.2. Related Literature and Overconfidence Measure 
4. ZI. Theoretical Foundations of Managerial Overconfidence 
The main idea behind overconfidence is that certain managers display a great amount of 
overconfidence in their own abilities and precision of their knowledge. This assumption is 
motivated by psychological studies that find biased self-attribution (Wolosin, Sherman, 
and Till (1973); Langer and Roth (1975); Miller and Ross (1975); and Schneider, Hastorf, 
and Ellsworth (1979)). People overestimate the degree to which they are responsible for 
their own success by attributing it to their own abilities and crediting to bad luck a 
potential failure. This self-serving attribution of outcomes, in turn, reinforces individual 
overconfidence. 7 This is also closely related to the 'better than average effect', which 
suggests that individuals believe that their abilities are above average (Svenson, (198 1) and 
Taylor and Brown (1988)) and 'narrow confidence intervals' which propose that people 
are miscalibrated in the way that their probability distributions or confidence intervals for 
uncertain events (i. e. the outcome of a merger) are too tight (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and 
Phillps, (1982)). 8 
In addition, overconfidence increases through interaction with the self-enhancement effect. 
Individuals are likely to be overconfident about events that have a positive meaning and 
representation to them (Weinstein, (1980) and Weinstein and Klein (2002)). More 
7 Such behaviour is associated with the winner's curse hypothesis, which arises in a common value auction (the 
asset has the same value to all bidders), because the highest bidder has the highest positive valuation error and 
therefore wins the auction but does not like the 'prize' (Bazerman and Samuelson (1983)). However, it bids 
more than the actual gain, and its shareholders suffer a loss. Of course, rational individuals should not enter into 
contests in which they lose even when they "win". Managers know about the winner's curse and know that other 
acquirers have on average lost money, but have the hubris to believe that they are better than other managers in 
spotting attractive merger opportunities. 8 Miscalibration is only one manifestation of overconfidence. The best-established finding in the calibration 
literature is that people tend to be overconfident in answering questions of moderate to extreme difficulty (i. e. 
merger initiation). See for example Lichtenstein et al. (1982) and Yates (1990). 
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specifically, individuals are infected by illusion of control (Weinstein (1980)). A CEO who 
conducts a merger apparently believes that she/he can control random tasks/events and is 
excessively optimistic about the future (Langer (1975); Langer and Roth (1975) and March 
and Shapira, (1987)). Kahneman and Riepe (1998, p. 54) summarize this motivation of 
overconfidence as follows: "The combination of overconfidence and optimism is a potent 
brew, which causes people to overestimate their knowledge, underestimate risks, and 
exaggerate their ability to control events". Secondly, Frank (1935) and Weinstein (1980) 
provide evidence that individuals are especially overconfident about projects which they 
are highly committed to. An overconfident CEO who initiates successful mergers can be 
thought of being highly committed since his compensation contract correlates personal 
wealth to the company's stock price and, hence, to the outcomes of corporate investment 
decisions. 9 According to Malmendicr and Tate (2004), the effects of control and 
commitment attach to the CEO's internal investment decisions as well. In the M&A 
setting, this kind of overconfidence about the prospects of his own firm may cause the 
CEO to be reluctant to raise external capital to finance a takeover bid. 10 Finally, managers 
who exhibit a successful history within the M&A field may think that they are more 
experienced than others and that might reinforce their overconfidence tendency. The 
"learning objection" (irrational agents will learn from experience to be rational) is weaker 
in corporate finance (than the asset pricing literature), because important corporate 
financial decisions about capital structure and investment policy are more infrequent than 
9 Griffin and Brenner (2004) argue that all concepts characterizing overconfidence are linked. They present 
theoretical perspectives on (mis)calibration, among them the most influential perspective, optimistic 
overconfidence. According to the authors, the optimistic overconfidence perspective builds, for example, on the 
better than average effect, unrealistic optimism, and illusion of control. 
10 Managerial overconfidence leads managers to believe that an efficient capital market undervalues their firm's 
risky securities. Therefore it leads to a preference for internal funds that can be socially costly. Overconfident 
managers dependent on external finance sometimes decline positive NPV projects, believing that the cost of 
external finance is simply too high (Heaton (2002)). 
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trading decisions, with longer-delayed outcomes and noisier feedback. Learning from 
experience is less likely in such circumstances (Brehmer (1980)). " 
In our M&A framework overconfidence is displayed in two forms. First, the manager may 
overestimate the value of the potential merger. This overvaluation stems from the 
manager's belief that his leadershiP skills are better than average or from the 
underestimation of the downside of the merger due to the illusion of control over its 
outcome (Malmendier and Tate (2004)). Second, the manager may overestimate the value 
of his current company (e. g. after a number of previous corporate investments) and engage 
into multiple acquisitions overestimating the capitalized value of his future leadership. 
Malmendier and Tate (2004) predict that an overconfident CEO is more likely to conduct 
value-destroying acquisitions if the perceived synergies are sufficiently large and if the 
perceived undervaluation and the portion of the deal financed by equity are sufficiently 
small. In addition, they argue that an overconfident CEO with abundant internal resources 
(i. e. large cash reserves and low leverage) is more likely to conduct an acquisition than a 
rational CEO and that the announcement performance in mean returns between rational 
and overconfident bidders should be positive. 
4. ZZ Measure of Overconfidence on Acquisition Activity 
The appeal of overconfidence as a general explanation of merger activity is contingent on 
its effect on average acquisitiveness. What is a more direct way to measure overconfidence 
in merger activity than the acquisitiveness itself (i. e. the number of acquisitions undertaken 
11 Russo and Schoemaker (1992) argue that managers make a mistake to equate experience with learning. 
Experience is inevitable; learning is not. Overconfidence persists in spite of experience because we often fail to 
learn from experience. In addition, Hayward (2002) posits that learning relates to the quality rather than quantity 
of a firm's experience. 
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by a unique bidder within a given period Of tiMe)? 12 As Heaton (2002, p. 35) argues: 
"overconfident managers want to undertake more projects". We identify overconfidence 
by employing the sophisticated research design suggested by Fuller et al. (2002), which 
defines the frequent bidder as the company that successfully acquired five or more bids 
over a three-year period. It has been argued in the literature that managers who initiate 
multiple bids in a short span of time tend to exhibit traits of overconfidence. Consequently, 
this sample is used to test this behavioural aspect of UK CEO/managers. 13 Viewing this 
issue from an opposite angle, overconfidence enhances the chances to succeed in contests 
(Goel and Thakor (2002) and Krahmer (2003)). Therefore, more successful acquisitions 
are likely to be undertaken by overconfident bidders who, in turn, by having more chances 
to win a contest are more likely to make many acquisitions and therefore to qualify in our 
frequent bidders' category. In addition, Fuller et al. (2002) argue that companies engaging 
in multiple, quick (many in a concentrated period) acquisitions seem to create relatively 
small amounts of synergies or to negotiate less efficiently. 14 Finally, overconfident- 
frequent acquirers believe that irrespective of overbidding for a target, the market will 
react favourably to their merger announcements due to the fact that it is already aware of 
their previous successful acquisitions decreasing the likelihood of failure, which on most 
occasions leads to share price reduction. In other words, the market will favour the 'certain 
solution' of an already tested -from previous successful bids- acquirer. 
" Surveying hundreds of overconfident CEOs would take too much time and could yield misleading 
conclusions. Overconfident managers might wish to appear more prudent and shade their answers accordingly. 
On the other hand, cautious ones might be feeling especially ebullient on the day of the survey. 
13 In the asset pricing literature, Glaser and Weber (2003) suggest that, by correlating measures of trading 
volume with miscalibration and better than average scores, they are able to empirically evaluate whether the 
"overconfidence" hypothesis explains high levels of trading volume. 
14 Acquisition fieldwork and laboratory experiments show that managers cannot carefully evaluate acquisitions 
that occur in quick succession (Haunschild, Davis-Blake and Fichman (1994)). Managers often experience an 
adrenaline rush or over-exuberance to acquire (Jemison and Sitkin (1986)) and hence, they ignore inferences 
from prior acquisitions, particularly if those inferences raise doubts about the merits of the focal acquisition. 
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Another recent major attempt to provide a proxy of overconfidence in M&As was 
launched by Malmendier and Tate (2004). The authors measured overconfidence by 
assessing how CEOs in a sample of Forbes 500 companies handled their stock options. 
Specifically, they examined 477 firms during the period from 1980 to 1994. If a CEO ever 
held options in his company until the last year before the expiration, he/she was classified 
as overconfident! 5 However, this way of measurement is not about purely capturing a 
CEO's overconfidence about merger profits or losses but mainly about a firm's 
performance in general. Therefore, it is not clear whether overconfidence about the CEO's 
own firm and about potential merger projects are distinguished, compared to our clear and 
direct proxy of measuring overconfidence in M&As. 16 
4.3. Data and Methodology 
4.3.1. Data 
We examine a sample of successful acquisitions by UK public companies that acquired 
both domestic and foreign targets, announced between January 1,1980 and December 3 1, 
2004. The sample acquisitions are drawn from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) 
15 Option holdings (Malmendier and Tate (2004), proxy) are strongly related to our measure of overconfidence. 
Overconfident CEOs holding options until the expiration year exhibit great amounts of acquisitiveness. For 
example, consider Wayne Huizenga, former boss of Dallas-based Blockbuster. He led the company during the 
14 years that it appeared in the sample. He held some of his options until their expiration year, qualifying him as 
overconfident. He also made six acquisitions. Contrast him with J. Willard Marriott, chairman and CEO of the 
Bethesda, Md. -based Marriott International. He led his company for 15 years. Unlike Huizenga, he didn't hold 
options until expiration, and he didn't do any deals. 
I Malmendier and Tate (2004) presented a second proxy. In particular, they compared they way CEOs were 
characterized in major newspapers and business publications, categorizing them as either overconfident or 
cautious. However, any judgement made by a newspaper or journal has a high probability of subjective 
judgement leading to unreliable conclusions. Press, named as journalists and analysts, is often biased due to 
personal intolerance, interests or passions and therefore inferences made by them should always be considered 
with a great caution. 
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Mergers and Acquisitions Database while the period selected is driven by the total 
availability of the database. The following criteria are used in selecting our final sample: 
1. Acquirers are UK firms publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
have five days of return data around the takeover announcement on the DataStrearn 
Database. 
2. Targets are private firms (including subsidiary firms). 17 The reason that the sample 
consists of private targets is twofold. First, we focus on private acquisitions because 
the bulk of merger activity in the UK consists of private acquisitions. Specifically, as 
Panel A of Table I shows, public transactions represent a very small fraction (9%) of 
the mergers and acquisitions activity in the UK, while private acquisitions stand for to 
the vast majority (91%) of the takeover activity in the UK. Moreover, public targets 
represent fewer industries in comparison to private targets, which represent 57 
different industries, as Table 2 shows. Hence, the sample of private transactions 
covers a broad range of industries and is more representative of reality. Second, we 
concentrate on private targets because they are more difficult to value than public 
targets (i. e., there is relatively less public information to evaluate private firms) and 
therefore they provide a unique sample to test managers' overconfidence. Specifically, 
the valuation of private targets serves as the most appropriate testing ground of the 
overconfidence hypothesis since they are more likely to reflect managers' beliefs 
about potential synergies and future cash flows than public target firms. Public firms 
have a broader investor base and therefore more closely followed by security analysts 
than private firms. 
17 We examine subsidiary targets, as they are one of the three main categories of the market for corporate 
control. All subsidiary targets are unlisted companies after checking the Target Public Mid Code from the SDC 
database. 
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3. We require that the deal value corresponds to at least 1% of the market value of the 
assets of the acquirer (defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity). 
4. The deal value is one million dollars or more. 18 
5. The frequent acquirer completes five or more bids in any three-year window during 
the sample period. 
6. We omit financial and utility firms (following Fama and French (1992)) for both 
bidders and targets. 
7. The bidder acquires at least 50% of the target's shares as a result of the takeover. 
For the sample of multiple acquirers we also exclude clustered acquisitions where the 
bidder acquires two or more firms within five days in order to isolate the, overlapping 
effect among the bids. After all this screening procedure we conclude to a sample of 3,844 
and 1,490 acquisitions undertaken by casual and multiple acquirers respectively. Note also 
that since the market has no information about the bidder at the first bid it reacts to the 
merger announcement, as it is just a 'normal' bid of a casual bidder. Hence, we include 
first bids of frequent acquirers into multiple bidders' group. The two created portfolios are 
then divided into three subsets based on the method of payment for the acquisition, i. e. 
pure cash, pure stock, and combined. 19 The combined payment sub-sample includes all 
acquisitions in which the payment method is neither pure cash nor pure stock. 
18 We employ a one million dollars cut-off point to avoid results being generated by very small deals. Similarly, 
studies like Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) in the US use a 
cut-off point of one million dollars. 
19 Only 10 stock acquisitions include prefer stock and therefore do not contaminate our analysis. 
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4.3. Z Methodology 
We calculate Cumulative Average Retums (CARs) for the five-day period [-2, +2]20 
around the announcement date as supplied by SDC. More specifically, we estimate the 
abnormal returns by using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Ril - R., (1) 
where R,, is the return on firm 1 and R., is the value-weighed market index return (i. e. the 
FT-All Share) This approach amounts to assuming that a=0 and 8=I for the firms in 
our sample. 21 The t-statistics are estimated using the cross-sectional variation of abnormal 
retums. 
It is obvious that in our long-run analysis a subsequent acquisition will occur within less 
than 36 months after a preceding acquisition, since our sample consists also of multiple 
acquirers. We therefore use Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPR) to sidestep the 
problem of cross-sectional dependence of sample observations. In each calendar month, a 
portfolio is formed by including all stocks with an acquisition event during the past 12,24, 
or 36 months. The portfolio is rebalanced every month by including new event firms that 
executed a transaction in the previous month and dropping the ones whose latest 
acquisition event falls out of the one to three-year holding period. The average monthly 
abnormal return during the one to three-year post-event period is the intercept from the 
time-series regression of the calendar portfolio return on the Fama and French (1993) 
20 We choose the five-day period because Fuller et al. (2002) find that a five-day window around the merger 
announcement given by SDC is wide enough to capture the first mention of a merger every time for a sample of 
about 500 announcements. 
21 We do not estimate market parameters based on a time period before each bid, since our sample contains 
acquirers making many acquisitions within a very small period of time and therefore, there is a high probability 
that previous takeover attempts would be included in the estimation period, hence making beta estimations less 
meaningful. Additionally, it has been shown that for short window event studies, weighting the market return by 
the firm's beta does not significantly improve estimation (Brown and Warner (1980)). 
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three-factor model. The FF 3-factor model are estimated by using the UK Mactor of 
Dimson et al's (2003) to account for the UK B/M ratio peculiarities: 
RM -R. =aj +A(R., -R ML, . fi) 
+ s, SMB, + hi H 
where RP, is the average monthly return of the calendar portfolio, R. is the monthly risk 
free return, Rmt is the monthly return of the value-weighted market index, SMB, the 
value-weighted return on small firms minus the value-weghted returns on large firms, and 
HML, the value-weighted return on high book-to-market firms minus the value-weighted 
return on low book-to-market firms. In addition, A, si and h, are the regression 
parameters and c,, is the error term. The a (intercept) is interpreted as the average of the 
individual, firm-specific intercepts. 
4.4. Empirical Results 
4.4.1. CasuallMultiple Bidder Abnormal Returns by Method of Payment 
Our goal in this chapter is to measure the effect of a manager-specific characteristic (i. e. 
overconfidence) on his/her desire to conduct acquisitions and on the outcome (short-run 
stock performance) of such corporate decisions. In Table 4.3 we present five-day CARs for 
the full sample of rational (casual bidders) and overconfident (frequent bidders) acquirers 
respectively classified by method of payment. The empirical results suggest that 
exuberance about potential merger synergies dominates the countervailing effect of 
perceived undervaluation. More specifically, for all bids, the CAR is positive (1.18%) and 
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I 
22 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This is in line with Chang (1998) and 
Ang and Kohers (2001) who document substantial gains for acquisitions of privately held 
firms. When we differentiate our results according to the overconfidence measure 
employed, we find that casual bidders significantly outperform (1.34%) multiple bidders 
(0.79%) by 0.55% at the 1% significance level. When we further investigate the returns on 
the basis of method of payment, casual bidders have significantly more positive abnormal 
returns than multiple bidders for cash payments and an on average better performance for 
stock and mixed forms of financing respectively. Consistent with Malmendier and Tate 
(2004), such a result provides an indication that overconfident managers mainly undertake 
cash offers. 
4.4. Z CasuallMultiple Bidder Abnormal Returns by DomesticlForeign Targets 
We subsequently examine in Table 4.4 the performance of casual and multiple bidders 
engaging in domestic and foreign acquisitions. Since the UK is a leading player in 
international acquisitions, the study of UK acquisitions abroad appears as an important 
aspect in determining the overall success of FDI by acquisition. 23 In addition, in respect to 
the impact on returns of bidding firms that pursue such deals, the literature suggests 
differing performance to domestic acquisitions, although no clear conclusion can be drawn 
concerning the direction of the results. 24 Doukas and Travlos (1988) argue that acquisitions 
of non-domestic targets serve as a diversification 'vehicle', enabling the expansion of the 
boundary of the acquiring firm and therefore its better performance. This expansion 
22 Franks and Harris (1989) examine the effects of a large sample of over 1800 UK takeovers on shareholders' 
wealth and find that bidder shareholders gain or do not lose around the merger announcement date. 
23 Healy and Palepu (1993) note that, over the late 1980s, the UK was the lead acquiring nation in international 
acquisitions accounting for almost 30 per cent of international corporate investments over that period. 
24 See, for example, Doukas and Travlos (1988), Fatemi and Furtedo (1988), Kang (1993), Eun, Kolodny and 
Scheraga (1996) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004). 
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permits the internalization of synergies that would otherwise be lost because of various 
market failures. 
Panel A reports the results for domestic (UK) acquisitions, which miffor the previous 
finding obtained in the full sample of Table 4.3. Firstly, we find that overall the 
announcement performance in mean returns between casual and multiple bidders is 
positive (0.59%) and, secondly, this pattern exists irrespective of the medium of exchange 
used in the transaction. Panel B, for cross-border (non-UK) acquisitions, virtually reports 
the same on average pattern as Panel A although the return difference obtained is not 
statistically significant. Overall, results reported in Panel A and B confirm to a major 
extent the return pattern documented in Table 4.3. This empirical evidence is considered 
critical since one could argue that our results are contaminated by the initial selection of 
the sample including both domestic and foreign targets. In a nutshell, the general pattern 
holds even after the target origin is taken into consideration. 
4.4.3. CasuallMultiple Bidder Returns by DiversifyinglNon-Diversifying Acquisitions 
Multiple bidders are more likely than casual ones to undertake a merger project that, ex 
ante is unlikely to increase value (see prediction 2). Thus, the average effect of 
overconfidence on the probability of doing a merger might reflect the greater average 
propensity of overconfident managers to do bad mergers. A merger characteristic that, ex 
ante, is unlikely to favour casual bidders as soon as the merger opportunity presents itself 
is the diversification effect. Prior research has shown that diversifying mergers are the least 
likely to create value. In particular, there is a large body in the literature providing 
evidence that diversification may diminish shareholders' wealth (e. g. Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990), Ang and Stulz (1994); Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996)). In 
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addition, in a recent paper, Doukas and Kan (2004) argue that bidders who acquire 
unrelated targets experience greater excess cash flow declines and valuation discounts than 
do bidders involved in related acquisitions. However, from our perspective, the CEO who 
is overconfident that his assessments of the merger's prospects are correct, presses on 
despite the ex ante negative signals from the market. 
Table 4.5 reports the results we obtain for casual and multiple bidders acquiring firms that 
are diversified or non-diversified from the bidder's industry, which enable us to control for 
the possibility that mergers cluster within industries over time. A diversified bidder is 
defined as a firm whose three-digit SIC code is different from that of the target companyý5 
Panel A presents, for diversifying acquisitions, a similar finding as the one obtained from 
the overall sample in Table 4.3. The CARs are substantially positive and significant for 
rational bidders (0.77%), who enjoy greater CARs than multiple bidders of 0.64% 
significant at the 1% level. The same picture is drawn from Panel B of non-diversifying 
acquisitions, where overconfident bidders exhibit on average worse performance than 
rational bidders. Therefore, as a whole, we conclude that our findings are robust to the 
effect of overconfidence after the cross-industry characteristic is taken into consideration. 
A noticeable point to underline is that managers of frequent bidding firms engage 
proportionally into more diversifying than non-diversifying acquisitions. This 
characteristic can indicate to a great extent, as discussed above, large amounts of 
managerial overconfidence. In addition, when comparing the economic value of multiple 
25 Servaes (1996) points out that a straightforward examination of the four-digit SIC codes of the segments of the 
f inn does not necessarily reveal the degree of diversification of the firm. He argues that the use of the four-digit 
SIC code would be too wide to identify the industrial structure of the firm. Similarly, Kahle and Walkling (1996) 
demonstrate how a four-digit SIC code firm assigned to a firm might be misleading with regard to the most 
reasonable two- or three-digit classifications. 
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bidders conducting diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions (Panels A and B, Table 
4.5) we confirm that diversifying acquisitions destroy wealth value relative to core-related 
acquisitions. 
4.4.4. CasuallMultiple Bidder Abnormal Returns by Q Ratio 
Another effect that may be related to increased merger activity is high growth future 
investment opportunities. In general, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that acquirers 
with a high market-to-book ratio (high Q ratio) outperform those with a low market-to- 
book ratio (low Q ratio) after a merger irrespective of the payment method used. 26 In some 
ways the market fails to understand that past managerial performance is not necessarily a 
good indicator of future performance, at least in the case of acquisitions. On the other 
hand, firms with a lower Tobin's Q ratio (high growth opportunities) are more likely to 
initiate mergers, suggesting that acquisitions may be a substitute for profitable investment 
opportunities. 
However, when we divide our sample according to the Tobin's Q ratio 27 we come up to the 
same pattern obtained from our previous analysis (Table 4.6). In particular, rational 
bidders experience significantly greater gains (1.74%) than overconfident acquirers 
(0.77%) for the sample of low Q ratio bidders and on average better performance for the 
sample of the firms with low growth opportunities (Panels A and B respectively), 
regardless of the form of financing employed. 28 In addition, in contrast to an expected 
26 The main argument is the extrapolation hypothesis that explains the differential performance of overvalued 
and undervalued acquirers. Acquirers commanding a high market rating due to their recent performance and 
expected future performance (overvalued acquirers) may act out of overconfidence or hubris in making 
acquisitions. The stocks of such companies may also be overvalued and although the managers may be aware of 
such overvaluation, the stock market may be not. 
27 The average Q ratio is calculated one month prior to the announcement date and is the product of the market 
value divided by the net book value. 
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intensive acquisition strategy for high growth bidders, we find that overconfident bidders 
are proportionally less in number than those with low growth opportunities, which is 
exactly the opposite picture than the one drawn by the sample of casual acquirers. As a 
whole, our results confirm the return pattern of the worse performance of multiple 
(overconfident) bidders against casual (rational) bidders and eliminate the possibility of 
bullish merger activity due to future high investment opportunities. 
4.4.5. CasuallMultiple BidderAbnormal Returns by Relative Size 
A very important component affecting bidder returns is the relative size of target to 
acquirer. Due to the fact that private targets are, on average, much smaller than public 
firms we expect the impact on the bidder of a private acquisition to be smaller than a 
public acquisition. In addition, we expect that larger firms are more likely to conduct a 
merger due to their empire incentives to grow more in value and size. Under this line of 
thinking, CEOs do not acquire companies to benefit their shareholders. On the contrary, 
they do it for themselves as a larger company means a bigger paycheck, a bigger fiefdom, 
and more attention from the media. We use the relative size of target to bidder by defining 
it as the deal value of the transaction divided by bidder market value one month prior to 
the announcement date. 
Table 4.7 displays the results for the relative size of target to bidder. In general, casual 
bidders enjoy larger profits than multiple bidders on average for both small and large 
relative size panels (Panels A and B respectively). We find that CARs are, in general, 
28 A plausible explanation is that low growth bidders might have exhausted their internal growth opportunities, 
especially in the case of multiple bidders. This is confirmed in Section 4.7, which shows that frequent bidders 
are involved in overinvestment strategies (generalize high amounts of capital expenditure) during a period of 12 
months prior the event. 
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positively related to the relative size regardless of the medium of exchange. Accordingly, 
Asquith et at. (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Kang (1993) found greater abnormal 
returns for large targets in the 1970s. In addition, Fuller et al. (2002) identified a similar 
pattern to our evidence for a sample of US takeovers. This is linked to the suggestion made 
by Loderer and Martin (1990) who claimed that large firms seem to pay too much for their 
targets and large bids seem to be overpriced on average, facts that deteriorate share price 
performance. This constitutes, of course, one more manifestation of the support of the 
overconfidence view. 
Finally, we observe that for the lower relative size acquisitions (i. e. where most large and, 
as expected, overconfident firms are included) a cash offer is the dominant method of 
payment. This evidence collaborates with Faccio and Masulis (2005) who suggest that 
cash financing is more preferable to larger acquirers due to its ease of use and their better 
access to debt markets, its ability to avoid significant costs of obtaining shareholder 
approval of pre-emptive rights exemptions and stock authorizations, and the higher 
regulatory costs of stock offers. 
4.4.6. CasuallMultiple Bidder Abnormal Returns by Debt Capacity 
Another key implication of our overconfidence story is that the overconfident bidder 
should have more internal resources. If a firm has a sufficient amount of cash on hand to 
finance a potential acquisition without issuing equity, then perceived undervaluation by the 
capital market will not discourage the CEO's enthusiasm to undertake the project. This is 
in line with the firm"s debt capacity, which can allow the CEO to conduct a merger 
without issuing 'mispriced' securitY (Malmendier and Tate (2004)). A CEO who 
overestimates a potential merger's return may ex ante believe it will be profitable even in 
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the case that ex post it corresponds to default. Therefore, even if he/she views the debt as 
too expensive given his/her perception of the acquisition's value, he/she may accept it 
rather than foregoing the project altogether. In other words, debt allows the CEO, and the 
shareholders whose interests he/she values, to remain the residual claimant on all of the 
future's value. This effect is even clearer if the CEO can issue riskless debt to finance the 
deal. 
Table 4.8 displays our results according to the bidders' debt capacity. Average debt 
capacity is calculated by adding the bidder's straight debt, short-term debt, and preferred 
equity and subtracting cash and marketable securities as of the date of the most recent 
financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction. Panels A and B show 
that casual bidders' share price performance significantly outperforms multiple bidders' 
performance overall (1.08%) and for low debt capacity levels (1.35%), and on average for 
firms with high debt capacity. In addition, as predicted, we observe from all panels (A, B 
and C) that multiple bidders have on average higher debt capacity than casual bidders. This 
is consistent with Hackbarth (2003) who finds that managerial overconfidence leads to 
greater debt financing and that overconfidence, by acting as a commitment device, can also 
ameliorate bondholder and shareholder conflicts such as debt overhang. Moreover, 
interestingly, a greater amount of multiple bidders is included in the portfolio with high 
debt capacity confirming our prediction that overconfident bidders have better access to 
debt markets. When managers have optimistic predictions of investment outcomes, they 
might be more inclined to finance with debt rather than equity. Overconfidence about the 
size of future outcomes would make managers unwilling to share future profits with new 
equity investors and make them more willing to issue debt rather than equity. 
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4.4.7. CasuallMulliple Bidder Abnormal Returns by Investment 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) postulate that overconfident CEOs have a higher sensitivity 
of corporate investment to cash flow, on average, than their peers. The authors document 
the same finding in their M&A overconfidence paper (2004) confirming that CEOs who 
are classified as overconfident by their options measure, conduct mergers that have higher 
average sensitivities of investment to cash flow. While for rational CEOs the possibility of 
investing internally is irrelevant as any project undertaken has always-positive NPV, for 
overconfident CEOs the examination of the trude-off between investment and mergers 
should be seriously taken into consideration. Particularly, overconfident CEOs must 
allocate resources between investment projects in a way that maximizes returns while 
minimizing perceived financing costs. In general, we may expect that aggressive 
(overconfident) investment strategies should lead to overinvestment and lower future stock 
returns. Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), capital expenditures are employed to serve 
as a measure of investment and represent purchases of property, plant and equipment for 
the 12 months ending on the date of the most current financial information prior to the 
announcement of the transaction. 
Table 4.9, Panel A displays the investment results which, in-hand with our previous 
findings, indicate that rational bidders exhibit significantly greater positive abnormal 
returns than overconfident acquirers (0.92%) even after controlling for the means of 
payment. When we differentiate our results on the basis of diversifying/non-diversifying 
acquisitions, we obtain the same return pattern irrespective of the target industry or the 
method of payment used in the transaction. One other interesting observation is that 
multiple bidders' use of stock in mergers is very slim relative to casual bidders. This 
suggests that they rely heavily on the other two financing methods because i) they have 
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more internally generated cash flows (i. e. they are not financially constrained), and ii) their 
stock is likely to be perceived by their own managers as undervalued (i. e. not a strong 
currency to buy corporate assets). That is managers think that their stock has more value 
than what the market receives! This is another indication of managerial overconfidence. 
In addition, in all panels we report higher average capital expenditure for overconfident 
bidders than rational CEOs. Therefore, we argue that the manager may overrate the value 
of his company and accomplish a number of several acquisitions. As discussed above, this 
stems from his overestimation of future returns from exclusive investment projects or 
general overestimation of the capitalized value of his future leadership. In sum, consistent 
to our expectations, we confirm overconfident CEOs' overinvestment, lower stock returns, 
and greater involvement into diversifying acquisitions, as also shown in Table 4.5. 
4.4.8. Robustness Test 
4.4.8.1. Multiple Bidders Abnormal Returns by First Vs Higher Order Bids 
In order to further confirm that multiple bidders is a reliable proxy/measurement of 
overconfidence in M&As we examine the performance difference between first bids and 
fifth and more bids of frequent bidders. The use of a homogeneous sample of only multiple 
bidders offers the opportunity to control for (much of) the information about bidder 
29 
characteristics contained in abnormal returns surrounding the merger announcement. In 
this case first deals made by multiple bidders are considered as casual acquisitions, since 
the market reacts for the first time to the information of a merger undertaken by a specific 
unique acquirer. The latter sample of fifth and higher bids within the multiple acquirers' 
29 Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003) argue that acquisition announcement reveals not only the value of the 
acquisition itself but also the stand-alone value of the bidders, the potential synergies of the combination, and 
possibly the bidder overpayment. 
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sample serves as an appropriate testing ground to test extreme CEOs overconfidence about 
the positive outcome of an acquisition. 
There are several possible explanations for the deteriorating performance of bidders 
completing many acquisitions in a short period of time. As already discussed, one possible 
reason is that such firms are unable to integrate subsequent acquisitions, due to the short 
interval among them, and hence ý each subsequent acquisition results in a worse 
performance than the previous one. 30 In addition, a review of the psychology literature on 
inference documents that the market systematically overweights salient, anecdotal'and 
attention-grabbing information (i. e. merger initiation of casual bidders), and underweights 
highly relevant information (i. e. mergers undertaken by frequent acquirers). Alternatively, 
we could interpret these results for later bids for private firms, as a consequence of the less 
favourable price bidders receive when they multiply acquire firms in a concentrated 
period .31 This is linked to our overconfidence story, providing a potential explanation for 
the announcement returns obtained. 
In addition, the hubris hypothesis takes the view that the worsening performance is high 
owing to less care being taken with the next takeover due to overconfidence drawn from 
the success of the previous one. This could manifest in several ways that a less careful 
choice of targets leads to a higher price paid for those targets, or a higher leverage is taken 
on to pay for subsequent acquisitions. Under this hypothesis, it sounds plausible for a 
decline to be much more acute for acquirers whose initial acquisition is successful. 
30 The example of Mr Ebbers of World. Corn who acquired numerous companies in a very short interval of time 
fits nicely with this view. 31 Note, however, that Hayward (2002) posits that very long intervals increase the likelihood that inferences 
from prior experiences are 'unavailable, inaccessible and inapplicable'. The author suggests a U-shaped 
relationship between the acquisition performance and the intervals between acquisitions, which means that the 
performance is worse either when acquisitions occur in quick succession or in very long intervals. 
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Furthermore, the subsequent acquisitions may sometimes tend not only to create less 
synergy, but could also be of destructive value (Conn et al. (2004)). Table 4.10 displays 
the results we obtain for these 2 subsets of frequent bidders' sample. We find that on the 
first acquisition attempt acquirers realize a large positive and significant CAR of 1.72% 
while later deals lead to less value creation (0.49%). The mean economic difference 
between the two groups is substantial (1.23%) and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The abnormal returns for acquisitions with deal order of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th or more deals 
suggest that the prior success leads to more acquisitions resulting systematically in lower 
abnormal returns. Acquisitions with a deal order of 2,3, and 4 or more deals have 
abnormal returns of 0.79%, 0.69%, and 0.63%. Moreover, these abnormal returns are 
statistically significant and different from zero at the one percent level. 
4.4.9. CasuallMultiple Bidder Abnormal Returns by Corporate Governance 
Finally, a natural question for the worse mergers undertaken by frequent bidders could be 
raised with regards to the nature of their corporate governance. As discussed above, our 
overconfidence story implies that if CEOs believe that they can defy all odds and 
efficiently extract above normal returns from an acquisition, then those CEOs are likely to 
create less synergies or negotiate less efficiently. Clearly the role of the board of directors 
should serve as a check on this behaviour. 32 It would be expected that overconfident CEOs 
would have weak corporate governance in contrast to a more efficient board of directors of 
casual-rational bidders. Along these lines, Malmendier and Tate (2004) argue that effective 
corporate governance strongly mitigates CEO acquisitiveness. 
32 However, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) found that when the board has a significant number of insiders on it, 
and when the CEO is also the board's chain-nan, the relationship between CEO hubris and the size of premium 
paid is particularly striking. 
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In Table 4.11 we report our return patterns obtained after controlling for bidders' corporate 
govemance. 33 The corporate govemance literature suggests that an effective board should 
have no more than 12 members and, more specifically, it becomes more efficient when its 
size (i. e. the number of directors) lies between 4 and 12.34 In general, we find that multiple 
bidders create on average less wealth value than casual bidders for both weak and strong 
corporate governance portfolios. Finally and most importantly, we document that 
multiple/overconfldent bidders proportionally employ less efficient board size supporting 
our view of "indirect relationship between overconfidence and corporate governance and 
providing a further plausible interpretation for the multiple/aggressive bidding 
phenomenon". 
4.4.10. Regression A nalysis 
The previous results analyze returns to acquirers using univariate comparisons. In this 
section, we perform multivariate tests on the determinants of acquirer's returns. In Table 
4.12 we present the results of regressing the bidder's CARs on factors that may impact 
CARs. As with all regressions that explain returns to acquiring firms, because of the low 
explanatory power of the regression, the results must be viewed with scepticism, although 
the F-statistic for the equation is positive and significant. Since our results suggest that 
there are fundamental differences between multiple and casual bidders, we initially run 
regressions for these two groups separately (Panel A) and then we examine the results 
when these two groups are put together (Panel B). 
33 Corporate governance data include only a fraction of our total sample (1990-2000), however, represent the 
main picture drawn according to the corporate governance literature. 
34 Of course this kind of corporate governance classification is quite weak and the results should me seen with 
caution. 
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In Panel A, we estimate bidder returns as a function of several bid characteristics, 
including whether the target is acquired with cash or stock. Other variables include the log 
of relative size of the target, the log of the target's size, the Q value, and dummy variables 
to indicate if the target and the bidder are in the same industry, if the bid is a fifth or higher 
bid (for multiple bidders' sample only), and if the bidder has high debt capacity. In Panel B 
we run a regression of CARs of all bids on all these factors including the dummy variable 
as to whether the bidder is a multiple acquirer. 
Each of the explanatory variables has been suggested by theory as a determinant of the 
market's perception of an acquisition. The relative size of the target proxies for several 
effects. At a basic level, the larger the target relative to the bidder, the greater the effect of 
the acquisition on the bidder, and the more likely a greater market reaction. The Q variable 
is engaged to consider for growth opportunities. Dummy variables are included for cash or 
stock offers in order to control whether the method of payment affects the returns we 
obtain for our two groups. Dummy variable for the fifth and higher bid is employed to 
capture the results of the univariate tests that show fifth and higher bids may be infected by 
higher degrees of overconfidence and may indicate that managers negotiate less efficiently. 
The domestic dummy accounts for the potential that bids for UK targets are different than 
bids for foreign firms. In addition, we account for industry effects by including dummies 
based on SIC codes and debt capacity, as we showed above that multiple bidders have a 
higher debt capacity and this may result in more aggressive acquisitions. Finally, and most 
importantly, in Panel B we include a dummy variable of whether the bidder is a multiple 
acquirer. As we have found so far, frequent bidding indicates overconfidence and therefore 
'bad' mergers are expected. 
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In general, the results are supportive to what we have found in the univariate analysis. 
CARs are positive and statistically significant for casual bidders while multiple bidders 
experience insignificant CARs. This result confirms the general pattern of the worse 
performance for multiple bidders. For casual bidders, the coefficients on common stock 
deals and relative size variables are positive and significant. This suggests that the CARs 
associated with stock deals are more positive than those associated with cash deals in 
acquisitions of casual bidders, and that the market views larger deals even more 
favourably. For multiple bidders, the coefficient on the dummy variable for the fifth and 
higher bid is negative and significant. This suggests that as the number of bids increases, 
the acquirer will have lower CARs. Further, the target size dummy is positive and 
significant while all the other variables are insignificant. In Panel B, which includes all the 
bidders, very interestingly, the dummy variable for multiple bidders is negative and 
significant. Our prediction is therefore confirmed since our measure of overconfidence has 
a significant negative effect on CARs. Particularly, the market discounts overconfident 
bids by approximately 90 basis points over the five-day window. Moreover, consistent to 
the above results, the market views favourably common stock deals, while negative CARs 
are experienced for cash acquisitions. In addition, the coefficient on the Q variable is 
marginally positive and significant. All other variables appear to be statistically 
insignificant. 
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4.4.11. Long-Run Analysis 
Up to this point we have analyzed the performance of casual versus multiple bidders for 
the five-day window. In order to obtain a better understanding of the market reaction to 
overconfident and rational bidders we examine their long-run performance (one, two and 
three years respectively). It is expected that the market receives multiple bidders more 
unfavourably. This is due to the fact that, as discussed above, multiple bidders are engaged 
in aggressive investment strategies, which create an overvalued combined firm leading to a 
natural long-run underperformance. 
Table 4.13 displays the abnormal returns for one, two and three-year calendar time 
portfolios formed on the basis of casual against multiple bidders. In general, we find 
negative and significant results for both portfolios, however, frequent/overconfident 
bidders perform worse on average confirming our prediction. Our results are, in most of 
the cases, robust when we differentiate on the method of payment used in the transaction. 
Subsequently, in Table 4.14 we split our sample into domestic and foreign acquisitions in 
order to isolate the effect of foreign acquisitions and the potential contamination they 
cause to the returns obtained. Panel A reports the results for acquisitions of UK firms. 
Overall, the return pattern confirms the above results reflecting more negative, on average, 
abnormal returns for multiple versus casual bidders. The same picture is drawn when we 
estimate Jensen's alphas for foreign acquisitions (Panel B, Table 4.14). Casual bidders 
outperfonn multiple bidders on average. Finally, when we further differentiate on the basis 
of the form of financing we obtain in general a similar return pattern. 
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4.5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we adopt a behavioural. approach using psychological insights in explaining 
the root of one of the most significant and disruptive decisions undertaken by corporate 
organizations (i. e. M&As) and their effects on shareholders' wealth value. Particularly, we 
establish and empirically approve the effect of overconfidence on managerial tendency to 
conduct merger deals. In addition, we provide evidence that acquisitions undertaken by 
overconfident managers have lower abnormal returns that those of casual bidders. 
We measure overconfidence by using a sample of frequent acquirers, defined as companies 
that pursued five or more acquisitions over a three-year time interval, and show that 
overconfident managers are keen, firstly, on initiating a large number of acquisitions 
(direct evidence) and secondly, on getting involved in mergers that the market discounts 
them compared to projects undertaken by "rational" CEOs. We empirically confirm the 
significantly better performance of casual versus multiple bidders after controlling for 
method of payment, target origin, target industry, relative size and bidder growth 
opportunities. Overconfident bidders are those with higher debt capacity, who have greater 
preference for cash offers and have presented excessive investment activity over a recent 
period before the announcement of an acquisition. 
In conclusion, the overconfidence theory proves to be a complementary theoretical 
framework to explain the causes of merger activity. In addition, "our proxy provides a 
significant future challenge to the managerial overconfidence theory of corporate finance 
enhancing the suggestion that studying such behavioural explanations is a fruitful avenue 
for future research. In general, our results have "direct implications on managerial 
corporate decisions' setting". First of all, firms should avoid high debt levels. Secondly, 
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the role of the board of directors is considered crucial. Corporations might want to make 
sure that they have the most independent directors as possible on their board, people that 
will need to play a more active role in the way they evaluate and select a merger project. 
We suggest that these individuals should be able and willing to take a view contrary to the 
CEO's bullishness on a proposed merger whenever this acts in the interests of their 
shareholders. 
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Table 4.1- Continued 
Panel B: Firm Data 
Casual Bidders (CB) Multip le Bidders (MB) 
Variables Number of Number of 
Mergers Mean Median Mergers Mean Median 
Assets 1928 599.033 70.99 806 590.516 158.87 
Capital 1640 232.637 18.84 652 283.649 33.26 
Investment (CAPEX) 1572 37.017 3.82 628 41.031 7.69 
Debt Capacity 1585 78.590 2.95 637 137.356 12.54 
Cash Flow 1645 66.050 9.72 652 63.433 14.96 
Q 3407 3.789 1.95 1384 6.747 2.13 
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Table 4.2. Financing Characteristics and Merger Activity by Industry 
The table reports in Panel A financing characteristics by year for acquisitions of private firms ftom 1980 to 2004 
undertaken by casual and multiple bidders. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined as bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. 
All others are casual bidders that also include the first bid of multiple bidders. Cash financing includes 
transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in 
common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. Panel B displays by industry, the fraction of sample firms that were 
acquired and firms that were acquiring private targets from 1980 to 2004. Industry data are organized using the 
acquiror and target MID description provided by the SDC database. First through fifth columns report the 
number and percentage of acquirers (casual and multiple) and targets respectively, in a particular industry. 
Panel A: Financing Characteristics 
Year Number of 
firms with 
Disclosed 
Method of 
Payment 
CR MB 
Casual Bidders 
Cash Stock 
N%N% 
(CB) 
Combo 
N% 
Multip 
Cash 
N% 
le Bidders ( 
Stock 
N% 
MB) 
Combo 
N% 
1980 1 1 100 - - 
1981 3 - 3 100 
1982 4 4 100 
1983 4 - 4 100 
1984 10 5 50 2 20 3 30 
1985 19 14 74 5 26 - - 
1986 53 6 44 83 3 6 6 11 4 67 2 33 - - 
1987 145 29 109 75 17 12 19 13 22 76 2 7 5 17 
1988 266 109 187 70 7 3 72 27 69 63 2 2 38 35 
1989 217 102 129 59 8 4 80 37 66 65 5 5 31 30 
1990 161 80 104 65 8 5 49 30 54 68 1 1 25 31 
1991 103 61 72 70 3 3 28 27 36 59 3 5 22 36 
1992 138 44 80 58 7 5 51 37 26 59 3 7 15 34 
1993 145 48 72 50 8 6 65 44 26 54 1 2 21 44 
1994 221 39 120 54 9 4 92 42 29 74 - - 10 26 
1995 202 49 100 49 6 3 96 48 27 55 3 6 19 39 
1996 218 76 112 51 4 2 102 47 44 58 2 3 30 39 
1997 283 140 149 53 7 2 127 45 73 52 3 2 64 46 
1998 332 150 194 58 5 2 133 40 100 67 1 1 49 32 
1999 287 143 150 52 8 3 129 45 81 57 - - 62 43 
2000 282 157 120 43 17 6 145 51 73 47 2 1 82 52 
2001 222 92 83 37 7 3 132 60 38 41 2 2 52 57 
2002 173 67 99 57 9 5 65 38 35 52 2 3 30 45 
2003 152 56 87 57 5 3 60 40 33 59 1 2 22 39 
2004 203 42 99 49 8 4 96 47 18 43 1 2 23 55 
Total 3844 1490 2130 55 153 4 1561 41 854 57 36 3 600 40 
Table 4.2- Continued 
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Panel B: Merger Activity by Industry 
Industry N 
CB 
% 
Tari! ets 
N% N 
MB 
% 
Tarizets 
N% 
Aerospace and Defense 46 1.19 36 0.94 -16 1.07 13 0.87 
Advertising andManagement 66 1.71 46 1.20 99 6.64 55 3.70 
Agriculture and Livestock 22 0.56 25 0.65 0 0 5 0.34 
Apparel and Retailing 24 0.61 31 0.81 5 0.34 2 0.13 
Automobiles and Components 114 2.96 102 2.65 42 2.82 43 2.89 
Automotive Retailing 61 1.58 77 2.00 34 2.28 40 2.68 
Broadcasting 37 0.95 31 0.81 11 0.74 6 0.40 
Building/Construction & Engineering 278 7.23 255 6.63 58 3.89 79 5.30 
Cable 5 0.12 2 0.05 - - 1 0.07 Casinos and Gaming 10 0.25 3 0.08 8 0.54 3 0.20 
Chemicals 111 2.88 115 2.99 89 5.97 59 3.96 
Computers and Electronics Retailing 10 0.25 13 0.33 1 0.07 
Computers and Peripherals 55 1.42 66 1.72 6 0.40 12 0.81 
Construction Materials 125 3.24 88 2.29 20 1.34 26 1.74 
Containers and Packaging 63 1.63 61 1.59 48 3.22 31 2.08 
Discount and Department Store Retailing 21 0.54 12 0.31 - - 1 0.07 E-commerce/B2B - - 2 0.05 - - 4 0.27 Educational Services 13 0.33 17 0.44 8 0.54 10 0.67 
Electronics 78 2.02 94 2.45 29 1.95 40 2.68 
Employment Services 34 0.87 41 1.07 27 1.81 27 1.81 
Food and Beverage 205 5.32 154 4.01 70 4.70 65 4.36 
Food and Beverage Retailing 114 2.96 145 3.77 39 2.62 42 2.82 
Home Improvement Retailing 11 0.28 24 0.62 15 1.01 16 1.07 
Home Furnishing 49 1.26 63 1.64 14 0.94 10 0.67 
Hotels and Lodging 51 1.32 65 1.69 27 1.81 44 2.95 
Household and Personal Products 21 0.54 24 0.62 19 1.28 10 0.67 
Industrials 146 3.79 151 3.93 46 3.09 48 3.22 
Internet and Catalog Retailing 10 0.25 8 0.21 - - - - Internet Software and Services 34 0.87 32 0.83 8 0.54 9 0.60 
IT Consulting and Services 115 2.98 100 2.60 57 3.83 38 2.55 
Legal Services - 1 0.03 - - Machinery 189 4.91 176 4.58 47 3.14 68 4.56 
Metals and Mining 131 3.40 141 3.67 76 5.10 29 1.95 
Motion Pictures/Audio Visual 42 1.08 43 1.12 8 0.54 10 0.67 
Non Residential 21 0.54 152 3.95 16 1.07 94 6.31 
Other Consumer Products 126 3.27 151 3.93 43 2.89 66 4.43 
Other Materials 23 0.59 43 1.12 13 0.87 27 1.81 
Other Media and Entertainment - 6 0.16 - - Other Real Estate 183 4.75 66 1.72 105 7.05 6 0.40 
Other Retailing 35 0.90 42 1.09 9 0.60 16 1.07 
Other Telecommunications 1 0.03 5 0.13 - - 1 0.07 Paper and Forest Products 30 0.77 48 1.25 7 0.47 8 0.54 
Professional Services 218 5.66 239 6.22 87 5.84 126 8.46 
Publishing 166 4.31 171 4.45 75 5.03 65 4.36 
Real Estate Management and Development 30 0.77 21 0.55 - - 3 0.20 Recreation and Leisure 52 1.34 59 1.53 41 2.75 46 3.09 
REITs 33 0.85 14 0.36 29 1.95 5 0.34 
Residential 2 0.51 4 0.10 - - 1 0.07 Semiconductor 15 0.38 21 0.54 6 0.40 12 0.81 
Software 182 4.72 210 5.46 42 2.82 68 4.56 
Space and Satellites 3 0.08 1 0.03 7 0.47 
Telecommunications Equipment 70 1.81 55 1.43 15 1.01 25 1.68 
Textiles and Apparel 186 4.83 144 3.75 7 0.47 22 1.48 
Tobacco 9 0.23 7 0.18 
Transportation and Infrastructure 126 3.27 109 2.84 30 2.01 34 2.28 
Travel Services 28 0.73 19 0.49 32 2.15 17 1.14 
1 Wireless 14 0.36 13 D. 34 - - 1 0.07 
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Table 4.3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Casual Vs Multiple Acquirers 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of casual and multiple bidders acquiring private 
firms over a period between 1980 and 2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
ARj, = R,, - R., 
where Rit is the Return on firm i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined 
as bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include 
the first bid of multiple bidders. Results in Panel A are comprised of bids of casual and multiple acquirers for 
private targets. The results are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing includes transactions 
made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. 
Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods 
classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. The last row represents the 
differences in mean short-run CARs. P-values are provided in parenthesis. ' Denotes significance at the 1% level; 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 'Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Bids 
All Bidders 1.1 80/oa 0.82%' 3.47%' 1.491/6" 
5334 2984 189 2161 
Casual Bidders 1.340/6" 0.95%1 3.83%' 1.62'Yo' 
3844 2130 153 1561 
Multiple Bidders 0.790/o* 0.49%' 1.92% 1.150/68 
1490 854 36 600 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.55% 0.46% 1.91% 0.46% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.005) (0.033) (0.277) (0.175) 
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Table 4.4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Casual Vs Multiple Acquirers by 
the Target Origin (Domestic Vs Foreign) 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of casual and multiple bidders acquiring domestic 
or foreign private companies over a period between 1980 and 2004. Cumulative abnon-nal returns are calculated 
for the five days [-2, +2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated 
using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R,, - R., 
where R,, is the Return on finn i and Rm, is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined 
as bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include 
the first bid of multiple bidders. Panel A represents the results of domestic acquisitions (UK firms) and Panel B 
the results of foreign acquisitions (non-UK firms) respectively. The results are further divided by the method of 
payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as 
transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and 
stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "othee' by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the 
mean. The last rows of each panel (A and B) represent the differences in mean short-run CARs. P-values are 
provided in parenthesis. ' Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at the 5% level; r Denotes 
significance at the 10% level. 
-T All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Domestic Targets 
Casual Bidders 1.330/6" 1.07%' 2.26% r 1.540/6" 
2711 1442 126 1143 
Multiple Bidders 0.74%' 0.47%b 0.10% LOW 
948 519 26 403 
Mean Differences in 
CARs [-2, +21 of Casual 0.59% 0.60% 2.16% 0.41% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.013) (0.022) (0.126) (0.329) 
Panel B: Foreig n Targets 
Casual Bidders 1.36%' 0.70%' 11.2%' 1.82%* 
1133 688 27 418 
Multiple Bidders 0.880/oa 0.52W 6.65% 1.1 90/0a 
542 335 10 197 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.48% 0.18% 0.45% 0.63% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.163) (0.640) (0.403) (0.306) 
Chapter 4 Do Overconfident Acquirers Gain Less from Acquisitions? 
Table 4.5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Casual Vs Multiple Acquirers by 
Diversifying/Non-Diversifying Acquisitions 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of casual and multiple bidders making 
diversifying acquisitions of private firms, represented in Panel A, or non-diversifying acquisitions, represented 
in Panel B over a period between 1980 and 2004. A diversified bidder is defined as a firni whose three-digit SIC 
code is different from that of the target company. CARs are calculated for the five days [-2, +2] around the 
announcement (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R,, - R,., 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and Rm, is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined 
as bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include 
the first bid of multiple bidders. The results are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. The last rows of 
each panel (A and B) represent the differences in mean short-run CARs. P-values are provided in parenthesis. ' 
Denotes significance at the 1% level ;b Denotes significance at the 5% level; Denotes significance at 
the 10% level. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Diversifying Acq uisitions 
Casual Bidders 1.370/6' 0.89%a 4.16%0 1.77%" 
2434 1385 97 952 
Multiple Bidders 0.7 3 0/6' 0.34% 1.59% 1.27%' 
959 562 23 374 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 or Casual 0.64% 0.55% 2.57% 0.50% 
minus Multiple Bidders 1 (0.006) (0.037) (0.245) (0.199) 
Panel B: Non-Diversifyin g Acquisitions 
Casual Bidders 1.28%' 1.06% a 3.27%' 1.38%* 
1410 745 56 609 
Multiple Bidders 0.890/0a 0.76%b 2.52% 0.97%' 
531 292 13 226 
Mean Differences in 
CARs [-2, +21 of Casual 0.39% 0.30% 0.75% 0.41% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.269) (0.444) (0.803) (0.518) 
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Table 4.6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Casual Vs Multiple Acquirers by 
their Q Ratio 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of casual and multiple bidders acquiring private 
firms over a period between 1980 and 2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
AR, = R,, - R,,,, 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and Rmt is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined 
as bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include 
the first bid of multiple bidders. We rank acquirers according to their Q ratio and divide them to low and high-Q 
acquirers respectively. The low-Q acquirers are defined as those with low Q ratio (bottom average), while the 
high-Q acquirers are defined as those with high Q ratio (top average). The acquirer Q ratio is calculated one 
month before the acquisition announcement date and is the product of the Market Value divided by the net book 
value. Panel A reports the results for low-Q acquirers. Panel B represents the results for the high-Q acquirers. 
The results are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in 
cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination 
payment comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as 
&Gother" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. The last rows of each panel (A and B) 
represent the differences in mean short-run CARs. P-values are provided in parenthesis. " Denotes significance 
at the I% level; b Denotes significance at the 5% level; ' Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Low Q 
Casual Bidders 1.74%' 1.2 1W 7.14% b 2.12%" 
1757 1025 53 679 
Multiple Bidders 0.77%* 0.42%' 3.54% 1.2 1 %' 
638 392 13 233 
Mean Differences In 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.97% 0.79% 3.60% 0.91% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.001) (0.013) (0.414) (0.093) 
Panel B: High Q 
Casual Bidders 1.17 0/6' 0.83%" 3.45% b 1.350/6' 
1650 831 65 754 
Multiple Bidders 0.870/6' 0.63%b 2 . 05%b 1.09%8 
746 386 14 346 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.30% 0.20% 1.40% 0.26% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.294) (0.555) (0.436) (0.583) 
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Table 4.7. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Casual Vs Multiple Acquirers by 
the Relative Size of the Target 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of casual and multiple bidders acquiring private 
firms over a period between 1980 and 2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R,, - R., 
where R, is the Return on firm i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined 
as bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include 
the first bid of multiple bidders. The relative size of the target is defined as the deal value divided by bidder 
market value. The Acquirer Market Value (MV) is calculated as of the month before the announcement date and 
is the product of the monthly share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue on Datastream. We 
rank acquirers according to their relative size and divide them to those with small and large relative size 
respectively. Panel A represents bids with small relative size of the target to bidder (bottom average) and Panel 
B bids with large relative size of the target to bidder (top average) respectively. The results are further divided 
by the method of payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock 
offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers 
consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of 
bids is reported below the mean. The last rows of each panel (A and B) represent the differences in mean short- 
run CARs. P-values are provided in parenthesis. " Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance 
at the 5% level; " Denotes significance at the 10% level 
-T All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Small Relative Size 
Casual Bidders 0.650/6" 0.83%' 0.03% 0.36% 
1734 1117 49 568 
Multiple Bidders 0.37%b 0.29% 0.49% 0.49% 
930 580 15 335 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.28% 0.54% -0.46% -0.13% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.198) (0.034) (0.739) (0.782) 
Panel B: Large Relative Size 
Casual Bidders 1.9 1 O/Oa 1.09%a 5.70% 2.34%' 
2104 1011 103 990 
Multiple Bidders 1.490/6" 0.89%a 2.95% 2.000/oa 
560 274 21 265 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.42% 0.20% 2.75% 0.34% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.218) (0.618) (0.306) (0.511) 
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Table 4.8. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Casual Vs Multiple Acquirers by 
their Debt Capacity 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of casual and multiple bidders acquiring private 
firms over a period between 1980 and 2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = R,, - R,,,, 
where R, is the Return on firm i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
bidders are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined as 
bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include the 
first bid of multiple bidders. The average debt capacity (in million pounds) is reported in brackets and is 
calculated by adding biddees straight debt, short-term debt, and preferred equity and subtracting cash and 
marketable securities as of the date of the most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the 
transaction. Data of debt capacity are obtained from SDC. We rank the data available from SDC according to the 
average debt capacity and form the portfolios. Panel A reports the results for all bids. Panel B represents the 
results of the acquirers that belong to the bottom average debt capacity levels and Panel C displays the results for 
the acquirers that lie on the top levels of debt capacity respectively. The results are further divided by the method 
of payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined 
as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination payment comprises offers consisting of both cash 
and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "othee' by SDC. The number of bids is reported below 
the mean. The third rows of each panel (A, B and Q represent the differences in mean short-run CARs. P-values 
are provided in parenthesis. ' Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at the 5% level; 
Denotes sign if icance at the 10% level. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Bids 
Casual Bidders 2.20%' 1.56%" 8.36%' 2.38%' 
1585 786 61 738 
CB Debt Capacity [78.59] [107.88] [6.52] [53.37] 
Multiple Bidders 1.12W 0.81%" 0.71% 1.49'Yo" 
637 336 9 292 
MB Debt Capacity [137.36] [229.30] [-19.69] [36.40] 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 1.08% 0.75% 7.65% 0.89% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.002) (0.052) (0.010) (0.135) 
Panel B: Low Debt Cap acity 
Casual Bidders 2.740/6' 2.15%" 8.92%" 2.520/o' 
851 330 48 473 
CB Debt Capacity [-32.071 [-48.56] [-9.571 [-22.86] 
Multiple Bidders 1.39%' 0.98% 0.79% 1.67% b 
260 99 7 154 
MB Debt Capacity [-24.98] [-33.49] [-57.34] [-18.04] 
Mean Differences In 
CARs [-2, +21 of Casual 1.35% 1.17% 8.13% 0.85% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.026) (0.116) (0.030) (0.327) 
Table 4.8- Continued 
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All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: High Debt Ca pacity 
Casual Bidders 1.58%' 1.12%' 6.31%0 2.13%' 
734 456 13 265 
CB Debt Capacity [206.90] [221.08] [65.96] [189.42] 
Multiple Bidders 0.940/6" 0.73%b 0.43% 1.29% b 
377 237 2 138 
MB Debt Capacity [249.31] [339.071 [112.09] [97.16] 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.64% 0.39% 5.88% 0.84% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.118) (0.383) (0.058) (0.304) 
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Table 4.9. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Casual Vs Multiple Acquirers by 
their Industry-Adjusted Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of casual and multiple bidders acquiring private 
firms over a period between 1980 and 2004. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
ARj, = R,, - R,,,, 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
bidders are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined as 
bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include the 
first bid of multiple bidders. The average capital expenditure (in million pounds) is reported in brackets and 
represents purchases of property, plant and equipment for the 12 months ending on the date of the most current 
financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction. Data of capital expenditure are obtained from 
SDC. We divide them by industry using the 3-digit SIC code. Panel A reports the results for all bids. Panel B 
represents the results of the acquirers that have different SIC codes from that of their targets (diversifying 
acquisitions) and Panel C displays the results of the acquirers with the same 3-digit SIC code with their targets 
(non-diversifying acquisitions) respectively. The results are further divided by the method of payment. Cash 
financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions 
made solely in common stock. Combination payment comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or 
convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is reported below the mean. The 
third rows of each panel (A, B and Q represent the differences in mean short-run CARs. P-values are provided 
in parenthesis. ' Denotes significance at the 1% level ;b Denotes significance at the 5% level; ' Denotes 
significance at the 10% level. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: All Bids 
Casual Bidders 1.99ly0a 1.50W 4.62%" 2.30%' 
1572 780 56 736 
CB Capital Expenditure [37.02] [46.83] [3.88] [29.14] 
Multiple Bidders 1.07*/o" 0.83%' -0.67% 1.37%' 
628 333 5 290 
MB Capital Expenditure [41.03] [62.49] [13.11] [16.87] 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.92% 0.67% 5.29% 0.93% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.007) (0.083) (0.011) (0.110) 
Panel B: Diversifying Acq uisitions 
Casual Bidders 1.900/01, 1.53%' 3.67%" 2.2 1 %' 
940 487 28 425 
CB Capital Expenditure [40.781 [52.16] [5.52] [30.05] 
Multiple Bidders 1.000/0a 0.66%' 0.06% 1.41%" 
373 200 2 171 
MB Capital Expenditure [52.75] [77.68] [1.40] [24.20] 
Mean Differences In 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.90% 0.87% 3.61% 0.80% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.023) (0.069) (0.068) (0.224) 
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Table 4.9- Continued 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel C: Non-Diversifying Acquisitions 
Casual Bidders 2.11 %' 1.47% a 5.57% 2.4 1 O/oa 
632 293 28 311 
CB Capital Expenditure [31.43] [37.96] [2.23] [27.901 
Multiple Bidders 1.17% b 1.09%b -1.15% 1.31% 
255 133 3 119 
MB Capital Expenditure [23.89] [39.661 [20.92] [6.34] 
Mean Differences In 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.94% 0.38% 6.72% 1.10% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.123) (0.573) (0.068) (0.295) 
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Table 4.10. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Multiple Acquirers (1st Deals Vs 
Later Deals) 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of multiple acquirers acquiring five or more 
private firms over the 1985 and 2004 period. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the five days [-2, 
+2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
AR,, = Ri, - R,,,, 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and R., is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The usual estimation period is 
eliminated due to the high probability of confounding events for acquirers acquiring five or more targets during 
a three-year period. Panel A represents the results of the first successful private acquisition of multiple acquirers 
within a 3-year period and then gradually the results of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th or more deals of multiple 
acquirers respectively. The results are further divided by the method of payment. Cash financing includes 
transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in 
common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of deals is reported below the mean. The last row 
represents the differences in mean short-run CARs. P-values are provided in parenthesis. ' Denotes significance 
at the I% level; b Denotes significance at the 5% level; ' Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Multiple Acq uirers (MA) 
Multiple Acquirers: Ist Deals 1.72%' 0.71% 2.84% 3.06% ' 
223 126 10 87 
Multiple Acquirers: 2nd or Afore Deals 0.79%' 0.49%" 1.92% 1.15% a 
1490 854 36 600 
Mean Differences in CARs [-Z +2] of 
Multiple Acquirers-Ist Deals minus 0.93% 0.22% 0.92% 1.91% 
Multiple Acquirers-2nd or Afore Deals (0.048) (0.663) (0.812) (0.026) 
Multiple Acquirers: 3rd or Afore Deals 0.69%" 0.39%b 2.46% 1.00%2 
1259 722 30 507 
Mean Differences in CARs [-2, +21 of 
Multiple Acquirers-Ist Deals minus 1.03% 0.32% 0.38% 2.06% 
Multiple Acquirers-3rd or Afore Deals (0.030) (0.536) (0.923) (0.018) 
Multiple Acquirers: 41h or Afore Deals 0.63%' 0.35%' 2.69% 0.89%a 
1028 589 25 414 
Mean Differences - in CA Rs [-2, +21 of 
Multiple Acquirers-Ist Deals minus 1.09% 0.36% 0.15% 2.17% 
Multiple Acquirers-41h or More Deals (0.024) (0.493) (0.971) (0.014) 
Multiple Acquirers: 5th or More Deals 0.49% b 0.31% 3.22% 0.57% 
777 439 19 319 
Mean Differences in CARs 1-2, +21 of 
Multiple Acquirers-Ist Deals minus 1.23% 0.40% -0.38% 2.49% 
Multiple Acquirers-5th or More Deals (0.013) (0.459) (0.928) (0.006) 
Chapter 4 Do Overconfident Acquirers Gain Less from Acquisitions? 
Table 4.11. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Casual Vs Multiple Acquirers by 
their Corporate Governance 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of casual and multiple bidders acquiring private 
firms over a period between 1990 and 2000 (fraction of our sample). Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated 
for the five days [-2, +2] around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. Abnormal Returns are estimated 
using a modified markct-adjustcd model: 
AR, = R,, - R., 
where R,, is the Return on firm i and R, is the Value Weighed Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Multiple acquirers are defined 
as bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include 
the first bid of multiple bidders. Strong corporate governance is defined as the governance of the companies 
whose number of directors (executives and non-executives) is between 4 and 12. The rest companies are defined 
as firms with weak corporate governance. Panel A represents bids of firms with weak corporate governance and 
Panel B bids of firms with strong corporate governance respectively. The results are further divided by the 
method of payment. Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are 
defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of 
both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. The number of bids is 
reported below the mean. The last rows of each panel (A and B) represent the differences in mean short-run 
CARs. P-values are provided in parenthesis. " Denotes significance at the 1% level; b Denotes significance at the 
5% level; ' Denotes significance at the 10% level 
All Cash Stock Combo 
Panel A: Weak Corporate Governance 
Casual Bidders 1.09%a 1.33%' 2.27% 0.64% 
415 238 14 163 
Multiple Bidders 0.47% 0.21% 0.02% 0.94% 
190 118 2 70 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.62% 1.12% 2.25% -0.30% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.299) (0.121) (0.407) (0.778) 
Panel B: Strong Corporate Governance 
Casual Bidders 1.85V 1.51%* 3.29%' 2.07%8 
994 472 39 483 
Multiple Bidders 1.36%" 0.65%c 1.28% 2.06%a 
389 190 6 193 
Mean Differences in 
CARs 1-2, +21 of Casual 0.49% 0.86% 2.01% 0.01% 
minus Multiple Bidders (0.265) (0.062) (0.366) (0.993) 
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Table 4.12. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses of Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns of Casual Vs, Multiple Acquirers 
The table presents ordinary least squares regression of the bidder's five-day cumulative abnormal return on the 
following variables. All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
Multiple acquirers are defined as bidders acquiring five or more targets within a 3-year period. All others are 
casual bidders that also include the first bid of multiple bidders. In Panel A, the first two dummy variables are 
defined as whether the target is acquired with cash and whether the target is acquired with stock. Cash offers 
include cash only and mixtures of cash and debt and stock offers include common stock. The remainder of the 
dummy variables are defined as whether the target is domestic (UK company), whether the bidder and target are 
in different industry, whether the bidder has high debt capacity, and whether the bid is the fifth or higher bid (for 
multiple bidders only). Panel B contains the same variables to panel A plus a dummy variable defined as 
whether the bidder is frequent acquirer. The Q variable, the log of the relative size of the target and the log of the 
target's size are also included in the regression. The Q ratio is calculated one month before the acquisition 
announcement date and is the product of the Market Value divided by the net book value. The relative size of the 
target is the natural log of target deal value, as reported by SDC, divided by acquirer market value as of the 
month before the announcement date. P-values are reported in brackets. 
Panel A Dependent variables Casual Bidders 
(CB) 
Multiple Bidders 
(MB) 
Intercept 0.023 0.010 
[0.0001 [0.257] 
Dummy =1 If Target is Acquired with Cash and Debt -0.006 -0.006 
[0.1831 [0.2811 
Dummy -I If Target is Acquired with Common Stock 0.049 -0.013 
[0.000] [0.592] 
Dummy -I If Target is Domestic -0.005 0.005 
[0.331] [0.383] 
Dummy -I If Target and Bidder are in Different Industry 0.004 -0.002 
[0.386] [0.765] 
Dummy =I If Bidder has High Debt Capacity -0.005 -0.002 
[0.319] [0.713] 
Dummy -I If Fifth or Higher Bid -0.014 
[0.017] 
Q 0.000 0.000 
[0.117] [0.205] 
Log of Relative Size 0.051 0.049 
[0.000] [0.551] 
Log of Target Size -0.000 0.004 
[0.979] [0.052] 
F-Statistic 7.428 1.54 
[0.000] [0.1301 
N 1585 637 
RI 3.6% 2.2% 
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Table 4.13- Continued 
Panel B Dependent variables All Bidders (CB+MB) 
Intercept 0.020 
[0.000] 
Dummy =I If Bidder is Multiple Acquirer -0.009 
[0.018] 
Dummy =I If Target is Acquired with Cash and Debt -0.008 
[0.032] 
Dummy =I If Target is Acquired with Common Stock 0.050 
[0.0001 
Dummy =I If Target is Domestic -0.001 
[0.827] 
Dummy =I If Target and Bidder are in Different Industry 0.002 
[0.616] 
Dummy =I If Bidder has High Debt Capacity 0.000 
[0.663] 
Q 0.000 
[0.0721 
Log of Relative Size 0.002 
[0.521] 
Log of Target Size 0.000 
[0.483] 
F-Statistic 5.279 
[0.000] 
N 2271 
R2 2.1% 
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Table 4.13. Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression of Long-Run Stock Returns using 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios of casual and multiple acquirers 
according to the Fama and French 3-factor model. The sample of the overall portfolio for casual (multiple) 
bidders consists of 3378 (1336), 3206 (1269) and 2986 (1180) successful takeover bids that took place over the 
period 1980-2002 (for 1,2 and 3-year analysis respectively) as identified from the Securities Data Corporation's 
(SDQ Global Financing database. Multiple acquirers are defined as bidders acquiring five or more targets 
within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include the first bid of multiple bidders. Calendar 
time regressions are further performed on the basis of the method of payment used in the transaction (Cash, 
Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and 
debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely in common stock. Combination financing comprises 
offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, and methods classified as "other" by SDC. 
Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement day of the successful takeover and remain for 12,24 and 36 
months respectively. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover. 
We estimate the calendar-time return under the Farna-French 3-factor model with the following regression: 
RPI - Rft = a, + fli (R., - Rfi )+s, SMB, + h, HML, + c,, 
The numbers in percentage represent the reported FF ct, which is the average of the individual, firm- specific 
intercepts. The t-statistics are calculated on the basis of Andrews' (1991) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors. The number of firms is reported below the monthly average abnormal returns. 
Casual Bidders (CB) 
I year 2 years 3 years 
All -0.71%' -0.88%8 -0.93%" 
3378 3206 2986 
Cash -0.62%* -0.72%' -0.64% a 
1885 1786 1703 
Stock 1.46% -2.01%* -2.18% 
134 125 118 
Combo 0.75%" -1.07%a -1.20%" 
1359 1295 1165 
Multiple Bidders (MB) 
I year 2 years 3 years 
All -0.87%" -1.28%' - 1.42% 
1336 1269 1180 
Cash -0.60%' - 1.00% a -1.15%' 
760 725 689 
Stock -1.87% -1.6 
I%b 
-1.67%a 
32 30 28 
Combo -0.86%' - 1.3 8% -1.62%" 
544 514 463 
Chapter 4 Do Overconfident Acquirers Gain Less from Acquisitions? 
Table 4.14. Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression of Long-Run Stock Returns by the 
Target Origin using Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
This table presents the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to merger portfolios of casual and multiple acquirers 
according to the Fama and French Mactor model. The sample consists of successful takeover bids that took 
place over the period 1980-2002 (for 1,2 and 3-year analysis respectively) as identified from the Securities Data 
Corporation's (SDC) Global Financing database. Multiple acquirers are defined as bidders acquiring five or 
more targets within a 3-year period. All others are casual bidders that also include the first bid of multiple 
bidders. Calendar time regressions are performed on the basis of the target origin (domestic/foreign) and further 
the method of payment used in the transaction (Cash, Stock, Combination of Cash and Stock). Cash financing 
includes transactions made solely in cash, or cash and debt. Stock offers are defined as transactions made solely 
in common stock. Combination financing comprises offers consisting of both cash and stock and/or convertibles, 
and methods classified as "other by SDC. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement day of the 
successful takeover and remain for 12,24 and 36 months respectively. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to 
include firms that have just completed a takeover. We estimate the calendar-time return under the Fama-French 
3-factor model with the following regression: 
RIv - Rfi = ai +A(R, l - 
Rfi )+S, SMB, + h, HML, + --il 
The numbers in percentage represent the reported FF cc, which is the average of the individual, firm-specific 
intercepts. The t-statistics are calculated on the basis of Andrews' (199 1) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors. The number of firms is reported below the monthly average abnormal returns. 
Panel A: Domestic Bids Casual Bidders (CB) 
I year 2 years 3 years 
All -0.96%' - 1.16% -1.23%* 
2404 2284 2139 
Cash -0.81%" -0.93%" -0.97%* 
1284 1216 1166 
Stock - 1.24% 
b 
-2.04% -2.21%' 
112 105 100 
Combo -1.09%" -1.51%& -1.64%& 
1008 963 873 
Multiple Bidders (MB) 
I year 2 years 3 years 
All -0.95%a -1.38%a -1.41%a 
849 803 748 
Cash -0.66%b -1.05%" -1.05%a 
462 439 423 
Stock -2.87%r -1.65%c -1.50%b 
26 25 23 
Combo -0.65%' - 1.22% -1.45%8 
361 339 302 
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Table 4.15- Continued 
Panel B: Foreign Bids Casual Bidders (CB) 
I year 2 years 3 years 
All -0.60%' -0.76%' -0.82%* 
974 922 847 
Cash -0.66%' -0.74%' -0.72%' 
601 570 537 
Stock -1.77% -3.20% -2.3 0% 
b 
22 20 18 
Combo -0.86% -0.94%' -1.03%" 
351 332 292 
Multiple Bidders (M 
I year 2 years 3 years 
All .0.70% 
b 
-1.01%a -1.37%" 
487 466 432 
Cash -0.41% -0.76% -1.12%* 
298 286 266 
Stock -0.10% -1.03% -1.62% 
6 5 5 
Combo -1.05%b -1.25%* -1.70%* 
183 175 161 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions, Implications and Proposals for Future 
Investigation 
5.1. Conclusions 
This thesis addresses several gaps that exist-on the factors driving acquiring firms' stock 
performance. It explicitly examines the inter-relation of standard performance 
determinants identified in the literature and the effects of important characteristics of the 
merger market such as frequent acquisitions, merger valuations and managerial 
overconfidence. Such task is distinctively important since the latter characteristics are 
believed to play a foremost role in shaping wealth effects of acquiring firms. Indeed our 
findings confirm their importance and thus create new avenues for future investigation. 
Firstly, this thesis documents empirical evidence on shareholders' wealth effects of UK 
public firms involved in acquisitions of targets with different ownership status and using 
alternative methods of payment. This study is the first empirical work that examines the 
performance of multiple bidders for the UK, which constitute a large proportion of the 
total UK merger market, offering an insight into their unique behaviour. Secondly, this 
thesis is the first UK study that provides empirical evidence on whether market valuations 
I 
influence acquirer's returns. Further, this thesis examines the performance of the specific 
category of frequent bidders and compares it to the performance of casual bidding firms. 
Such an examination offers the opportunity to provide a behavioural explanation of 
bidders' returns. More specifically we suggest that overconfidence drives high managerial 
acquisitiveness which serves as a new measurement of this behavioural concept. Finally, 
we report empirical evidence on unlisted acquisitions, which are major components of the 
global merger activity; however, very few studies have been launched on this issue. 
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We initially (chapter 2) used a sample of UK frequent acquirers (i. e. acquirers that made 
many domestic and foreign acquisitions within a very short period of time) to control for 
(much oo the information contained surrounding the acquisition announcement. We found 
that bidders acquiring private firms or subsidiaries realized significantly positive returns 
for the five-day period around the event announcement, while acquisitions of public firms 
generated significant losses for the acquiring firm's shareholders, irrespective of the 
method of payment used in the transaction (cash or stock). For private targets and 
subsidiaries, bidders gained when they used cash and mixed form of financing, while they 
exhibited insignificant returns for stock acquisitions. We subsequently examined bidder 
returns on the basis of the relative size of the target to the bidder. We found that the larger 
the target to the bidder, the larger the abnormal returns obtained. All these patterns are 
similar to the US study of Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) who employed a similar 
research design (i. e. the use of multiple bidders' sample) to ours. 
Further, we proceeded to a number of several robustness checks to identify whether these 
results stand after controlling for various characteristics. We controlled for target origin 
(domestic/foreign targets), as it could be the case that the inclusion of foreign targets 
contaminates our results. However, we obtained similar return patterns to the ones 
displayed in our main analysis. We then examined whether diversifying/non-diversifying 
acquisitions alter our results. We reported that, irrespective of the target belonging to the 
same industry with the bidder or not, our results mirror our main findings. Finally, we 
examined whether our patterns hold when we control for bidders' book-to-market ratio. 
Such an analysis was also used in order to further confirm the robustness of our initial 
hypothesis (i. e. the research design we follow allows us to control for much of the 
information about bidder characteristics contained in the returns at the acquisition 
253 
Chapter 5 Conclusions, Implications and Proposals for Future Investigation 
announcement). On the whole, the results enhanced our assumption that announcement 
market returns are not affected by bidders' characteristics and also that the general patterns 
stand when we control for book-to-market ratio. 
Nevertheless, the picture we drew when we proceeded to a long-run examination of bidder 
returns was completely opposite. In particular, we obtained negative abnormal returns 
irrespective of the target ownership status or the method of payment used in the 
transaction. Such a finding indicates that the market probably overreacts to acquisitions of 
private firms and/or subsidiaries and therefore no fruitful conclusion can be generalized 
with regards to the type of target acquired and the profits enjoyed by bidders' shareholders. 
We then (chapter 3) explored some potential factors for the return patterns obtained. More 
specifically, we investigated whether market conditions (stock market valuations and/or 
merger activity) drive the performance of bidding firms. According to the literature there is 
a link between high market valuations and intensive merger activity. Therefore, we raised 
the question whether stock prices or merger waves determine to an extent bidder returns. 
We used a sample of UK domestic acquisitions and classify the market into high-, neutral- 
or low-valuation periods based on the P/E ratio of the TOTMKUK index and for 
robustness reasons on the TOTMKUK index itself. In addition, we examined the share 
price performance of acquiring firms according to the level of merger activity they 
experienced. We classified each month as a hot or cold merger month respectively, after 
ranking each month according to the number of mergers, and identifying whether this 
month lies in the top or bottom 30% quartile with the largest or smallest number of 
mergers respectively. 
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We found that stock market valuations are indeed a significant deterministic factor of the 
bidder performance experienced. Overall, we found quantitatively similar patterns to the 
ones obtain in chapter 2. However, when we examined bidder performance on the basis of 
market valuations, we obtained positive and significant abnormal returns in high-valuation 
periods, while insignificantly positive CARs are generated during low-valuations periods. 
We further checked whether the employment of a different proxy (TOTMKUK index 
itself) for market classification and/or different event window (-20, +20) alter our return 
patterns. We reported, however, that our results are robust when different market valuation 
proxy and/or event window are applied. Such a finding indicates that the market is likely to 
reward acquisitions undertaken during an upward market, while it appears indifferent to 
acquisitions initiated when stock prices are low. In addition, when merger activity was 
taken into account, cold markets (i. e. markets with a small number of successful 
acquisitions) were found to lead to larger on average positive abnormal returns than hot 
markets, suggesting that acquirers are more cautious. Finally, we explored the 
interrelationships between different states of stock market valuation and merger activity 
and we identified larger positive abnormal returns during high valuation periods 
irrespective of the number of mergers undertaken. Consequently, we argued that stock 
prices drive performance of bidding firms, although there is a link with merger activity. 
We further investigated long-run performance of acquisitions carried out during different 
valuation periods. In general, the returns we obtained were significantly negative; 
however, we found that low-valuation bidders generate on average less loss than high- 
valuation bidders even when method of payment and target ownership status are taken into 
consideration. Such a result indicates that the market initially rewards the initiatives of 
high-valuation acquirers to conduct mergers during periods that all the stock prices are in 
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general above their fundamental values, but realizes its fault though time and corrects it. In 
contrast, for low-valuation acquisitions the market is cautious initially but it learns over 
time and believes that such mergers are likely to have better potential. In addition, we 
provided evidence, by examining six-month pre-event performance of bidding firms, that 
our results are not just a manifestation of long-run reversals. Finally, we suggested that 
herding behaviour of managers is likely to be a potential explanation for the worse long- 
run performance of high-valuation bidders versus low-valuation acquirers. 
Lastly (chapter 4), we investigated whether managerial psychological biases (namely 
overconfidence) are responsible for the difference in magnitude of results we obtain 
between casual bidders and multiple bidders. The main idea behind the intuition of 
overconfidence is that managers believe that their abilities are better compared to other 
managers and overestimate the synergies they can obtain through a merger. We define 
overconfident managers as those that make many acquisitions (i. e. frequent acquirers) 
within a short time interval (i. e. five or more bids within a three-year period). 
We suggested that overconfident bidders conduct a large number of acquisitions in a small 
period of time while overconfidence traits lead to lower abnormal returns. Moreover, we 
provided evidence that overconfident CEOs exhibit worse performance than rational 
bidders after controlling for several effects (i. e. method of payment, target origin, core 
industry, M/B value, relative size). Further, we preceded to several robustness checks to 
provide evidence that various components that, according to the literature, characterize 
overconfidence, at the same time characterize the behaviour of frequent bidders. This is 
because, one could argue, the dynamic acquisitiveness of frequent acquirers could be 
related to a number of reasons other than overconfidence. We showed that overconfident 
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managers exhibit a proportionally higher debt capacity and strongly prefer cash or debt- 
financed mergers to stock deals. In addition, we reported that overconfident managers 
favour to conduct diversifying acquisitions. 
Moreover, we presented that frequent acquirers are likely to be engaged in overinvestment 
procedures prior to an acquisition initiation, leading them to lower abnormal returns. 
Finally, firms making many acquisitions are likely to be governed by a less efficient board 
of directors. Therefore, we suggested that corporations should make sure that they have 
independent directors on the board, so that these directors will have the willingness to take 
a view that contrasts with the CEO when this serves the interests of the firm's 
shareholders. 
5.2. Suggestions for Future Research 
In chapter 2 we found that acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries increase the 
wealth gains of bidding finns' shareholders; however, in the long run such acquisitions 
lead to negative abnormal returns. This finding is really interesting and raises a number of 
questions: Why when we examine several short periods individually we obtain positive 
abnormal returns, but when we add up these small periods and create a total period of one, 
two or three years for investigation we obtain negative abnormal returns? The importance 
of this question increases when we take into consideration the fact that private firms and 
subsidiaries are often sold at a discount and therefore overpricing should not be the case 
for such underperformance. How can we solve this puzzle? Is it just a result we obtained 
due to methodological problems or does some other answer, more convincing, lie behind 
this puzzle? We believe that it would be interesting to explore the above questions and 
provide some plausible explanations. 
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In chapter 4 we suggested that overconfidence is a potential factor that determines the 
corporate decisions of some managers and this overconfidence 'pushes' them to undertake 
a large number of merger projects. Of course overconfidence is not the only behavioural 
aspect that may influence managerial decisions. Consequently: Arc there any other 
behavioural or psychological biases that lie behind merger initiations? For example, are 
managers infected by representativeness? Are managers willing to change their opinion in 
the face of new information? In other words, are they infected by conservatism? Do they 
appear to engage in "narrow framing"? Does the managerial decision of conducting a 
merger entail ambiguity aversion? All these concepts are borrowed from the behavioural 
finance literature and are likely to offer some interesting interpretations to managerial 
motivation to initiate merger projects. 
In chapter 3 we examined the performance of bidding firms on the basis of market 
valuations while in chapter 4 we studied, as discussed above, the link between managerial 
overconfidence and corporate acquisitions. Some other interesting questions arise: Is a 
high market valuation correlated with a high degree of managerial overconfidence? Do we 
expect that booming periods are related to conductions of large number of acquisitions, 
product of managerial overconfidence? And how does this affect bidders' performance? 
The answers to these questions appear to promise very useful conclusions. 
Finally, in chapters 2 and 4 we reported lower abnormal returns of a unique multiple 
bidder in later deals (third and higher or fifth and higher) compared to first deals. This 
result may be related to the recently well-known concept of divergence of opinion among 
investors. In particular, in the first deals investors have differences in opinion with regards 
to the synergies of a potential merger and this increases the returns generated by the 
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bidder. However, as this specific bidder proceeds to a number of many acquisition 
attempts, investors are aware of the results of a merger from previous deals by the same 
bidder and therefore small discrepancies in opinion occur. This results in lower returns. 
We suggest that this phenomenon of a potential link between divergence of opinion and 
lower abnormal returns in later deals demands a thorough further investigation. 
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